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The Qaraqash List

Dr. Elise Anderson

Uyghur Human Rights Project

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This testimony describes and assesses the significance of the Qaraqash (Karakax) List, a database detailing personal information about 311 detainees in a subdistrict of Qaraqash county, Hotan, based on a report written and published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project in February 2020.

METHODS OF RESEARCH EMPLOYED

The testimony is based on a report titled “Ideological Transformation: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” which describes and analyzes the significance of a leaked database from Qaraqash county, Hotan prefecture, East Turkistan.¹ UHRP obtained the document, which has come to be known widely as the “Qaraqash List” (alt. “Karakax List”), from Uyghur exile Abduweli Ayup, who received the document directly from Asiye Abdulaheb after a government employee in the Uyghur region leaked it to her as part of the same set of documents now known as the China Cables.²

Because the spreadsheet had been converted into a PDF file prior to our viewing it, we were unable to use metadata to verify its authenticity and instead used the contents of the document itself to do so. UHRP, along with other researchers who have reviewed and written about this document, felt confident in the spreadsheet’s authenticity based on: (1) linguistic cues in the document, including personal naming conventions particular to Uyghurs in the Hotan region; (2) factual information which corroborates details such as the ongoing policies in the region and the names of internment facilities in Qaraqash; (3) personal information in the database, including Chinese identification numbers, which we cross-checked to assess

¹ Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, <https://uhrp.org/report/ideological-transformation-records-mass-detention-qaraqash-hotan-html/>. Several other reports about the Qaraqash List were also published on the same day. See Adrian Zenz, “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang,” *Journal of Political Risk* 8 (2), February 2020, <https://www.jpolarisk.com/karakax/>; Ivan Watson and Ben Westcott, “Watched, judged, detained: Leaked Chinese government records reveal detailed surveillance reports on Uyghur families and Beijing’s justification for mass detentions,” *CNN*, February 2020, <https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2020/02/asia/xinjiang-china-karakax-document-intl-hnk/>.

² The China Cables are a batch of classified Chinese-government documents including a telegram, four bulletins, and a court document, which in sum give insight into the workings of the XUAR internment camp system and the surveillance system that is linked to it. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals for Mass Internment and Arrest by Algorithm,” *International Consortium of Investigative Journalists*, November 24, 2019, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/>. See also ICIJ, “The China Cables,” November 2019, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/>.

authenticity; (4) comparison to other government documents we have reviewed; and (5) discussion with experts, who agreed that the document appeared authentic.³

In the days that followed the publication of the Qaraqash List, Chinese state media predictably claimed that the list was inauthentic. However, in its reporting, *China Daily* inadvertently confirmed the authenticity of the document in a video featuring an individual whose information appeared on the Qaraqash List.⁴ Neither UHRP nor any other researchers working with the document had made this individual's information public in our reporting or in redacted excerpts prepared by UHRP. That Chinese state media knew the individual was on the list suggests that the list was authentic and already in the possession of a government and/or media representative.

We conducted a close reading and translation of the entire spreadsheet, which is titled “Internees related to ‘unreturned’ persons” (出境未归人员亲属送培学员), in order to determine its contents and significance. The spreadsheet contains detailed information in Mandarin about the family, social, and religious circles of a subset of detainees from throughout Qaraqash county, all of whom are 1) related to at least one person who is outside China and 2) under the jurisdiction of eight neighborhood offices in the Bostan subdistrict of the Qaraqash county seat. The document presents data on detainees and the members of their familial, social, and religious circles through information detailed in a series of cells including the following:

a. Entry numbers. Each entry begins with a unique number in numerical order between 1 and 667. Many detainees have repeat entries in the document, meaning that the total number of detainees listed in the document, 311, is lower than 667.

b. Facility of detention. The document refers to four detention centers: the No. 1 Training Center (第一培训中心), No. 2 Training Center (第二培训中心), No. 3 Training Center (第三培训中心), and No. 4 Training Center (第四培训中心). The document also lists a “health-care area” (医护区); it is unclear whether this area is located at one of the camps or is a separate facility in its own right.

c. Date interned. The document lists some (but not all) detainees' dates of internment. The entries stretch from April and May 2017 to October 28, 2018. We know that the document incorporates periodic new information on old cases, but the latest date which appears in the document is March 8, 2019, meaning either that it was obtained and leaked

³ For a detailed description of how another scholar verified the spreadsheet and its contents, see Zenz, “The Karakax List.”

⁴ China Daily (@ChinaDaily), “‘Don't ruin my good life and willfully interfere in anything of us, I am living a good life,’ said Bulitiji Balati, one of the people on Adrian Zenz's ‘Karakax List,’” Twitter, February 23, 2020, <https://twitter.com/ChinaDaily/status/1231481315901394945>.

at that time or that there were simply no more versions of the document after this date. Adrian Zenz dates the spreadsheet to sometime before late June 2019.⁵

d. Detainee name. This cell lists each detainee first and last names, transliterated into Chinese characters from their original Uyghur versions.

e. ID number. This cell lists each detainee's 18-digit Chinese national ID number. All IDs belonging to the 311 detainees whose information is provided in the database begin with the digits 653222, signifying that the individuals were born in Qaraqash county.⁶

f. Responsible subdistrict office. Each detainee listed in the document falls under the administration of the Bostan subdistrict office. The Bostan subdistrict is centered on an area in the northeastern corner of the Qaraqash administrative center. In Chinese administrative governance, a subdistrict (街道) is a political-administrative designation given to township-size units attached to a larger urban area, as opposed to discrete townships or towns. Each subdistrict has its own bureaucratic management office, which we often render in English as the “subdistrict office” (街道办 or 街道办事处).

g. Responsible neighborhood office. This cell notes the neighborhood and related administrative office responsible for each detainee. All eight neighborhoods in Bostan subdistrict appear throughout the spreadsheet: Ümid (希望), Yipbazar (依甫巴扎), Yuhua (玉华), Shadliq (夏特勒克), Bostan (波斯坦), Yengisheher (英协海尔), Yuhe (玉河), and Üzüm (玉祖木).

h. Detainee address. Most of the entries list addresses. The document is unclear as to whether these addresses are those of each detainee's household registration.

i. Reason(s) for detention. Information in this column records the reason(s) for each detainee's detention.

j. Management level. A number of entries include notes about the “management level,” including “normal” (普), “strict” (严), or “maximum” (强) management. We interpret the “management level” to refer to the degree of control and surveillance given by the authorities to detainees.

⁵ Zenz, “The Karakax List,” section 1.3.

⁶ In his own report on the document, Dr. Adrian Zenz notes that a total of 2,802 adult persons and hundreds of minors appear in the list. He further writes, “Of these 2,802 [adults], 1,432 are shown with their full names and ID numbers, and 1,370 only by name, age, and often address and/or occupation. Of those with ID numbers, all have IDs from Xinjiang, 1,405 have IDs from Hotan Prefecture, and 1,372 have IDs from Karakax [sic] County.” See Adrian Zenz, “The Karakax List.”

k. “Three circles.” This is the most extensive column of the document. In it, the compilers have recorded detailed information about individuals (and in some cases, cultural and religious practices) connected to detainees in three categories: 1) immediate and extended family, 2) friends and neighbors, and 3) religious circle. Entries in this column include detailed information about individuals who are associated with each of the 311 detainees, such as their name, ethnicity, sex, ID number, age, employment place/status, and behavior status (e.g., “good behavior,” “ok behavior,” etc.). Other information included in some but not all entries includes detention status and any relevant prior criminal charges and/or sentence lengths for these associated individuals. Many entries also make note of the use of what we have translated as “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), which appears to be a method authorities are using to gather and analyze data.⁷

l. Evaluation. This column assesses whether a particular detainee should remain in internment or be released. In several cases, the evaluation appears not in the evaluation column but instead in the “three circles” column. Many, though not all, of the evaluations are marked with language identifying the employees of the subdistrict or neighborhood office as the recorders/compilers of this information, e.g., “A collision analysis carried out by subdistrict office community officials found [...]”

Our team also cross-referenced names and ID numbers to determine the number of 311 detainees represented in the document, which contains a total of 667 entries. In addition, we combed through the document to collate statistics about the camps where the detainees were held, the reasons given for their detentions, and the *shequ* officials’ judgments about the detainees’ status; we also utilized the available data to identify important demographic and other trends. Additionally, we analyzed the degree to which the list appeared to have been integrated with other aspects of security and surveillance systems used to enact Party-state policies in the region, including the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), Becoming Family program, and the forced labor system, among others. (Please see the [full UHRP report](#) for a more detailed discussion of the document’s contents and significance.)

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Uyghurs have been a consistent target of Chinese state repression for decades. The Uyghur homeland, which many Uyghurs long preferred to call by various names including (but not limited to) East Turkistan, only became known as “Xinjiang” (a Mandarin placename meaning “new territory” or “new dominion”) in 1884, when the Qing established loose rule over the land and began using “Xinjiang” in its documents. In 1949, upon the establishment of the People’s

⁷ This “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” appears to be a novel term that warrants future investigation and scrutiny.

Republic of China, the Chinese military invaded and claimed to “peacefully liberate” the Uyghur Region, where the population was roughly 80% Uyghur and 6% Han, an act that many Uyghurs and other indigenous peoples in the region saw as an act of colonization. The region became formally known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 1955.⁸

Uyghurs have complained of unequal treatment under the law and increasingly egregious rights abuses at the hands of the Party-state throughout the decades since the establishment of the PRC, including in the Cultural Revolution (c. 1966–76), from which the region was not spared. Following a brief period of openness in the 1980s, which many Uyghurs remember as a “golden era” when Uyghur community life felt free and full of promise, the state began clamping down on space for a Uyghur civil society. Scholars writing about the region on the basis of both historical and ethnographic research have documented these complaints, identifying broad patterns and trends in state repression. Gardner Bovingdon, for instance, identified a pattern beginning in the ‘90s whereby the Party-state responded with increasingly hardline measures to all expressions of Uyghur discontent, each time pushing back harder than before. In effect, the Party-state sent a message that they would allow no space for Uyghurs to have a civil society or to express dissatisfaction with any aspects of PRC governance.⁹

The pattern identified by Bovingdon provides a useful lens for examining political and other developments in the region throughout the 2000s and 2010s, as the Party-state continued to implement increasingly hardline measures targeted at Uyghurs—a distinctive ethnic and cultural group—and progressively erase the already diminished rights they enjoyed. Meanwhile, in the early 2000s, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) came to provide a further narrative and policy frame for Chinese Party-state treatment of the Uyghurs. As Sean Roberts demonstrates, “terrorism” became pretense for Party-state-led crackdowns on Uyghurs despite a lack of compelling evidence for linkages between Uyghurs and global jihadist movements.¹⁰

The patterns identified by Bovingdon and Roberts intensified further following the events that unfolded on and around July 5, 2009, when a peaceful Uyghur-led demonstration in Ürümchi calling for justice for the Uyghur victims of a Han vigilante mob in Shaoguan devolved into an ethnic riot and show of state force following police intervention.¹¹ The July 2009 events

⁸ Any historical overview is necessarily selective and limited in scope; I am painting broad strokes here. For a detailed history of the region, see James Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (2nd edition), New York: Columbia University Press; London: C. Hurst Co., 2021 (originally published 2007).

⁹ Gardner Bovingdon, *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land*, Columbia University Press (New York, NY): 2010.

¹⁰ Sean Roberts, *The War on the Uyghurs: China’s Campaign against Xinjiang’s Muslims*, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ), 2020.

¹¹ The events on and around July 5, 2009, are contested. The Chinese government insists that only 197 people, most of whom were Han, were killed in the violence. International media has repeated this statistic *ad nauseum* and often uncritically. Other documentary evidence, including some collated and analyzed by UHRP, suggests that many more Uyghur deaths occurred on and around July 5, and that thousands of Uyghurs disappeared at the hands of the state in

in Ürümchi marked a watershed moment in the history of the Uyghur Region. State-led surveillance had long existed in the Uyghur Region, as throughout the PRC—often in the form of human informants and record-keeping by means of government-organized units such as the *danwei* (Ch. work unit) as well as the *on a'ile* (Uy. “ten households”), a system whereby neighbors at the village level would be grouped together to spy and inform on one another. But surveillance took a much more sophisticated technological turn following the XUAR authorities’ hard-line response to the events in Ürümchi. In January 2011, the *Associated Press* used statistics from government officials in the XUAR to report that approximately 40,000 high-definition surveillance cameras, which were covered with “riot-proof protective shells,” had been installed throughout the region in the lead-up to the one-year anniversary of the unrest.¹² Meanwhile, policing increased dramatically in the region from 2012 onward, and ultimately went on to reach unprecedented highs in 2016.¹³

The year 2014 proved another watershed in the period immediately preceding the current campaign. That year, XUAR leadership blamed a series of attacks in Ürümchi, Kunming, and elsewhere on Uyghur jihadists. By that Spring, authorities, then under the leadership of Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian,¹⁴ announced two “counter-terrorism” campaigns: a “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism” (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) and simultaneous “People’s War on Terror” (反恐人民战争). The “counter-terrorism” policy of these campaigns included heavily militarized policing and tech-based surveillance alongside a system of grid-based policing and new developments in big-data gathering.¹⁵ In June of that same year, authorities in the autonomous-region rolled out the *bianminka*, or “People’s Convenient Card,” essentially a passbook-style system that ultimately prevented many Uyghurs—particularly those with rural household registrations—from living or traveling outside their place of registration. The *bianminka*, which was not implemented equally among people of different ethnic backgrounds, effectively served an apartheid-style tool that removed poor Uyghur migrants from cities such as Ürümchi and bound them into place in their rural home communities, where they could be more easily monitored and controlled by local officials.¹⁶ In 2015, with the *bianminka*

the days, weeks, and months that followed the initial violence. Many Uyghurs refer to the events as the “Ürümchi Massacre.” See Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Can Anyone Hear Us?: Voices from the 2009 Unrest in Ürümchi,” July 1, 2010, <https://uhrp.org/report/can-anyone-hear-us-voices-2009-unrest-urumchi/>.

¹² Associated Press, “China puts Urumqi under ‘full surveillance’,” printed in *The Guardian*, January 25, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/25/china-urumqi-under-full-surveillance>.

¹³ Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State,” *China Brief* 17 (4), Jamestown Foundation, March 14, 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/>.

¹⁴ Party leadership replaced Wang Lequan with Zhang Chunxian after dissatisfaction with how Wang handled the events of July 2009.

¹⁵ Julia Famularo, “‘Fighting the Enemy with Fists and Daggers’: The Chinese Communist Party’s Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” in *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*, ed. Michael Clarke (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 2018.

¹⁶ While the adoption of the *bianminka* system was one of the most significant events in the Uyghur Region in 2014, it went under-reported in the international press and still has yet to receive full scrutiny from scholars and analysts for its role in the events that immediately preceded the mass internment campaign of 2017 and current human-rights

policy still restricting the movement of many people, regional authorities briefly relaxed formerly stringent passport application policies for Uyghurs, whom they had long discriminated against through routine passport denials. As a result, thousands of Uyghurs went through the process of applying for passports, the application for which required they submit biometric data to the authorities.¹⁷ Sean Roberts speculates that this period of relaxed passport applications for Uyghurs might have been intended for the purposes of an early mass biometric data-gathering drive, as the passport application process included submitting voice samples, DNA, and 3D images.¹⁸ In 2017, authorities throughout the region went on to gather biometric data on a massive scale through a “free physical examinations for all” program.¹⁹

In May 2016, officials announced that the *bianminka* system would be phased out, likely in anticipation of Chen Quanguo’s appointment as XUAR Party Secretary on August 29 of that year.²⁰ Chen’s appointment would prove another watershed moment in the region’s history. Shortly after Chen’s appointment as Party Secretary, XUAR authorities continued to expand the existing security and surveillance apparatus in the region. Adrian Zenz and James Leibold found that in 2016 alone, the XUAR authorities advertised more than 31,687 police jobs, many of them third-tier contract positions for police assistants. The number of advertised jobs account for an increase of more than three times the number of jobs advertised in the previous year.²¹ In 2016 the authorities also began a program of human surveillance called “Becoming Family” (结对认亲), a new iteration of the *fanghuiju* (访惠聚) program initiated in 2014 to “send down” cadres to visit and surveil Uyghurs in rural townships and villages; they went on to initiate a third wave of “relatives” visits in 2017. By late 2018, more than 1 million individuals who call themselves “family members,” most of whom are Han, had been sent into Uyghurs’ homes to spy and report on the families.²² At some point in this period (c. 2016–17), authorities also began using a policing app known as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (一体化联合作战平台), or

crisis. See “The Race Card,” *Economist*, September 3, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/china/2016/09/03/the-race-card> and Mercy A. Kuo, “Uyghur Biodata Collection in China: Insights from Darren Byler,” *The Diplomat*, December 28, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/uyghur-biodata-collection-in-china/>.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch. “China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang,” November 21, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/22/china-passports-arbitrarily-recalled-xinjiang>.

¹⁸ See Roberts, *China’s War on the Uyghurs*, pp. 186–87.

¹⁹ Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions: Private Information Gathered by Police, Under Guise of Public Health Program,” December 13, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>.

²⁰ “The Race Card,” *Economist*.

²¹ Zenz and Leibold, “Xinjiang’s Rapidly Evolving Security State.”

²² Darren Byler, “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes. Here’s What They Think They’re Doing,” *China File*, October 24, 2018, <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang>; see also HRW, “China’s Algorithms of Repression.” No recently published source gives an updated figure for the number of cadres who are currently participating in the “Becoming Family” program, or for the total number of participants over time. However, Professor Timothy Grose, an expert on the region, continues to find first-hand evidence of Becoming Family and other surveillance efforts from Chinese-government websites and social media, which he then shares on his Twitter account (<https://twitter.com/@timothyagrose>).

IJOP, a predictive policing app that collects a vast array of microdata, including such details as electricity use and ownership of exercise equipment, to build a composite picture of individuals.²³ The collated information is leveraged to determine who is a “threat” to the Party-state and, as a result, who should be detained, interned, and possibly even imprisoned.²⁴

The Chinese Party-state has been surveilling and monitoring Uyghurs in the Uyghur Region for decades. From the start of a new securitization push following the events of July 2009 in Ürümqi into the campaign of mass detention that began shortly after Chen Quanguo’s appointment to the role of Party Secretary in 2016, the Party-state has utilized new developments in big-data gathering and surveillance technologies to build a totalizing surveillance state with key features that include a vast policing network, surveillance cameras, checkpoints, apps, and programs of neighborhood-level human surveillance. It is in this context that the Qaraqash List was compiled. The spreadsheet was remarkable at the time it was leaked to the international press because it gave observers the first granular-level view of the individuals affected by the mass internment campaign. The list also shed light on the policies being implemented across the region, which utilize a sophisticated technological infrastructure alongside clumsier, more error-ridden forms of human surveillance to gather and store massive amounts of data allowing representative of the government to recast normal, everyday cultural and religious behaviors as “suspicious” and even “criminal.”

Key takeaways and implications of the Qaraqash List, along with a subsequent leaked list known as the “Aksu List,” include the following:


- Evidence for linkages between the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) and the information gathered and stored on individual Uyghurs at the subdistrict and neighborhood levels of geopolitical administration in the Uyghur Region;
- Linkages between this information and other government policies and tools, including the Becoming Family program and the program of forced labor;
- The scope and intent of data-gathering, and the direct relationships between that data and various forms of repression playing out in the Uyghur Region today;
- The role of guilt-by-association in Chinese Party-state repression of Uyghurs; and
- Evidence that the Party-state has effectively criminalized everyday life as it restructures Uyghur society from the ground up.

²³ Writing about the IJOP is unclear about the time when the technology was developed and rolled out for use in the region.

²⁴ Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App,” May 1, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>.

I will be glad to discuss these points, as well as answer any questions regarding factual evidence for core crimes and the PRC response to Tribunal proceedings and accusations of crimes, in my oral testimony.

“IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION”: RECORDS OF MASS DETENTION FROM QARAQASH, HOTAN



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- A leaked document from Qaraqash provides documentary proof that people in East Turkistan are detained or deemed suspicious for legitimate and reasonable actions verifying the claims of the Uyghur diaspora and internment camp survivors.
- Reasons for suspicion and detention include: “visiting abroad,” “applied for a passport,” “applied for a passport and didn’t leave the country,” “overseas communication,” “prayed regularly,” “religious knowledge comes from grandfather,” or “had a beard.”
- Local officials decide and record these judgments, demonstrating wide-ranging arbitrary power over residents and their entire families.
- The Qaraqash Document confirms local implementation of key features of the intensive and brutal Uyghur crisis, particularly the regular use of the Integrated Joint Operations Platform for surveillance and control, the “Becoming Family” program as a tool for identifying Uyghurs who should be detained, and identification and harsh punishment of “two-faced” officials - those who are deemed to have betrayed the Party after having been appointed to serve it.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report describes and analyzes data from what we have dubbed the Qaraqash Document, a spreadsheet containing information about Uyghur internees in Bostan subdistrict, Qaraqash (also: Karakax) county, Hotan prefecture. The Qaraqash Document, which includes data that appears to have been gathered between 2017 and 2019, contains detailed information about the familial, social, and religious circles of internees under the jurisdiction of the Bostan subdistrict office. The purpose of the document appears to be evaluating whether the internees should remain in or be released from detention.

The Qaraqash Document provides confirmation of the veracity of eyewitness and survivor testimony, especially the reasons for detention, the systematic reliance on guilt by association to deprive individuals of their liberty, and the sorting of detainees into “standard,” “strict,” and “maximum” detention protocols. It also confirms local implementation of key features of the intensive and brutal Uyghur crisis, particularly the regular use of the Integrated Joint Operations Platform for surveillance and control, the “Becoming Family” program as a tool for identifying Uyghurs who should be detained, and identification and harsh punishment of “two-faced” officials (两面性干部), those who are deemed to have betrayed the Party after having been appointed to serve it. There is no reference to any kind of judicial process for the judgments. These are arbitrary judgments recorded by local officials, who exert tremendous arbitrary power over residents and their entire families. The authorities assess and record whether former internees’ moods and thinking are “stable,” (思想 / 情绪稳定), whether they can “recognize their mistakes,” (能够认识错误), have a “sincere attitude of regret” (悔过态度认真), or “present no threat” (没有现实危害).

Details in the Qaraqash Document put a human face on the continuing political terror in East Turkistan. The document provides surprisingly intimate glimpses into the life circumstances and histories of internees. These details also give important, if still limited, insight into how low-level local bureaucrats and other government employees make decisions about who is interned, why, and for how long. Uyghurs are the victims; some Uyghurs, almost certainly, are among the bureaucrats filling up these case records. Details in the Qaraqash Document paint a portrait of extrajudicial internment in the Uyghur region at the hyper-local level, even as an administrative and bureaucratic routine. As its repression tightens, the Chinese party-state continues to conscript large swaths of Uyghur society into its project to transform that society, giving Uyghurs no choice but to be complicit in the repression of their own people. Victims and persecutors are basically neighbors.

The Qaraqash Document contains an alarming message. The Chinese government can mobilize immense human and technological resources to leverage a form of granular repression that demands loyalty to power. The ongoing monitoring means not only do individuals refrain from ordinary behaviors that have been criminalized, but they are also forced to repeatedly and publicly demonstrate their fealty and obedience to the Party and State through participation in loyalty displays. The document notes whether people show “good behavior” by participating in propaganda rallies (发声亮剑), complying with the attendance system (考勤制度), and attending *shequ*-organized concentrated study (集中学习) and speech activities (宣讲活动).

The leak of the Qaraqash Document comes on the heels of two other major document leaks to the Western press over the past several months. In November 2019, the *New York Times* published a report based on a leak of more than 400 pages of internal documents and speeches regarding the campaign in the Uyghur region. Less than one month later, in December 2019, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and numerous international news outlets published a series of articles based on the leak of 24 pages of internal documents from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) officials in the southern Uyghur region. Taken together, these two leaks confirm Party Secretary Xi Jinping’s personal responsibility for orchestrating human-rights crimes against Uyghurs and other Turkic and/or Muslim peoples.

Read in conjunction with the “Xinjiang Papers” leaked to the *New York Times* and the “China Cables” revealed by the ICIJ, the Qaraqash Document illustrates how instructions from policymakers at the tip of political leadership in Beijing are carried out by local officials. Officials are in effect implementing at the grassroots what many observers have called a cultural genocide.¹ The matter-of-fact labeling of ordinary and legitimate thoughts, actions, and beliefs as “suspicious,” which in turn serves as the justification for egregious human rights abuses, is chilling.

- d. Internee name. This cell lists each internee’s first and last names, transliterated into Chinese characters.
- e. ID number. This cell lists each internee’s 18-digit Chinese national ID number. All IDs begin with 653222, signifying a household registration in Qaraqash county.
- f. Responsible subdistrict office. Each internee listed in the document falls under the administration of the Bostan subdistrict office. (We describe the demographic makeup and administrative structure of Bostan, one of four Qaraqash subdistricts, in greater detail in the following section.)
- g. Responsible neighborhood office. This cell notes the neighborhood (and related administrative office) responsible for each internee. All eight neighborhoods in Bostan subdistrict (detailed below) appear throughout the spreadsheet.
- h. Internee address. These addresses are likely those noted in each internee’s household registration.
- i. Reason(s) for detention. Information in this column records the reason(s) for each internee’s detention. (We describe reasons for detention in further detail in Section IV.)
- j. Management level. A number of entries include notes about the “management level” of internees, including “normal” (普), “strict” (严), or “maximum” (强) management.
- k. “Three circles.” This is the most extensive column of the document. In it, the compilers have recorded detailed information about individuals connected to detainees in three categories: 1) immediate and extended family, 2) friends and neighbors, and 3) religious circle. Entries in this column include detailed information about the associated individuals, such as name, ethnic group, sex, ID number, age, employment place/status, and behavior status (e.g., “good behavior,” “ok behavior,” etc.). Other information included in some but not all entries includes detention status and any relevant prior criminal charges and/or sentence lengths. Many entries make note of the use of what we have translated as “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), which appears to be a method authorities are using to gather and analyze data. This “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” appears to be a novel term that warrants future investigation and scrutiny.
- l. Evaluation. This column notes whether a particular internee should remain in internment or be released. In several cases, the evaluation appears not in the evaluation column but instead in the “three circles” column.

The identities of the government employees who compiled the information and created the document are not recorded. However, language in the document, including phrases such as “neighborhood office opinion” (社区意见), suggests that its provenance is the Bostan subdistrict office and the eight neighborhood offices (社区) under its administration.

III. THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS IN BOSTAN, QARAQASH

This document shines important light on the administrative apparatus of extrajudicial and indeed extralegal internment in Bostan, Qaraqash, as well as in the Uyghur region more broadly. Qaraqash county (Uy. Qaraqash nahiyesi, Ch. 墨玉县) is located in the northwest part of Hotan prefecture. The center of Qaraqash, which is one of seven Hotan counties, is located roughly 21 miles (34 kilometers) from Hotan city, the administrative center of the prefecture. Statistics from 2018 list the 2017 population of Qaraqash as 646,202 individuals, 97.73% (or 631,541) of whom were Uyghur and 2.22% (or 14,392) of whom were Han.² The population of Qaraqash grew 12% between 2015 and 2017, and the Uyghur population of the county had the largest growth in that period, from 563,606 in 2015 to 631,541 in 2017.^{3 4}

The Bostan subdistrict is centered on an area in the northeastern corner of the Qaraqash administrative center. In Chinese administrative governance, a subdistrict (街道) is a political-administrative designation given to township-size units attached to a larger urban area, as opposed to discrete townships or towns. Each subdistrict has its own bureaucratic management office, which is often rendered in English as the “subdistrict office” (街道办 or 街道办事处). A single subdistrict such as Bostan consists of multiple smaller neighborhood units known as *shequs* (社区), which are managed by offices referred to colloquially by the same name.⁵ Bostan includes eight such neighborhoods: Umid (希望), Yipbazar (依甫巴扎), Yuhua (玉华), Shadliq (夏特勒克), Bostan (波斯坦), Yengisheher (英协海尔), Yuhe (玉河), and Üzüm (玉祖木).

Publicly available government sources show that changes to the administrative structure of Qaraqash occurred in 2017. In May of that year, the Qaraqash County Party Committee established four new district management committees (区管委会), numbered 1 through 4, to oversee the work of the Chinibagh (其乃巴格街道), Siza (斯孜街道), Bostan (波斯坦街道), and urban (城区) subdistricts.⁶ In June and July 2017, the county party committee further created other district management committees, all overseeing a number of smaller administrative-political units throughout the county. That an administrative restructuring in Qaraqash occurred as the camp system expanded in earnest in 2017 is likely no coincidence. Rather, we believe it is further evidence to suggest that XUAR authorities, as well as government and Party officials reaching up to the highest levels of governance in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), have conceived of their campaign as one that encompasses the entire means of governance and social order in the Uyghur region. The extent to which this restructuring has occurred in other counties and administrative units throughout the region, as well as across the PRC more broadly, warrants future research.

IV. THE DOCUMENT IN NUMBERS

The Qaraqash Document consists of 667 entries describing 311 individuals. While the document describes some individuals in only one entry, it describes others in as many as six. These multiple entries appear to have been written over a period of time, documenting multiple assessments of the behavior and attitudes of the internee and their family members in order to determine whether they should remain in re-education.

It is not possible to determine how large a sample of internees from Qaraqash county this document represents, but analyzing the demographic characteristics and reasons for their internment provides valuable insights into the nature of the internment campaign. Furthermore, the document provides additional solid evidence for many of the previously reported features of the ongoing crackdown in East Turkistan.

Demographic Characteristics: Age and Sex

One of the most striking aspects of the data is that internees are overwhelmingly male, with only 29 women identified among the 311 individuals. Most of the first-person survivor testimonies from former camp internees have been given by Uyghur and Kazakh women, some of whom were allowed to leave China due to marriage to a foreign national. However, this document is additional evidence suggesting that men are far more likely to be sent to the camps. Adrian Zenz has argued that the camps represent only part of a comprehensive program of controlling and reprogramming the Uyghur population, and that women are more likely to be sent directly into coerced labor in factories, bypassing the camps.⁷




Chart 1: Individuals in the Qaraqash Document by Sex

The age of the detainees skews towards the young and middle-aged; as can be seen in Table 1 below, being an “unsafe post ‘80s,’90s or ‘00s person” is one of the most common reasons for internment.

The Camps

The individuals in the document were sent to four different facilities. In many entries the facilities are referred to simply as Centers 1 to 4, while in others they appear with longer names which give additional information about their location. These names are Number One Training Center (Bostan) (第一培训中心[博斯坦库勒]), Number Two Training Center (Train Station) (第二培训中心[火车站]), Number Three Training Center (Old Vocational High School) (第三培训中心[老职高]), and Number Four Training Center (Number Two Middle School) (第四培训中心[二高]). References to other detention centers appear in the “three circles” column. In some entries the individual’s relatives are listed as teachers or detainees in district or area training centers (区培训中心), including district centers number 6, 10 and 12. Several individuals are described as being in a medical facility, and some appear to have been moved between facilities. The detainees were overwhelmingly sent to Center One and Center Two. Center One is a facility constructed for the purpose of serving as an internment camp and located in the southwest corner of Qaraqash county. There is a train station located in the county, but it is not certain where the camp is located.




Chart 2: Number of Individuals in Each Camp

Satellite Images of Identified Camps in Qaraqash County



Center Number 1 (Bostan)



*Qaraqash county train station,
suspected location of Center Number 2*



*Center Number 3
(Old Vocational High School)*



*Center Number 4
(Number Two Middle School)*

Reasons for Detention

The Qaraqash Document is a list of people in the “re-education” system who have relatives overseas, suggesting that overseas relatives are a major reason for suspicion by the government. However, only a small number of entries in the document list overseas relatives as a reason for internment. The numerous other reasons listed in the “reasons” column provide evidence of why the government is sending people to internment. While the language in the document is fairly standardized, in some cases the compilers have used a variety of terms to describe similar reasons. We have grouped those reasons together and listed them below. Some individuals in the document have only one reason for detention listed, while others have multiple reasons, meaning the total number of reasons is higher than the number of individuals described. For a detailed breakdown of the reasons for internment listed in the document, please see Appendix III.

Reason	Number
Birth policy violations	115
Unsafe post 80s, 90s, or 00s person	91
Ex-convict or other past law violation	40
Wore veil/wife wore veil/had beard	33
Applied for passport (and didn't leave the country)	25
Reason related to religious practice	23
International travel	20
Religious extremist thought infection	19
Related to prisoner	12
Movements within China	8
Possessed or watched illegal media	5
Two-faced official	5
Related to someone outside of the country	4
Did not obey <i>shequ</i> personnel	4
Fraudulent marriage certificate	3
Overseas communication	2

Table 1: Reasons for Internment

Family-planning policy violations are the single most common reason for internment in the Qaraqash Document. The document lists the number of excess births each individual is responsible for, also making note when a single birth resulted in more than one child. Uyghurs in the document are sent away for one or more extra births; in one case simply disobeying the birth spacing policy, requiring three years between births, is listed as a reason. Another lists obtaining a “false abortion certificate” as a reason in addition to extra births. Some individuals are described as “maliciously” violating birth policies (恶意超生) if they have a large number of children. However, it is not clear that the consequences for one extra birth are any lighter than the consequences for more than one extra birth.

Notably, men constitute the majority of those who were interned for violating birth policies. In most of these cases, the description in the “three circles” section seems to suggest that the men’s wives were not interned for the same reason. That family-planning policy violations constitute the primary reason for internment in the Qaraqash Document is intriguing. It might simply be the case that officials looking to meet internment quotas were searching for any legal or other violation among the Uyghur population in Qaraqash, where anecdotal evidence suggests that Uyghur birth rates have long been high. However, it is also possible that these internments are consistent with state anxieties about the demographic make-up of the Uyghur region. The internment campaign has been preventing the formation of new Uyghur families through physical separation of married couples and removal of people of child-bearing years into camps since 2017. The Qaraqash Document demonstrates for the first time that the campaign is also punishing those with large families.

Overseas connections appear in the Qaraqash Document as another major reason for internment. The document itself was compiled to list those with family overseas. Additionally, many entries list travel overseas as a reason for internment, sometimes specified as travel to one or more of 26 “sensitive countries,” mostly Muslim-majority nations such as neighboring Central Asian states, Malaysia, Indonesia, and a number of African countries, among others.⁸ Saudi Arabia is on the sensitive countries list, but having been on an unofficial Hajj is often listed separately as a reason for internment. Applying for a passport is also a frequent reason for detention, even in cases when someone has never left the country. Many individuals appear to have been interned for merely applying for a passport in 2015, when Uyghurs were briefly encouraged by the government to do so. This brief campaign to encourage Uyghurs to apply for passports, following on a period of many years when passports were very difficult to obtain, has raised a question that remains unanswered. Analysts remain uncertain, raising the possibility that the government supported Uyghurs’ passport applications because it was deliberately seeking to identify Uyghurs who had a desire to travel.

Communicating with someone outside of the county also appears as a reason for detention in the spreadsheet. One individual was sent for “accidentally clicking on an overseas website on their phone” (手机点击网站链接无意登陆境外网站). Individuals who traveled domestically were targeted, underscoring policies with the intent of controlling Uyghur movements within China as well. The document lists several individuals who were interned for “complex” movements and communication (外出期间人际交往和活动轨迹比较复杂). The precise meaning of this term is unclear; however, it illustrates that Uyghurs cannot move freely around China without suspicion. Others are specifically labeled “7.5 diverted persons” (7.5 分流人员), referring to Uyghurs who

were expelled from the regional capital of Urumchi following the July 5, 2010 riots and who remained on the radar of the authorities afterward.

Violations involving religious practice are another major reason for internment. Going on a Hajj not organized by the government is an additional violation beyond just visiting Saudi Arabia. Wearing a veil, having a wife who wore a veil, or having a beard are among the reasons for internment. Some individuals were sent for participating in any unofficial religious activities, studying religion, or even having a household with a “dense religious atmosphere” (家庭宗教氛围浓厚). The data clearly demonstrates that eliminating religious practice is one of the central goals of the re-education campaign.

***Shequ* Assessment and Current Status of Internees**

The entries in the document give a sampling of the process of internment for the people of Qaraqash county. It is not possible to determine whether the fact that some individuals have multiple entries, and others only one, indicates something about their ultimate fate or whether it is simply due to a sampling bias in the document.

Judgment in final entries	No. of individuals
Community management and control	98
Finished/safe	77
Continue training, finish after one year	43
Working at the park (在园区就业)	41
Continue training	34
Returned for work (返乡就业 / 返回就业)	11
Official returned to post, continued management	2
At Hotan Vocational School	2
Sentenced to prison (strike hard)	2
Can have regular home visits (正常回家探亲)	1

Table 2: Assessment of the Shequ in the Last Entries of Each Individual

While numerous entries indicate that a particular individual is no longer in “training,” it also appears that this does not necessarily mean that they have been released. Many entries describe individuals as being returned to their residence for local monitoring under “*shequ* management and control” (社区管理管控), while others describe them as “found employment.” The term used, *jiuye* (就业) can have the innocuous meaning of simply getting a job, but it is also associated with China’s longstanding “re-education through labor” or *laogai* (劳改) system, describing people being released from a re-education camp or prison into a factory or other facility where they work with little or no pay and remain under state monitoring and control.⁹ This term is used extensively in the many categories of forced labor and forced-work-placement implemented intensively by Xinjiang authorities since mid-2018.¹⁰

Only a small number of entries specify the job the individual is engaged in. For example, Entry 484 describes the internee as running his family’s curtain shop, and Entry 592 notes that the internee is a janitor in a kindergarten. The standardized language in the remainder of the entries may indicate placement in a coerced labor program. Some official media reports from the region describe Uyghurs being sent to job placement far from their homes,¹¹ which appears to be a method of both maintaining control over the population and weakening their connection to their culture, as described in recently published analyses.¹² One report from Qaraqash county shows the local Party Secretary giving a speech to Uyghurs being sent to employers “inside and outside Xinjiang,” telling them that they must “listen to their team cadres, obey management, work hard no matter the time or place, not participate in illegal religious activities and criminal activities.”¹³

There are also numerous entries which list the individuals as being sent to “work in the industrial park” (园区就业). These seem even more likely to be reference to forced labor, given the testimonies of forced labor in factories that have emerged from the region.¹⁴ In some entries, such as Entry 227, the *shequ* officials agree to send the individual to “work in the industrial park” but do not agree to “finish,” clearly showing that detainees are being sent to work while still in the re-education program. In 2018, Shawn Zhang identified the largest camp in Qaraqash county, referred to in the Document as the “Number 1 Training Center,” or sometimes as the “Number One Training Center (Bostan).” He notes that “[B]ostan” refers to the industrial park in the facility, with the re-education camp located in the southeast corner of the compound.¹⁵ Several entries describe individuals as sent to the Hotan Vocational School after finishing re-education; it is not clear if this is part of the camps system or a genuine vocational school.



The Party Secretary of Qaraqash county addresses labor transfer workers at the Qaraqash county train station in 2017. Hotan Zero Distance.

The document reveals details about what has been happening in Uyghur towns and villages during the internment campaign. *Shequ* officials assess the behavior and attitudes of detainees’ relatives, including their participation in “*shequ* work” (社区工作). The “good behavior” of their relatives appears to be a key determinant of whether a detainee will be released. Officials enter Uyghur households to carry out these political and behavioral assessments. Entry 369, for example, describes community officials coming to the home of the detainee’s wife and being told by her son

that she was not at home, raising suspicions that she was deliberately avoiding them and obstructing their work. Entry 315 describes the family members of the detainee blocking the door to prevent officials from entering the household.

Detainees and their relatives continue to be assessed after being released from the camps into *shequ* “management,” where they and their family members continue to be subjected to bureaucratic control. *Shequ* officials assess and record whether former internees’ moods and thinking are “stable” (思想 / 情绪稳定), determining whether they “can recognize their mistakes” (能够认识错误), have a “sincere attitude of regret” (悔过态度认真), and/or “present no threat” (没有现实危害).

Disobeying village management personnel and failing to participate in “community work” are also among the reasons for being sent to a camp, demonstrating the compulsory nature of these activities. One individual (Entry 309) was sent for not cooperating with the *shequ* work, including not joining flag raisings and not carrying out patrol duty. Entry 378 notes that the detainee’s family members occasionally fail to join flag-raising ceremonies on time, and recommends that the detainee should not be released. Other entries describe cooperating with community work such as participating in propaganda rallies (发声亮剑活动), complying with the attendance system (考勤制度), and attending *shequ*-organized concentrated study and speech activities (集中学习和宣讲活动). Some individuals released from detention are noted as having daily visits from local cadres, signing in every morning and attending roll call after work.



*A weekly flag raising ceremony in Qaraqash county in 2018.
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xinjiang Branch.¹⁶*

V. THE DOCUMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF STATE POLICIES

The ground-level information contained the Qaraqash Document confirms policy measures put in place from 2017 into the present, laying bare the technological and human resources required to implement mass scale repression. The Qaraqash Document provides for the first time a direct link between the leaked policy documents published by the New York Times and the ICIJ, and ground-level experiences of targeted Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, as revealed by the testimony of survivors and family members of residents.

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform

The document provides a stunningly detailed example of the results generated by the surveillance and data-collection system used by Xinjiang authorities, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, or IJOP (一体化联合作战平台). In May 2019, Human Rights Watch released “China’s Algorithms of Repression,” a report detailing a cell-phone app that Chinese police and officials utilize to connect to the IJOP. It collects a vast array of microdata, including such details as electricity use and ownership of exercise equipment, to build a composite picture of individuals. The collated information is leveraged to determine people considered as threats to the state and as a result who should be detained and interned.

The platform integrates information on numerous legitimate activities labelled by authorities as suspicious, including lack of socialization and use of everyday communications tools, such as WhatsApp. Peaceful expressions of religious belief and practice also indicate unsuitable behavior. Human Rights Watch’s report notes: “Another key element of IJOP system is the monitoring of personal relationships. . . . For example, the IJOP app instructs officers to investigate people who are related to people who have obtained a new phone number or who have foreign links.”¹⁷ When Chinese state representatives visit Uyghur and other Turkic peoples’ homes to gather this data, there is no requirement to inform individuals as to the reason for the collection of details on the minutest aspects of their lives. However, as Human Rights Watch states, it is “consistent with Xinjiang local government statements that emphasize officials must collect data for the IJOP system in a ‘comprehensive manner’ from ‘everyone in every household.’” In November 2019, the International Consortium of Journalists revealed government records showing that more than 15,000 individuals were detained in a seven-day period as a result of being identified as suspicious by the IJOP.¹⁸ As such, the implementation of the IJOP demonstrates little to no relationship with the Chinese government’s stated goal of conducting counterterrorism actions.

The Qaraqash Document mentions the IJOP system at several points in the “Three Circles” column, emphasizing how suspicion is established through “guilt by association.” For example, relatives of the people in Entry 2 and Entry 4 were sent to re-education centers based on information gathered by the IJOP, as was Entry 19’s brother, a small-business owner, who was interned on October 2, 2017. The individual in Entry 13 was referred to state authorities based on information collected in the IJOP and was not sent to an internment camp after her employer vouched for her character. A neighbor of the individual in Entry 14 was not as fortunate, however, and was interned from February 2018. The IJOP identified the person as living or traveling with high-risk individuals. In the “Evaluation” column, the Qaraqash Document notes the discovery that the individual in Entry 50 was friends via WeChat with a suspicious Uyghur based in Turkey. Under

interrogation, he denied the link, and the authorities concluded to continue his internment. Entry 221 shows the implications of religious associations and was interned on April 8, 2017 for traveling and living with a “wild imam” (野阿訇). The internment was concluded on August 24, 2018.

References to the kinds of suspicious behavior identified in the IJOP app occur throughout the Qaraqash Document. As described in Entry 221, connections between Uyghurs and people and places overseas is cause for concern among Chinese officials. In an iterative pattern, Uyghurs are interned or imprisoned for “infractions” ranging from applying for a passport, even though the individual did not even go abroad, to traveling overseas.

For example:

Entry 2 (“Evaluation” column)

“From May 10 to September 2016, he visited Saudi Arabia for 128 days. Upon returning, he stayed long-term in Qaraqash county. He poses a threat and we recommend he continue his reeducation.”

Entry 20 (“Three Circles” column)

“...sentenced for 15 years in August 2017, for online contact overseas, now serving in the Urumchi Women’s Prison.”

Entry 31 (“Three Circles” column)

“His wife...was sent to a training center...because she went abroad. She finished training on July 21, 2018. His brother...was sent to a training center because he visited Dubai.”

Entry 80 (“Reason(s) for detention” column)

“Visited sensitive countries four times to do business.”

Entry 114 (“Reason(s) for detention” column)

“Applied for passport.”

Entry 202 (“Reason sent for re-education” column)

“Went abroad for pilgrimage three times.”

Entry 207 (“Reason(s) for detention” column)

“Family member of runaway person (abroad).”

Another item of information communicated to the IJOP by local officials is any expression of religious belief and practice. Accounts from internment camp survivors and families of victims regularly cite religion as a primary reason for detention in the camp system.¹⁹ The Qaraqash

Document once again confirms participation in religious activities and belief in Islam as a leading reason for internment or suspicion despite clear indications these practices are legitimate and peaceful. As noted above, 23 individuals were detained for their religious practice and another 19 for “religious extremist thought infection.” Throughout the document individuals are highlighted as persons of interest due to their faith. The cases are too numerous to cite individually; however, two examples illustrate how the Chinese government violates the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples’ fundamental human right to freedom of religion.

Entry 64 (“Three Circles”)

“Investigation conducted by local offices finds that this person has basic religious knowledge (prays, goes to religious events and ceremonies). His religious knowledge came from his grandfather and was received when he was a child. (Grandfather was sentenced for six years in June 2017 for inciting terrorism ideology).”

Entry 181 (“Three Circles”)

“This person undertook a pilgrimage to Arab [*sic*],²⁰ went to a mosque during the two main religious holidays, prayed at home, attended religious events and ceremonies, prayed at home after meals, and fasted. His religious knowledge comes from his mother.”

“Becoming Family” Household Surveillance

The Qaraqash Document provides confirmation of the implementation of the Xinjiang “Becoming Family” program of intense monitoring inside Uyghurs’ homes. The “Becoming Family” policy sends Party cadres to regularly undertake multi-day “homestays” with Uyghur families. The government called the observers “big sisters or brothers,” echoing the exact language of early CCP development policies in East Turkistan that placed the Uyghur as a backward people in need of civilizing influences from more advanced societies. However, the intense repressive turn in the region means the current use of the term has taken on a more intimate form. “Big sisters and brothers” are cadres, predominantly Han, tasked with gauging the loyalty of Uyghurs. As the Human Rights Watch described the program: “During these visits, families are required to provide officials with information about their lives and political views, and are subjected to political indoctrination.”²¹

The “Becoming Family” policy limits remaining Uyghur spaces free from state intrusion and constitutes a gross violation of privacy. In an extended essay for ChinaFile, anthropologist Dr. Darren Byler detailed not only the presumption of Uyghur lip service to CCP fealty, but also the special emphasis placed on ordinary expressions of religious affinity that is built into the “Becoming Family” program:

At times, the big brothers and sisters feared the Uighurs might be slippery, that however cheerfully they might open their houses or declare their loyalty to the Chinese nation, beneath their smiles and gestures of wholesome secularism there might lurk darker allegiances, uncured attachments to their “diseased” religious ways. But there were simple ways to test for this kind of thing. One could offer a host a cigarette or a sip of

beer; a hand could be extended in greeting to a little sibling of the opposite gender, staying alert for signs of flinching. Or one could go out to the market for some freshly ground meat and propose that the family make dumplings. And then wait and watch to see if the Uyghurs would ask what kind of meat was in the bag.²²

The Qaraqash Document confirms that information collected through the “Becoming Family” visits to Uyghur homes resulted in people being hauled away to camps. For example, Case 221 describes how one individual was flagged by a “big sister” or “brother” for merely wearing a headscarf. Camp survivor Zumrat Dawut confirmed the intrusiveness of the visits in an interview with Radio Free Asia: “The visitors will ask what family members have been doing recently, what food they cook, and even about their sleeping habits.”²³ In its open abuse of privacy, the Chinese government undermines the fundamental right to freedom of religion through reporting of legitimate activities to the IJOP.

Rooting Out “Two-faced” Officials

The appearance of the term “two-faced” in the Qaraqash Document also substantiates previous reporting on the varied strategies the state is employing to justify its repression of Uyghurs. Entry 315 mentions the term and states that the individual was “taken in” for this reason. The term is usually leveled at Party members whom the authorities suspect of being disloyal to the state. UHRP’s October 2018 report “The Persecution of The Intellectuals in The Uyghur Region: Disappeared Forever?” describes several prominent Uyghur scholars who disappeared or censured on the charge.²⁴ In a report dated September 24, 2018, Radio Free Asia described how Azat Sultan, a literature professor at Xinjiang University, had been investigated for being a “two-faced” academic.²⁵ Abdukerim Rahman, a second literature professor at Xinjiang University, was similarly accused with the label. Amy Anderson, who knew Abdukerim personally, wrote: “it was hard to see the logic behind Rahman’s criminalization since his teaching and research had little to do with religion....he had been accepted and celebrated by the Chinese party-state for over 50 years. How could a man be celebrated until the age of 77 and then suddenly be charged as a ‘two-faced’ person out of nowhere? Where is his second ‘face’?”²⁶

In sum, given the large number of relatives detailed, there is an inherent guilt by association outlined in the Qaraqash document. Every action, witting or unwitting, could endanger not only oneself but your family, relatives, any associate. This targeting of communities at the individual level reveals ingrained state paranoia and alarming intent. A process of suspicion, investigation, and punishment that is both perpetually capricious and violently disruptive to Uyghur lives.

Implications

The Qaraqash Document indicates the Chinese government is perfecting an art of repression that will not stop at East Turkistan. The possible export of this repression to the rest of China has already received extensive commentary. However, communication of the template that is contemporary East Turkistan to Beijing’s rising number of allies indicates the development of an anti-democratic bloc. Such a pattern has terminal implications for international human rights standards.

The Qaraqash Document details information only 311 individuals from Bostan subdistrict and other administrative units of Qaraqash, who were detained and then later reevaluated between early 2017 and early 2019. UHRP suspects it is highly likely that more Bostan and Qaraqash residents than those listed in this document have been detained at one point or another from 2017 up to the time this list was generated. This conclusion is based on the suspicious behaviors described in the “Three Circles” column of the document, which extends to individuals beyond the 311 detainees. Furthermore, given the predominant Uyghur demographic in Qaraqash county and evidence that Uyghurs, regardless of status, have become state suspects means 311 individuals is the tip of the iceberg.

There are likely hundreds or thousands of similar documents generated by other subdistrict and neighborhood-level offices for other subsets of internees throughout the Uyghur region. Where are these other documents? International human rights standards and Chinese law do not allow for secret detention. The government must make public the complete list of all those in administrative detention or sentenced to a term of imprisonment and make information about their health and welfare available to family and lawyers.

Uyghurs by the million have lost their freedom and suffered countless acts of cruelty at the hands of the state. The scale of the human rights violations may never be countable. It is important to record and pay tribute to those individuals who are in the midst of an existential fight for their identity and culture. The contemporary breakup of Uyghur spaces under the Chinese Communist Party began in the 1990s with the demolition of cities and neighborhoods and the curbs placed on freedom to develop independent scientific, philosophical, and artistic works. We are now witnessing the dismantling of the smallest units of Uyghur society in family and personal relationships, a process evidenced in the Qaraqash Document. The document tells us the Chinese government is creating a new organization of Uyghur society: that of jailer and jailed, loyal and disloyal. This rearrangement constitutes a form of cultural genocide. The prevention of this cultural genocide is everyone’s responsibility.

VI. METHODOLOGY

This report presents a leaked official document from Qaraqash county, Hotan prefecture, East Turkistan. UHRP obtained the document from Uyghur exile Abduweli Ayup, who received the document directly from a government employee in the Uyghur region. The UHRP verified the authenticity of the document based on its similarity to other documents we have reviewed (but not published for safety reasons) in the past.

UHRP's research team used publicly available information on the subdistrict to give context to the document's data. The team cross-referenced names and ID numbers to determine the number of individuals represented in the document, and to trace and collate statistics about the camps where they were detained, the reasons they were detained and *shequ* officials' judgments about detainees' status.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research team at the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) wishes to express our thanks to all the individuals who contributed to this report. We are especially grateful to scholar and advocate Abduweli Ayup for entrusting us with the Qaraqash Document. Without his faith in our work, this report would not have come to fruition. We are also grateful to Dr. Adrian Zenz and Cheryl Yu at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation for their feedback on terminological and other questions, and to an anonymous translator for their fastidious work translating excerpts of the document. We would also like to thank UHRP Director Omer Kanat for his invaluable guidance and expertise, and UHRP Director of Global Advocacy Louisa Greve for her detailed feedback on early drafts. Finally, we express our deepest appreciation to the donors whose generous contributions to the UHRP make our research and reporting possible.

VIII. ENDNOTES

- ¹ Washington Post Editorial Board. (2019). China is achieving its ‘beauty’ by means of cultural genocide. [online] Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/china-is-achieving-its-beauty-by-means-of-cultural-genocide/2019/11/25/f80c0d66-0faf-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html; Azeem, I. (2019). China Must Answer for Cultural Genocide in Court. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/ughurs-xinjiang-china-cultural-genocide-international-criminal-court/>; and Zand, B. (2019). 'The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide.' [online] Available at: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-ughurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html>.
- ² Members of the Hui, Mongolian, Manchu Kazakh, Kirgiz, Xibe, Uzbek, and other groups comprised the remaining .05% of the population that year.
- ³ 新疆统计年鉴 2018 [2018 *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook*]. (2018).
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- ⁵ *Shequs* date to the 1990s, an experiment in restructuring the bureaucratic relationship between government and citizenry following the breakup of the work-unit system of social organization across the PRC. For more on the role of *shequs* in the Uyghur region, and particularly for an ethnographically based discussion of the *shequ*’s role in perpetrating forms of confusion and state violence against Uyghur citizens, see geographer Sarah Tynen’s (2019) “State territorialization through *shequ* community centres: bureaucratic confusion in Xinjiang, China” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) <https://rsa.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21622671.2019.1643778#.Xh9-u1NKhm8>.
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- ⁸ Human Rights Watch. (2018). “Eradicating Ideological Viruses:” China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims. [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs>
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- ¹⁶ 中国科学院，新疆分院。October 2018. 新疆分院：突出政治建设，牢记初心使命 勇于担当新疆工作总目标的重大责任。 [Xinjiang Branch: Emphasize political construction, keep in mind the original mission, bravely bear the duty of the overall goal of Xinjiang work] [online] Available at: http://www.cas.cn/zt/rwzt/ysyrys/sjfb/201810/t20181023_4667180.shtml
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出境未归人员亲属送培学员

序号	教育点	入教时间	姓名	身份证号	乡镇(街道)	村(社区)	组号	精准管理分类	三属情况	乡镇研判意见
1	第一培训中心	2017-5-23	图尔荪托合提	653222196602	博斯坦街办	玉华社区		1.老婆曾蒙面, 2.超生4孩;	<p>亲属圈共8人, 其中1人收押, 妻子: 萨伊普加玛丽, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222197906, 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在喀什监狱(判刑6年)。 长子: 阿不, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199801, 陕西打工, 现实表现好。 次子: 帕提, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199509, 幼儿园老师, 现实表现好。 三子: 阿不, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222200204, 墨玉县三中就读, 现实表现好。 四子: 阿不, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306, 幼儿园学生, 现实表现好。 五子: 阿不, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306, 幼儿园学生, 现实表现好。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈中未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经驻社区寺管会干部对图尔荪托合提的三圈、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 偶尔在家做乃玛孜, 星期五偶尔去清真寺参加居麦乃玛孜, 饭后做杜瓦, 偶尔参加两节会礼, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其父亲图尔, 于1991年去世。</p>	研判结果: 图尔荪托合提除妻子蒙面、超生四胎之外, 未发现其他问题, 且目前该人思想转变大, 能够认识错误, 悔过态度认真, 没有现实危害, 同意退培训后回乡管控。
2	第一培训中心	2017年10月11日	阿卜杜米力克	653222196704	博斯坦街办	玉华社区		1、出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回可疑人员 2、超生1孩	<p>亲属圈中有8人, 培训2人, 妻子: 阿米乃, 653222197003, 家庭住址: 新疆墨玉县博斯坦街道明珠社区和谐巷, 墨玉县爱心医院护士, 2017年10月17日因出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回送培; 弟弟: 阿卜杜喀迪尔, 653222197106, 居住地址: 吐外特乡艾日克村, 2017年11月因一体化推送、超生两胎送培, 儿媳: 阿布都外力, 653222199004, 爱心医院的医生, 表现一般; 儿媳: 布海里目木, 653222198808, 墨玉县迎宾社区干部, 表现良好; 孙女: 苏麦, 653222201105, 迎宾幼儿园就读(学龄前儿童), 表现良好; 次子: 阿迪力, 653222199310, 实习生(在新疆二医院实习), 表现一般; 长女: 阿依, 653222199410, 墨玉县爱心医院的医生, 表现一般; 次女: 阿依, 653222199712, 墨玉县爱心医院医生, 表现良好; 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈里面未发现其他严打收押送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经驻寺管会干部对阿卜杜米力克的三圈、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现, 此人每次饭后都会做祷告, 每天早晨在家做一次礼拜, 每周五去一次清真寺做居麦乃玛孜, 每年两节会礼都去清真寺做礼拜, 参加朋友和亲属的四项活动, 该宗教知识来源于该人奶奶: 萨伊普汗(1991年去世)。</p>	研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判后认为, 阿布杜米力克送培原因是出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回可疑人员; 此人于2015年3月将户口从墨玉县迁至库尔勒, 2016年2月在库尔勒办理护照, 护照证件号码: E6100, 于2016年5月10日至9月16日出境至沙特阿拉伯长达128天, 出境返回后长期在墨玉县居住, 有现实危害, 建议继续培训。
3	第一培训中心	2018-3-11	吾阿力妮萨	653222197501	博斯坦街办	玉华社区		超生两胎	<p>亲属圈共6人, 其中收押1人, 培训1人, 爸爸: 麦提, 2017年3月30日因资助恐怖被判有期徒刑7年, 目前在乌鲁木齐第四监狱服刑, 老公: 艾合麦提托合提, 653222197501, 因超生两胎, 办理护照未出境被乌鲁木齐送教培训, 目前已转回墨玉县第三培训中心参加培训。 长女: 苏比伊, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222200103, 北京中学高中一年级学生。 二女: 赛比, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222200403, 墨玉县第二中学初一学生。 三女: 娜迪, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201201, 墨玉县玛热帕提幼儿园中二班学生。 四女: 娜扎, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201508, 学龄前儿童。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈里面未发现其他严打收押送培人员。 宗教传承圈: 经驻社区寺管会干部对吾阿力妮萨的三圈、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排 发现此人送培以前每次吃过饭后做祷告, 每天早晨在家做一次乃玛孜, 参加亲属和朋友的婚礼, 起名, 割礼(该知识来源于其母亲古丽妮娅孜罕)。</p>	研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判分析一致认为, 其亲属在我辖区期间现实表现良好, 积极配合社区工作, 本人超生两胎, 目前参加教育培训未满一年, 建议继续培训, 提升国语水平。
4	第一培训中心	2018-3-11	柔则艾力	653222198304	博斯坦街办	玉华社区		80后不放心人员	<p>亲属圈共13人, 收押1人, 送培2人 公公: 麦提, 身份证号码: 653222195404, 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在监狱(判刑6年)。 丈夫: 麦提, 身份证: 653222198606, 因办理护照于2017年5月21日被普恰克其乡送培; 二弟: 阿卜杜吉力力, 身份证号码: 653222199203, 2017年5月4日因一体化推送人员(9.13段通联)送培, 爸爸: 艾则, 身份证号码: 65322195708, 水利局退休干部目前表现好; 母亲: 多来提塔吉罕, 身份证号码: 653222195905, 扎瓦镇合尼村农民, 目前表现好; 大姐: 塔基姑丽, 身份证号码: 653222197511, 斯孜社区业务公司职工目前表现好, ; 二姐: 努热曼, 身份证号码: 653222197801, 县医院急诊科护士, 目前表现好; 三姐: 吾依尔曼, 身份证号码: 653222198302, 扎瓦镇合尼村, 裁缝, 目前表现好; 一弟: 阿卜杜克热木, 身份证号码: 653222198905, 扎瓦镇合尼村, 开出租车, 目前表现好; 婆婆: 凯麦尔罕, 身份证号码: 653222196002, 在家农民, 目前表现好。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈中未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经驻社区寺管会干部对柔则艾力的三圈、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 2014年每天做一次乃玛孜, 吃过饭后做祷告, 每年两节会礼去亲属墓地做祷告, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其奶奶麦热木汗(2011年去世)。</p>	研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判分析一致认为其亲属在我辖区期间现实表现良好, 积极配合社区工作, 本人系80后不放心人员, 思想较为活跃, 目前参加教育培训未满一年, 建议继续培训, 提升国语水平。

5	第三培训中心	2018-2-25	如则麦提	653222197603	博斯坦街办	英协海尔社区	库木鲁克北路	1.非法出境人员或非法出境未遂被遣返人员, 2.违法计划生育: 超生	<p>亲属圈: 经摸排该人三代亲属中共有10人, 其中收押1人, 培训人员1人, 辖区8人</p> <p>1、米吉提, 男, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222195409, 2015年8月28日因聚众扰乱社会秩序被判刑3年, 2017年4月因罪阿旬再被判刑10年。</p> <p>2、妻子: 艾乃丽汗, 女, 身份证号码: 653222198703, 2018年11月06日因80后不放心人员被英协海尔社区送培。</p> <p>3、父亲: 卡迪, 男, 身份证号码: 653222194204, 无业在家。</p> <p>4、母亲: 巴伊玛, 女, 身份证号码: 653222195903, 残疾无业在家。</p> <p>5、姐姐: 阿米乃, 女, 身份证号码: 653222196610, 无业在家。</p> <p>6、长子: 伊利亚, 男, 身份证号码: 653222200210, 就读于墨玉县三中(8年级);</p> <p>7、次子: 亚库, 男, 身份证号码: 653222200605, 就读于墨玉县三小(3年级);</p> <p>8、长女: 热依, 男, 身份证号码: 653222201212, 就读于阔纳下海幼儿园(大班);</p> <p>9、二女: 穆克斯, 女, 身份证号码: 653222201609, 家庭教育;</p> <p>10、岳母: 热比罕, 女, 身份证号码: 653222195905, 农民, 目前在英也尔乡库木阿依拉格村居住。</p> <p>社交圈:</p> <p>邻居: 麦麦提敏, 身份证号码: 653222193905, 2018年6月1日因煽动恐怖判刑思想6年, 邻居: 吾哈妮妮萨, 女, 维吾尔族, 653224197702, 2018年2月1日因宣扬极端思想、聚众扰乱社会秩序判刑14年。</p> <p>邻居: 阿卜杜热合曼, 男, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222196003, 2017年7月29日因危害公共安全判刑5年6个月</p> <p>宗教传承圈: 经入户走访、外圈核查及三圈六图碰撞, 本人会做礼拜, 参加“四项活动”(做一次礼拜, 周五去清真寺, 两个节日, 起名、割礼, 婚礼葬礼), 该宗教知识来源于其(爷爷: 阿西, 200年去世)。</p>	<p>1.非法出境人员或非法出境未遂被遣返人员(2014年10月至2015年8月被昆明市勐腊县公安机关被拘留9个月(准备出境)后交给和田县公安局, 也被拘留3个月以后放家), 存在现实危害。</p> <p>2.计划生育超生2胎(女儿: 热依拉2012年12月出生, 身份证号码: 65322201212, 女儿穆克斯纳2016年9月出生, 身份证号码: 65322201609);</p> <p>该人三代亲属中共有10人, 其中收押1人, 培训人员1人, 亲属中严打、收押多, 在目前该人思想转变一般, 望能够更加深刻的认识错误, 建议继续培训</p>
6	第二培训中心	2017-10-27	布艾西罕	653222198007	博斯坦街办	夏特勒克社区	夏特勒克社区	严打前蒙面	<p>亲属圈: 该人亲属共5人, 其中1人送培, 4人在辖区, 无收押人员</p> <p>丈夫: 图尔孙尼亚孜, 身份证: 653222197704, 41岁, 2018年5月15日因不配合社区里工作被喀尔赛镇送培至第一培训中心(波斯坦库勒培训中心)</p> <p>父亲: 莫, 69岁, 现在辖区, 农民。</p> <p>母亲: 吾尔妮萨, 2011年8月因病去世。</p> <p>长子: 阿卜杜萨, 17岁, 现墨玉县第一中学学生,</p> <p>二子: 阿卜杜热, 11岁, 现墨玉镇小学学生,</p> <p>长女: 不热, 9岁, 现墨玉镇小学学生,</p> <p>社交圈:</p> <p>阿依努尔, 35岁, 农民, 在辖区, 家庭妇女。</p> <p>木热尼萨, 50岁, 农民, 在辖区, 家庭妇女。</p> <p>巴一曼, 37岁, 农民, 在辖区, 家庭妇女。</p> <p>宗教传承圈:</p> <p>社区包片干部入户走访及统战宗教干部外围摸排、三圈六图串并分析, 在核实中发现该人会做礼拜, 正常参加四项活动、两节会礼, 在家做礼拜, 父亲: 莫 (夏特勒克社区二片区) 教会其礼拜知识。</p>	<p>经街道社区摸排发现其丈夫: 图尔孙尼亚孜 以盖房子为由, 进行购买台力帕克清真寺, 但是了解后发现该人未将清真寺进行拆除, 而是将清真寺进行维修, 三非一建建筑、装修依旧存在, 具有一定的宗教思想; 布艾西罕 因蒙面被送培, 其父亲等亲属在辖区积极配合社区工作, 按时参加社区组织的各项活动, 本人认错态度较好, 无现实危害, 建议结束培训, 由社区管控。</p>
7	第一中心		阿卜杜米力克	65322219670	博斯坦街办	玉华社区			<p>经核查该人亲属圈2人培训, 妻子: 阿米乃, 653222197003, 家庭住址: 新疆墨玉县博斯坦街道明珠社区和谐巷, 墨玉县爱心医院护士, 因出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回送培; 弟弟: 阿卜杜喀迪尔, 653222197108, 居住地址: 吐外特乡艾日克村 因一体化推送, 送培; 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈里面未发现其他严打收押送培人员。宗教传承圈情况: 经驻寺管会干部对阿卜杜米力克 的三圈、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现, 此人每次饭后都会做祷告, 每天早晨在家做一次礼拜, 每周五去一次清真寺做居妻乃玛孜, 每年两节都会去清真寺做礼拜, 参加朋友和亲属的四项活动, 该宗教知识来源于该人奶奶: 萨伊普汗(19年去世)。</p>	同意
8	第一中心		托合提	65322219840	博斯坦街办	玉华社区			<p>一、亲属圈: 老婆: 图合萨依普, 65322219840, 塔克拉玛干药店个体, 和丈夫一同多次出境公安审查未送培人员, 现实表现一般; 长子阿不, 653222200904, 县四小学生, 现实表现好; 二子麦麦提, 653222201305, 麦热排提幼儿园就读, 现实表现好; 长女那那, 653222201409, 麦热排提幼儿园就读, 现实表现好;</p> <p>父亲: 依米, 653222195812, 喀尔赛乡喀尔栋村农民, 现实表现一般; 母亲艾则扎姆, 653222196005, 喀尔赛乡喀尔栋村农民, 现实表现一般;</p> <p>岳父: 阿卜杜热, 653222194807, 墨玉镇吐万卡帕克拉农民, 现实表现一般; 岳母帕塔木, 653222195710, 墨玉镇吐万卡帕克拉家属, 现实表现一般。</p> <p>妹妹: 依提拜尔, 653222198612, 喀尔赛乡喀尔栋村农民, 现实表现良好; 妹妹: 苏力塔妮, 653222198405, 喀尔赛乡喀尔栋村农民, 现实表现良好;</p> <p>弟弟: 图孙麦提, 653222198903, 塔克拉玛干药店, 现实表现差, 办护照原因于2017年12月1日送培; 弟媳: 热依汗, 653222199310, 喀尔赛乡喀尔栋村农民, 现实表现一般;</p> <p>妹妹: 阿尔则古丽, 653222199010, 吐外特乡开药店, 现实表现较好; 妹妹: 艾力, 653222198502, 吐外特乡开药店, 现实表现较好;</p> <p>二弟: 图迪麦提, 653222199103, 塔克拉玛干药店, 现实表现良好, 未婚;</p> <p>二、社交圈:</p> <p>朋友: 穆塔里甫, 653222197411, 夏特勒克社区保安, 现实表现一般。朋友阿卜杜米吉提, 653222198307, 塔克拉玛干药店打工, 现实表现一般; 朋友希尔麦提, 653222199009, 开出租车, 现实表现一般;</p> <p>三、宗教传承圈: 驻社区管寺干部对托合提 的三圈六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现, 该人于2011年3月 号在爷爷去世时去喀尔赛喀尔栋村清真寺参加爷爷葬礼, 2008年3月17日去喀尔赛喀尔栋村清真寺做居妻乃玛孜, 2008年去喀尔赛喀尔栋村清真寺参加古尔邦节, 之后在去未去过清真寺, 吃饭后做祷告。根据社区甄别意见, 街道综合研判后认为托合提 于2014年12月迁入安徽省太和县经济开发区回民社区105国道太豪路东侧603房并在安徽办理护照后5次出境至重点国家逾期返回长期在和田生活人员, 有一定现实危害, 建议继续培训。</p>	同意

9	第一中心		麦提艾力	65322219850	博斯坦街办	依普巴扎社区	<p>亲属圈：父亲死亡。</p> <p>母亲：阿巴斯罕，65岁，目前在辖区。</p> <p>姐姐：阿丽米罕，农民，目前在。</p> <p>哥哥：玉努斯，50岁，墨玉县社保局工作，目前在辖区。</p> <p>二姐：古力吉乃提，43岁，目前在辖区。</p> <p>三姐：布苏打，42岁，波斯坦街道计划生育干部，目前在辖区。</p> <p>二哥：阿卜杜热合曼，35岁，扰乱社会秩序罪，参加恐怖组织19年判刑。</p> <p>四姐：奴儿扎罕，30岁，目前在辖区。</p> <p>弟弟：阿卜杜木塔里甫，29岁，2018年2月扰乱社会秩序罪，参加恐怖组织，企图，包庇他人判刑25年。</p> <p>二弟：艾合买提江，26岁，2018年2月扰乱社会秩序罪被判刑10年。</p> <p>社会关系：该人社会圈，朋友圈中没有严打收押送培人员。</p> <p>邻居圈：邻居圈其中没有严打收押送培人员。</p> <p>宗教传承圈：此会做礼拜，每天家做一次礼拜，做聚礼日礼拜，斋月期间封斋，参加两节会礼，参加四项活动（起名、割礼、葬礼、婚礼），宗教知识是小时爸爸（艾买提江）传授给麦提艾力。</p> <p>2017年去世）传授给麦提艾力。</p> <p>社区研判意见：此人因1、办理力护照人员：2016年2月16日办理团队旅游护照，护照号：E680，未出境被送教育培训，且该人三圈中二哥：阿卜杜热合曼，扰乱社会秩序罪，参加恐怖组织19年判刑。弟弟：阿卜杜木塔里甫，2018年2月扰乱社会秩序罪，参加恐怖组织，企图，包庇他人判刑25年。二弟：艾合买提江，2018年2月扰乱社会秩序罪被判刑10年。此人家属亲属中严打收押人员多，其思想受到极端思想感染，经社区研判建议对调整为严管、继续培训。</p>	同意
10	第一中心		阿卜杜力艾列孜	65322219960	博斯坦街办	玉祖木社区	<p>亲属圈：</p> <p>爸爸 图尔荪，55岁 2017年6月因因蓄留双色大胡子、组织地下教经被严打判刑5年，乌鲁木齐监狱服刑</p> <p>妈妈 凯麦尔妮萨，48岁 2018年4月因野阿葡判刑10年。</p> <p>大哥 阿卜杜力，29岁 2017年6月因野阿葡被判刑10年</p> <p>大姐 吾热妮萨，27岁 车队路83号 2017年5月因受宗教极端思想感染送培</p> <p>二姐 布艾吉热，25岁 金蝴蝶黄金店打工</p> <p>弟弟 阿卜杜瓦哈普，20岁 2017年4月因受宗教极端思想感染送培。</p> <p>弟弟 买买提阿不拉，18岁 墨玉县职业学校学生</p> <p>妹妹 姆耶赛尔，16岁 金蝴蝶黄金店打工</p> <p>妹妹 纳纳孜丽，16岁 墨玉县职业学校学生</p> <p>邻居圈：</p> <p>邻居买买提明，2017年5月因宣扬宗教极端思想判刑6年、邻居阿卜杜瓦哈普，2017年5月7日，因受家庭宗教极端思想感染的重点人员家属被送培。</p> <p>失联圈：</p> <p>买买提阿不拉，墨玉县职业学校学生</p> <p>吾热妮萨，严打收押人员亲属送培</p> <p>宗教圈：</p> <p>该人在在“两节”会上做过乃麻子，每次吃完饭后念多啊，并且会念古兰经中三、四个经段。其宗教行为跟随自己的母亲（凯麦尔妮萨）和父亲（图尔荪）所学，宗教传承来源于父母。</p> <p>综合研判意见：该人家中收押送培人员亲属较多，家中宗教氛围浓厚，本人年龄教小，未履行国家义务教育，短期内难以驱除家庭带给的影响，其亲属在辖区居住期间表现一般，建议继续培训。</p>	同意
11	第一中心		玉苏普江	65322219870	博斯坦街办	夏特勒克社区	<p>亲属圈：爷爷：麦提艾力，因涉及2号案件被收押判刑12年。</p> <p>父亲：艾拜都，夏特勒克社区重点人员。</p> <p>母亲：萨伊普，夏特勒克社区二网格农民。</p> <p>弟弟：亚库普，夏特勒克社区一网格居住医家。</p> <p>姐姐：玛依努尔，同德社区居住，在家。</p> <p>妹妹：热孜亚，罗克曼医院护士。</p> <p>二妹：阿丽亚，在家。</p> <p>妻子：凯丽比努尔，幼儿园教师。</p> <p>长女：乃斯，家庭教育。</p> <p>岳父：麦提艾力，吐外特乡，公安局上班。</p> <p>岳母：努尔加罕，居住吐外特乡，吐外特乡医院上班。</p> <p>社交圈：阿布都拉，身份证：65322219820，夏特勒克社区二网格居住，个体户卖烤肉。</p> <p>麦提艾力玉苏普，身份证：65322219880，2017年5月破坏社会稳定送培。</p> <p>宗教传承圈：经社区包联干部入户走访及统战宗教干部外围摸排、三圈六图串并分析，在核实中发现该人会做礼拜，正常参加四项活动、两节会礼，每天去波斯坦清真寺做礼拜一次，其礼拜知识是其父亲：艾拜都（夏特勒克社区）教的。经社区综合分析研判：玉苏普江，男，维吾尔族，身份证号码65322219870，户籍所在地：新疆墨玉县喀拉喀什镇英协海尔村，现住址夏特勒克社区，此人因80后不放心人员，于2017/6/4送培至第一培训中心（博斯坦库勒）。其亲属父亲为社区重点人员，爷爷因涉及2号案件被收押判刑12年，经情报线索中涉及其母亲在家组织特阿威活动，其家庭宗教氛围浓厚本人有现实危害，建议该人继续培训。</p>	不同意
12	第一中心		如则麦提	65322219721	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	<p>一、亲属圈：</p> <p>妻子：热比罕，65322219740，玉华社区，在辖区；</p> <p>长子：阿卜杜，65322219920，疆内外出务工</p> <p>二子：阿卜杜，65322219960，疆内外出务工，</p> <p>三子：阿卜杜，65322220080，四小学生，</p> <p>四子：穆合，65322220130，学龄前在家，</p> <p>长女：热依，65322219980，和田技师学院学生，</p> <p>二女：热依，65322219980，三中学生，</p> <p>长儿媳：祖合热，65322219950，疆内外出务工，</p> <p>姐姐：古丽胡玛尔，5322219700，棉麻公司下岗工人。表现良好。</p> <p>二、社交圈：</p> <p>麦提艾力，65322219660，玉华社区玉石一巷，喀尔塞车站合同工；表现良好。</p> <p>图迪麦提，65322219710，玉华社区玉石一巷，个体户；表现良好。</p> <p>阿卜杜克热木，65322219730，玉华社区玉石一巷，是城建局国家干部，表现良好。</p> <p>三、宗教传承圈情况：经社区管寺干部对如则麦提的三圈、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现，此人送培以前每次吃过饭后都做祷告，每天早上在墨玉县博斯坦清真寺做一次乃玛孜，每周五去墨玉县博斯坦清真寺做居麦乃玛孜，每年两节会礼都会去清真寺做礼拜。（该宗教礼仪常识及以上行为来源于其父亲麦子孙）</p> <p>根据社区甄别情况街道综合研判认为：根据社区甄别意见，街道综合研判后认为如则麦提，超生四胎之外，未发现其他问题，且目前该人思想转变大，能够认识错误，悔改态度认真，没有现实危害，同意培训后回户籍地。</p>	同意

APPENDIX II

Students sent to re-education [who are] family members of those who went abroad and have not returned

No.	Location of Re-education	Re-education Start Date	Name	ID Number	Subdistrict	Neighborhood (Community)	Group Number	Reason Sent for Re-education	Level of Management	"Three Circles" Status	Township Authority's Evaluation and Suggestions
1	Re-education Center No.1	2017-5-23	Tursuntoht	65322219660	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	Bostan Street, Yuhua Community, Yuhua Neighborhood,	1. Wife wore a veil. 2. Has 4 children over the legal limit.		<p>Family circle includes 8 people with 1 in detention. Wife: Sahipjama, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322219790. In June of 2017, she was detained in a prison in Kashgar (sentenced to six years) under the "Strike Hard" campaign for participation in an illegal Tabligi activity. Eldest daughter: Arzigül, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID Number: 65322219920, contract worker at Yéngiyer Town Akewu Sitang Kindergarten, good behavior. Eldest son: Abliz, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322219980, working in Shaanxi province, good behavior. Second daughter: Pat, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322219950, kindergarten teacher, good behavior. Second son: Irip, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220020, studying at Qaraqash County No. 3 Middle School, good behavior. Third son: waris, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220130, kindergarten student, good behavior. Fourth son: Abd, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220130, kindergarten student.</p> <p>Social circle: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no one else detained or sent for re-education under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Tursuntoht's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that before being sent to a re-education center, he occasionally performed Namaz at home. On Fridays, he occasionally visited the mosque to perform Jüme Namaz. After eating, he performed Dua and occasionally celebrated the two holidays. This religious knowledge originated from his grandfather Turd, deceased 1994.</p>	Evaluation: Besides Tursuntoht's wife wearing a veil and the excess birth of four children, this investigation did not uncover any other problems. Moreover, he has reformed his way of thinking, he recognizes his mistakes, he has a genuinely repentant attitude, and he currently poses no threat. He is approved to be released from re-education and return to his hometown for further monitoring and control.
2	Re-education Center No.1	2017-10-11	Abdulmalik	65322219670	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	Bostan Street, Mingzhu Community,	1. Overstayed a visit to one of 26 critically sensitive countries. Suspicious person. 2. Has 1 child over the legal limit.		<p>Family circle includes 8 people with 2 in re-education centers. Wife: Amine, ID number: 65322219700, home address: Xinjiang Qaraqash County, Bostan Street, Mingzhu Community, nurse at Qaraqash Aixin Hospital. On October 17, 2017, she was sent to a re-education center for overstaying a visit to one of 26 critically sensitive countries. Brother: Abduqadir, ID number: 65322219710, place of residence: Tuwet Town Airike Village Group No. 1 #21. In November of 2017, he was sent to a re-education center following an IJOP push notification warning, and he has two children over the legal limit. Eldest son: Abd, ID number: 65322219900, doctor at Qaraqash County Aixin Hospital, average behavior. Daughter-in-law: Buhelchem, ID number: 65322219880, Qaraqash Yingbin Community official, satisfactory behavior. Granddaughter: Summeyrem, ID number: 65322220110, studying at Yingbin Community Kindergarten (preschooler), good behavior. Second son: Ad, ID number: 65322219931, intern at Kashgar Second People's Hospital, average behavior. Eldest daughter: guli, ID number: 65322219941, doctor at Qaraqash County Aixin Hospital, average behavior. Second daughter: Ayshe, ID number: 65322219971, doctor at Qaraqash County Aixin Hospital, satisfactory behavior.</p> <p>Social circle: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no other individuals detained or sent to Re-education Centers under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Abdulmalik's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that he prayed after meal and every morning he prayed once at home. Every Friday he visited the mosque to perform Jüme Namaz and every year he celebrated the two holidays. He participated in the "Four Activities" with friends and relatives. This religious knowledge was passed on to him by his grandmother Sayiphan (deceased 1994).</p>	Evaluation: According to the collision analysis carried out by subdistrict office community-level officials, Abdulmalik was sent to a re-education center because he overstayed a visit to one of 26 critically sensitive countries and is a suspicious person. In March 2015, he changed his household registration from Qaraqash County to Korla. In February 2016, he applied for a passport in Korla, passport number: E610. From May 10 to September 2016, he visited Saudi Arabia for 128 days. Upon returning, he stayed long-term in Qaraqash county. He poses a threat and we recommend he continue his re-education.
3	Re-education Center No.1	2018-3-11	Hörnisa	65322219750	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	Bostan Street, Yuhua Community, Yipbazar West Road,	Has 2 children over the legal limit.		<p>Family circle includes 6 people with 1 detained and 1 in a re-education center. Father: Meme, On March 30, 2017, he was sentenced to 7 years in prison for funding violent terrorism, currently serving his sentence in Ürümchi Prison No. 4. Husband: Ehmettoht, ID number: 65322219750, sent to a re-education center in Ürümchi by authorities there for having two children over the limit, and for applying for a passport without leaving the country. He has been transferred to Qaraqash County Re-education Center No. 3 to receive re-education. Eldest Daughter: Subh, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220010, first-year high school student at Beijing Academy. Second Daughter: Seb, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220040, first-year middle school student at Qaraqash No. 2 Middle School. Third Daughter: Nadir, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220120, second-year student at Qaraqash Marepat Kindergarten. Fourth Daughter: Nazal, female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322220150, preschool-aged child.</p> <p>Social circle: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no one else detained or sent to a re-education center under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Hörnisa's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that before being sent to a re-education center, she prayed after every meal and performed Namaz once every morning. She participated in relatives' and friends' wedding ceremonies, naming ceremonies, and circumcision ceremonies. (This knowledge originated from her mother Gülnetihar.)</p>	Evaluation: A collision analysis carried out by subdistrict office community officials found the individual's relatives within this jurisdiction exhibit satisfactory behavior. This individual gave birth to two children over the legal limit and currently has not completed a full year of re-education. We recommend she continue her re-education and improve her Chinese language ability.

4	Re-education Center No.1	2018-3-11	Roz'eli	65322219830	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community Bostan Street, Yuhua Community, Yipbazar West Road,	Post-80's generation untrustworthy individual	<p>Family circle includes 13 people with 1 detained and 2 sent to re-education centers. Father-in-law: Memtimin, ID number: 65322219540, detained in a prison in June 2017 (sentenced to six years) under the "Strike Hard" campaign for participation in an illegal Tablig activity. Husband: Memetjan, ID number: 65322219860, On May 21, 2017, he was sent to a reeducation camp by Purbetgachi town authorities for applying for a passport. Second brother: Abdjéil, ID number: 65322219920, On May 4, 2017, he was sent to a reeducation camp following an IJOP push notification warning. (Mobile and internet services suspended on September 13, 2015 under the "Cutting Communication" campaign). Father: Ez, ID number: 65322195708, retired Bureau of Water Resources official, good behavior. Mother: Dolettaihan, ID number: 653222195905, farmer in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Elderest sister: Gul, ID number: 65322219751, employee of a company in Sizi Community, good behavior. Second sister: Nur, ID number: 65322219780, emergency room nurse at a county hospital, good behavior. Third sister: Hó, ID number: 65322219830, tailor in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Brother: Abd, ID number: 65322219890, taxi driver in Heni Village, Zawa Town, good behavior. Mother-in-law: Cernerman, ID number: 65322219600, home-based farmer, good behavior.</p> <p>Social circle status: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no one else detained or sent to a re-education center under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle status: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Roz'eli's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that before being sent to a re-education center, she performed Namaz every day and prayed after every meal. Every year she visited relatives' tombs and prayed during the two holidays. Her religious knowledge originated from her grandmother Miremkan (deceased 2005).</p>	Evaluation: A collision analysis carried out by subdistrict office community officials found the individual's relatives within this jurisdiction all exhibit satisfactory behavior and enthusiastically participate in community work. She is a post-80's generation untrustworthy individual. She harbors restive thoughts and currently has not completed a full year of re-education. We recommend that she continue her re-education and improve her Chinese language ability.
5	Re-education Center No.3	2018-2-25	Rozimemet	65322219760	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yingxie Ha'er Community Kumu Luke North Road,	1. Illegally left the country or was repatriated after a failed attempt to leave the country. 2. Violated family planning policy: had children over the limit.	<p>Family circle: A collision analysis of three generations of relatives found a total of 10 members, with 1 detained, 1 in a re-education center, and 8 within this jurisdiction. 1. Mijit, male, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222195409, On August 28, 2015 he was sentenced to 3 years in prison for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order. In April of 2017 he was sentenced to an additional 10 years in prison for illegally proselytizing as a "wild Imam." 2. Wife: Enel, female, ID number: 653222198703, On November 6, 2018, Yingxie Ha'er community officials sent her to a re-education center due to her status as a post-80's generation untrustworthy individual. 3. Father: Asim, male, ID number: 65322219420, unemployed. 4. Mother: Bayime, female, ID number: 653222195903, handicapped and unemployed. 5. Sister: Amine, female, ID number: 653222196610, unemployed. 6. Elderest son: Ilyas, male, ID number: 653222200210, studying at Qaraqash County No. 3 Middle School (8th grade). 7. Second son: Yaqi, male, ID number: 65322200605, studying at Qaraqash No. 3 Elementary School (3rd grade). 8. Elderest daughter: Rah, male, ID number: 65322220121, studying at Kuonaxia Ha'er Kindergarten (third-year student). 9. Second daughter: Mu, female, ID number: 65322201603, homeschooled. 10. Mother-in-law: Rabiye, female, ID number: 653222195905, farmer, currently resides in Yingye'er Township, Kumu Ailag Village.</p> <p>Social circle: Neighbor: Memet, ID number: 653222193905, On June 1, 2018, he was sentenced to 6 years in prison for inciting terrorism. Neighbor: Góhemisa, female, Uyghur ethnicity, 653224197702, On February 1, 2018, she was sentenced to 14 years in prison for spreading extremist thoughts and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order. Neighbor: Abdurahman, male, Uyghur, ID number: 653222196003, On July 29, 2017, he was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months in prison for endangering public safety.</p> <p>Religious Circle: Upon conducting a home interview and investigating those associated with him, including those within his "Three Circles and Six Diagrams," it was found this individual prays and participates in the "Four Activities" (praying, visiting the mosque on Fridays, celebrating the two holidays, attending naming ceremonies, circumcision ceremonies, wedding ceremonies, and funerals). These religious practices originated from his grandfather (Asimu, deceased 20).</p>	1. Illegally left the country or was repatriated after a failed attempt to leave the country. (Detained for 9 months from October 2014 to August 2015 by Mengjia County, Kunming City public security organ for attempting to leave the country. He was then transferred to Hotan County Public Security Bureau and detained an additional 3 months, after which he was released to his home. He currently poses a threat. 2. Has 2 children over the family planning legal limit (daughter: Rah born December 2012, ID number: 6532220121, daughter: Mu, born in September 2016, ID number: 65322201603); Three generations of this individual's relatives include 10 people with 1 detained and 1 in a re-education center. Many of his relatives are detained under the "Strike Hard" campaign. Currently this individual shows average progress in reforming his ideas and needs to more deeply recognize his mistakes. We recommend he continue his re-education.
6	Re-education Center No.2	2017-10-27	Bu'ayshihan	65322219800	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Shadiq Community, Shadiq Community,	Veiled before the "Strike Hard" campaign.	<p>Family circle: This individual's family circle includes 5 members with 1 sent to a re-education center and 4 in this jurisdiction. No family members have been detained. Husband: Tursumniyaz, ID number: 653222197704, 41 years old. On May 15, 2018 he was sent to Re-education Center No.1 (Bostan Kule Re-education Center) by Qarassay Town authorities for refusing to participate in community work. Father: Mór, 69 years old, currently located in this jurisdiction, farmer. Mother: Hórnisa, died of illness in August 20 . Elderest son: salam, 17 years old, currently a student of Qaraqash County No.1 Middle School. Second son: rahman, 11 years old, currently a student in Qaraqash County Elementary School. Elderest daughter: reb, 9 years old, currently a student in Qaraqash County Elementary School.</p> <p>Social circle: Aynur: 35 years old, farmer, currently located in this jurisdiction, housewife. Muranisa: 50 years old, farmer, currently located in this jurisdiction, housewife. Bayiman: 37 years old, currently located in this jurisdiction, housewife.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community officials assigned to her residential section conducted a home interview and United Front Work Department religious affairs officials investigated her "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." They found this individual would pray at home and would participate in the "Four Activities" and celebrate the two holidays. Her father Mómín (Shadiq Community) taught her how to pray.</p>	A collision analysis carried out by community-level officials found this individual's husband Tursumniyaz purchased a mosque in Tailipake under the pretense of building a house. It was later revealed that he did not tear down the mosque, but renovated it instead. Illegal decorations and adornments, as defined under the "Three Illegal Religious Activities and One Item" campaign, still exist on the structure. This individual still harbors certain religious thoughts. After Bu'ayshihan was sent to a re-education center, her father and other relatives willingly participated in community work and participated in various community-organized events. She recognizes her mistakes and currently poses no threat. We recommend she end her re-education and be further monitored and controlled by community officials.

7	Re-education Center No.1	Abdumalik	65322219670	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	<p>Family circle includes 2 individuals sent to Re-education Centers. Wife: Amina , ID number: 653222197003 , home address: Xinjiang, Qaraqash County, Bostan Street, Mingzhu Community , nurse at Qaraqash County Aixin Hospital, sent to a re-education center for overstaying a visit to one of 26 ethnically sensitive countries. Brother: Abdugadi , 653222197103 , residence: Tuwet Town Airike Village , sent to a re-education center following an LIOP push notification warning.</p> <p>Social circle: An investigation revealed no one within this individual's circle of friends and neighbors has been detained or sent for re-education under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: Management Committee for Places of Worship officials conducted a collision analysis of Abdumalik 's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams" and found that he would pray after each meal and perform Namaz prayer every morning. Every Friday he would visit the mosque to perform Jüme Namaz. Every year during the two holidays he would visit the mosque to pray. He participated in the "Four Activities" with his friends and family. His religious knowledge originated from his grandmother Sayiphan (deceased 1981).</p>	Approved
8	Re-education Center No.1	Ümid	65322219840	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	<p>Family circle: Wife: Tohsayip , 653222198402 , owner of a pharmacy in Taklamakan, has left the country multiple times with her husband, a Public Security Bureau investigation has not recommended she be sent for re-education, average behavior; Eldest son: Ablet , 653222200900 , student at Qaraqash No. 4 Elementary School, good behavior; Second son: Mehmet , 653222201300 , studying at Mairen Paiti Kindergarten, good behavior; Eldest daughter: Nefise , 653222201400 , studying at Mairen Paiti Kindergarten, good behavior; Father: Emel , 653222195812 , farmer in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village, average behavior; Mother: Ezizem , 653222196000 , farmer in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village, average behavior; Father-in-law: Abdurahman , 653222194807 , farmer in Qaraqash County Tuowan Kapakela Village, average behavior; Mother-in-law: Patem , 653222195710 , family member in Qaraqash County Tuowan Kapakela Village, average behavior; Sister: Ihtibar , 653222198612 , farmer in Qarasay Town Kaerdong Village, good behavior; Brother-in-law: Sultan , 653222198400 , farmer in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village, good behavior; Brother: Tursunmemet , 653222198900 , works in a Taklamakan pharmacy, poor behavior. On December 1, 2017 he was sent to a re-education center for applying for a passport. Sister-in-law: Reyhan , 653222199310 , farmer in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village, average behavior; Sister: Arziqul , 653222199010 , runs a pharmacy in Tuwet Town, satisfactory behavior; Brother-in-law: Eli , 653222198500 , runs a pharmacy in Tuwet Town, satisfactory behavior; Brother: Turdimemet , 653222199100 , works in a Taklamakan pharmacy, satisfactory behavior, unmarried;</p> <p>Social circle: Friend: Mutellip , 653222197411 , Shadiq Community security guard, average behavior. Friend: Abdumutillip , 653222198307 , works in a Taklamakan pharmacy, average behavior; Friend: Shimmerel , 653222199005 , taxi driver, average behavior;</p> <p>Religious circle: Management Committee for Places of Worship officials conducted a collision analysis of Tohti 's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams" and found that on March 10, 2008, after the death of his grandfather, he traveled to a mosque in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village to attend the funeral. On March 17, 2008, he went to a mosque in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village and performed Jüme Namaz. In 2008 he went to a mosque in Qarasay Town, Kaerdong Village to participate in an Eid al-Adha festival, after which he stopped and has not since visited a mosque. He prays after every meal.</p> <p>According to the community-level officials' evaluation and subdistrict office officials' collision analysis, in December 2014, Tohti , relocated to Anhui Province, Taihe County, Economic Development Zone, Hui Community, China National . After applying for a passport there, he overstayed a visit to a critically sensitive country 5 times. He is a long-term Hotan resident. He poses certain threat and we recommend he continue re-education.</p>	Approved
9	Re-education Center No.1	Memit	65322219850	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yipbazar Community	<p>Family circle: Father is deceased. Mother: Abbashan , 65 years old, currently in this jurisdiction. Eldest sister: Almihan , farmer, currently in this jurisdiction. Eldest brother: Yunus , 50 years old, works in the Qaraqash County Bureau of Social Security, currently in this jurisdiction. Second sister: Güljennet , 43 years old, currently in this jurisdiction. Third sister: , 42 years old, a family planning official in Bostan Street subdistrict, currently in this jurisdiction. Second brother: Abdurahman , 35 years old. Sentenced to 19 years in prison for disrupting social order and participating in a terrorist organization. Fourth sister: Nezerhan , 30 years old, currently in this jurisdiction. Third brother: Abdumutellip , 29 years old. In February 2018, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison for disrupting social order, participating in a terrorist organization, and attempting to cover-up for others. Fourth brother: Ehmjetjan , 26 years old. In February 2018, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.</p> <p>Social circle: No family member or friends have been detained or sent for re-education under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Neighbor circle: This individual does not have any neighbors who have been detained or sent for re-education under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: This individual would pray, which included praying at home once each day and performing Friday Prayer. He fasted during Ramadan, participated in ceremonies during the two holidays, and participated in the "Four Activities" (naming ceremonies, circumcision ceremonies, funerals, and wedding ceremonies). Mehmet Eli 's father , deceased 2001) taught him this religious knowledge at a young age.</p> <p>Community Evaluation: This individual was sent for re-education on February 16, 2016 for applying for a passport (passport number: E680) for group travel without leaving the country. Among those in his "three circles," his second brother, Abdul Raxman , was sentenced to 19 years in prison for disrupting social order and participating in a terrorist organization. His third brother was sentenced to 25 years in prison in February 2018 for disrupting social order, participating in a terrorist organization, and attempting to cover-up for others. His fourth brother Ehmjetjan was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 2018 for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order. Many of this individual's family members and relatives are either detained under or involved in the "Strike Hard" campaign. His ideas are infected with religious extremism. Upon the community officials' evaluation, we recommend that he be put under strict control and continue re-education.</p>	Approved

10	Re-education Center No.1		Abduleziz [REDACTED]	65322219960 [REDACTED]	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuzumu Community	<p>Family circle: Father: Tursun [REDACTED], 55 years old. In June 2017, he was sentenced to 5 years in prison under the "Strike Hard" campaign for growing a long, two-toned dyed beard and organizing underground Quranic study. He is serving his sentence in a prison in Ürümqi. Mother: Qembemsa [REDACTED], 48 years old. In April 2018, she was sentenced to 10 years in prison for illegally proselytizing as a "wild Imam." Eldest brother: Abdulla [REDACTED], 29 years old. In June, 2017, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for illegally proselytizing as a "wild Imam." Eldest sister: Hörnisa [REDACTED], 27 years old, Chepai Road, [REDACTED]. In May 2017, she was sent to a re-education center for being infected with religious extremism. Second sister: Buhajre [REDACTED], 25 years old, works at "Golden Butterfly" gold jewelry store. Brother: Abduwahab [REDACTED], 20 years old. In April, 2017 he was sent to a re-education center for being infected with religious extremism. Brother: Memetabdul [REDACTED], 18 years old, student at a vocational school in Qaraqash County. Sister: Muyesser [REDACTED], 16 years old, works at "Golden Butterfly" gold jewelry store. Sister: Mazli [REDACTED], 16 years old, student at a vocational school in Qaraqash County.</p> <p>Neighborhood circle: Neighbor: Memtimin [REDACTED]. In May 2015, he was sentenced to 6 years in prison for spreading religious extremism. Neighbor: Abduwahab [REDACTED]. On May 7, 2015, he was sent to a re-education center for familial ties to a "critical individual" who was infected with religious extremism by family.</p> <p>Social circle: MemetAbdulla [REDACTED], student at a vocational school in Qaraqash County. Hörnisa [REDACTED], sent to a re-education center for familial ties to an individual who was detained under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: This individual performed namaz during celebrations of the two holidays. He would perform dua and recite several verses of the Quran after each meal. He learned these religious practices from his mother (Kamarnisa [REDACTED]) and father (Tursun [REDACTED]), and his religious heritage originates from his parents.</p> <p>Evaluation: A relatively high number of this individual's family members have been detained or sent to a re-education center, and his home has a strong religious atmosphere. This individual is relatively young and he has not fulfilled the national compulsory re-education requirement. It is difficult to expunge his family's influence within a short period of time. All of his family members who reside within this jurisdiction are in average behavior. We recommend he continue to receive re-education.</p>	Approved
11	Re-education Center No.1		Yusupjan [REDACTED]	653222198706 [REDACTED]	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Shadiq Community	<p>Family circle: Grandfather: Memti [REDACTED], detained and sentenced to 12 years in prison for involvement in "Case No. 2." Father: Abdulla [REDACTED], Shadiq Community "critical individual." Mother: Sahipjamal, farmer in Shadiq Community Section No. 2. Brother: Yaqub [REDACTED], dentist in Shadiq Community Section No. 1. Elder sister: Mähmur [REDACTED], resides in Tongde Community, home-based. Sister: Raziye [REDACTED], nurse at Loqman Hospital. Sister: Aliye [REDACTED], home-based. Wife: Qelbintu [REDACTED], kindergarten teacher. Daughter: Nesibe [REDACTED], home-schooled. Father-in-law: Melinesir [REDACTED], works in the Tuwet Town Public Security Bureau. Mother-in-law: Nurjahan [REDACTED], resides and works at a hospital in Tuwet Town.</p> <p>Social circle: Abdulla [REDACTED], ID number: 653222198203 [REDACTED], resides in Shadiq Community Section No. 2, self-employed selling barbeque. Memetja [REDACTED], ID number: 653222198802 [REDACTED]. In May 2017, he was sent for re-education for disrupting social stability.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community-level "Becoming Family" officials conducted a home interview and United Front Work Department religious affairs officials investigated his "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." After analysis, they found this individual would pray, participate in "Four Activities" and two holidays. He would visit Bostan Mosque to pray once every day. His religious knowledge was taught to him by his father Abdulla [REDACTED] (Xiata Leke Community Section [REDACTED]).</p> <p>Community level officials comprehensively investigated Yusupjan Abdulla, male, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222198706100337, household registration location: Xinjiang, Qaraqash County, Qaraqash Town Yingxie Hai'er Village, #177, currently residing in Shadiq Community Section No. 2. He is a post-80's generation untrustworthy individual. On June 4, 2017, he was sent to Re-education Center No. 1 (Bostan Kule). His father is a "critical individual" in his community. His grandfather was sentenced to prison for 12 years due to involvement in "Case No. 2." According to intelligence, his mother organized Tarawih activities at home. His home has a strong religious atmosphere. He poses a threat, and we recommend he continue re-education.</p>	Unapproved

12	Re-education Center No.1	Rozimemet [REDACTED]	65322219721 [REDACTED]	Bostan Subdistrict Office	Yuhua Community	<p>Family circle: Wife: Rabiya [REDACTED], 65322219740 [REDACTED], Yuhua Community, [REDACTED], located in this jurisdiction; Eldest son: [REDACTED] salam [REDACTED], 65322219920 [REDACTED], works in another area of Xinjiang. Second son: [REDACTED] weil [REDACTED], 65322219960 [REDACTED], works in another area of Xinjiang. Third son: [REDACTED] rahman [REDACTED], 65322220080 [REDACTED], No. 4 Elementary School student. Fourth son: [REDACTED] mel [REDACTED], 65322220130 [REDACTED], preschool-aged child. Eldest daughter: Raf [REDACTED], 65322219980 [REDACTED], student at Hotan Technical College. Second daughter: Reyhan [REDACTED], 65322219980 [REDACTED], No. 3 Middle School student. Daughter-in-law: Zohre [REDACTED], 65322219950 [REDACTED], works in another area of Xinjiang. Sister: Gulhumar [REDACTED], 53222197004 [REDACTED], hard off cotton company worker, satisfactory behavior.</p> <p>Social circle: Memetjan [REDACTED], 65322219660 [REDACTED], Yuhua Community, [REDACTED], contract worker at Ka'ersai Station, satisfactory behavior. Turdimemet [REDACTED], 6532221971040 [REDACTED], Yuhua Community, [REDACTED], self-employed, satisfactory behavior. Abdukirim [REDACTED], 65322219730 [REDACTED], Yuhua Community, [REDACTED], Administration of Urban Construction government official, satisfactory behavior.</p> <p>Religious circle: Management Committee for Places of Worship officials conducted a collision analysis of Rozimemet [REDACTED]'s "Three Circles and Six Diagrams" and found that before being sent to a re-education center, he would pray after each meal and perform namaz prayer every morning at the Qaraqash County Bostan Street mosque. Every Friday he would visit the Qaraqash County Bostan Street mosque to perform Jume namaz. Every year during the two holidays he would visit the mosque to pray. (His religious heritage, knowledge, and aforementioned practices originated from his father [REDACTED] itursun [REDACTED]).</p> <p>Evaluation: A collision analysis carried out by subdistrict office community officials found no problems other than Rozimemet [REDACTED] having four children over the legal limit. Moreover, he has reformed his way of thinking, recognizes his mistakes, has a genuinely repentant attitude and currently poses no threat. He is approved to be released from re-education and return to his hometown for further monitoring and control.</p>	Approved
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Type of Reason	Reason	Original Chinese	Number
Birth policy violations	Gave birth to X number of extra children/ person who violated birth policies, X number of extra births	超生X孩/ 违反计划生育法超生X胎人员	113
	Did not implement 3-year birth spacing policy	未落实计划生育三年间隔生育政策	1
	Provided fake abortion certificate	提供虚假流产证明	1
Unsafe post 80s, 90s, or 00s person	Unsafe post 80s, 90s, or 00s person	80/90/00后不放心人员	91
Ex-convict or other past law violation	Normal/dangerous type ex-convict	一般/危安类刑满释放人员	29
	Law and order type ex-convict	治安类刑满释放人员	1
	Person diverted from detention center	看守所分流人员	1
	Committed minor offense, not prosecuted	构成轻微犯罪，未追究法律责任的人员	1
	Person who took drugs	吸毒人员	3
	Person under special management	列管特殊群体人员	1
	Domestic violence	构成家暴行为/ 家庭暴力人员	2
	Witness in a fraud case	行骗案件受害者证人	1
	Operated a music business without a license and without paying taxes	音乐创业期间，没有办营业执照，没有交税，属于非法经	1
Wore veil/wife wore veil/had beard	Wore a veil/ wore veil before strike hard	蒙面/ 严打前蒙面	6
	Wore a veil and “jilbab”/burqa	蒙面，穿“吉里巴甫”服人员/ 穿罩袍人员	3
	Wife wore a veil	妻子蒙面	11
	Had a beard/ had a beard before strike hard	以前留胡子/严打前留胡子	12
	Had a beard, wore short trousers, Wahabi thinking	留胡子，穿短裤， 有瓦哈比思想	1
Applied for passport	Applied for passport (and didn't leave the country)	办理护照人员(未出境人员)	24
	A household where many people applied for passports	一户多人办理护照人员	1

Religious extremist thought infection	Household has a thick religious atmosphere, susceptible to religious extremist thought infection	家庭宗教氛围浓厚，易受宗教极端思想感染人员	5
	Person with religious extremist thought infection	宗教极端思想感染人员	9
	Influenced by religious extremist thinking	受宗教极端思想的影响	1
	Slightly infected by religious extremist thought	受宗教极端思想感染轻微人员	1
	Received religious thinking infection unsafe post 90s person	受宗教思想感染90后不放心人员	1
	Thinking unstable, ability to resist religious infiltration low	思想不稳定，宗教极端思想渗透抵抗能力较低	1
	Person spreading extremist thinking	传播极端思想被遣返人员	1
Reason related to religious practice	Unofficial hajj	零散朝觐人员	10
	Restaurant not open during Ramadan	在斋月期间饭馆没有正常营业	1
	Gave to mosque	给清真寺积极捐款人员	1
	Provided space for illegal lectures	提供非法讲经场所	1
	Illegally studied religion	非法教学经人员	1
	Attended illegal religious activities before the strike hard campaign	严打前参加非法宗教活动	1
	Provided space for illegal religious activities	为他人提供场所进行非法宗教活动	2
	Unpunished parent or guardian of a minor who attended religious activities	参加非法宗教活动未成年人的父母或其他法定监护人员中未打击人员	1
	Attended illegal religious classes over the age of 16	参加非法教经班时16岁以上的人员	1
	Attended illegal classes under the age of 16	非法学经时16岁以下的未成年人	1
	Sent son/daughter to illegal religious classes	送儿子非法学经/ 送未成年子女学经	2
Attended illegal tabiq (preaching)	参加非法台比力克	1	

International travel	A returned person/ suspicious returned person	防回流人员/形迹可疑回流人员	16
	Went to one of the 26 sensitive countries, suspicious return person	出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回形迹可疑人员	2
	Illegal exit or attempt to return	非法出境人员或非法出境未遂被遣返人员	1
	Sent by the Public Security Bureau, went to sensitive countries 5 times	公安审查转培训人员，5次往返重点国家	1
Related to prisoner	Related to a prisoner	收押人员亲属	2
	Related to a “strike hard” prisoner	严打收押人员亲属	10
Movements within China	Abnormal movements, thinking difficult to grasp, complex communications	行动轨迹异常，思想难掌握，人际交往复杂	1
	Person who moved household registration to inland and lived in Qaraqash for a long time	户籍迁入内地，人在墨玉长期生活人员	1
	This person engaged in business and labor activities outside since 2004, during their time outside their communication and movements were relatively complex, they did not ask permission to leave, and their whereabouts could not be grasped, was labeled an unsafe post-80s person by the shequ	该人从2004年起一直在外从事经商和务工等活动，外出期间人际交往和活动轨迹比较复杂，也不落实请销假措施，行踪不宜掌握，被社区列为80后不放心人员	1
	7.5 diverted person	7.5分流人员	3
	Left without permission, went to Urumchi without authorization	未向原户籍地请假，擅自到乌市	1
A person with two households	双户人员	1	
Two-faced official	Two-faced official	两面性干部	3
	Official who did namaz (prayer) at home	国家干部在家做乃玛孜	1
	Official who attended illegal preaching	国家干部参加非法台比力克	1
Did not obey community (shequ) personnel	Did not obey shequ personnel	不服从社区管理人员	4

Related to someone outside of the country	Family fled outside of country	境外追逃人员亲属	3
	Family of someone who illegally left the country	非法出境人员亲属	1
Possessed or watched illegal media	Kept illegal religious books / Illegal books hidden in the home	非法存留非法宗教书籍/ 家中藏有非法书籍	2
	From October 2011 to July 2012, during the training session at Beijing agricultural vocational college, he watched illegal religious videos with others that Tursuntohti X downloaded on his computer.	2011年10月至2012年7月在北京农业职业学院培训期间与他人一起观看图尔荪托合提·X用电脑下载非法宗教视频	1
	Suspected of downloading illegal terrorist or other religious extremist audio or video	具有观看下载传播暴恐音视频或其他类宗教极端音视频的嫌疑	1
	Accidentally clicked on an overseas website on their phone	手机点击网站链接无意登陆境外网站	1
Fraudulent marriage certificate	Married with a fake marriage certificate	持假结婚证结婚的人员	1
	Fraudulently obtained marriage certificate as a minor	未成年骗取结婚证结婚	1
	Illegal nika (Islamic marriage ceremony), married with a fake marriage certificate	该人非法念尼卡持假结婚证结婚	1
Overseas communication	Pushed by Public Security Bureau for overseas communication	公安机关推送境外通联	1
	Overseas communication	境外通联	1



The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) was founded by the Uyghur American Association (UAA) in 2004 with a supporting grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). UHRP's mission is to promote human rights and democracy for the Uyghur people. In 2016, UHRP became an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit, tax-exempt organization.

UHRP works to raise the profile of the Uyghur people by:

Researching, writing and publishing commentary and reports in English and Chinese covering a broad range human rights issues involving civil and political rights, through to social cultural and economic rights; preparing briefings – either written or in person – for journalists, academics, diplomats and legislators on the human rights situation faced by the Uyghur people.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project
1602 L Street, Suite 613, Washington D.C., 20036
Tel: (202) 478-1920 Fax: (202) 478-1910
www.uhrp.org info@uhrp.org
[@UyghurProject](#) [@UHRP_Chinese](#)

1 **10 September 2021 (2:29:10 – 3:30:16)**

2 **Elise Anderson**

3

4 ELISE ANDERSON – Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. In my
5 oral remarks, I would like to share a brief overview of the Qaraqash List, per my
6 organization’s research on it. Some parts of this presentation will repeat information
7 from my written testimony, but I will also highlight other details which weren’t in my
8 short submission but which are of potential interest to the panel. So, let’s get started.

9 The Qaraqash List--shown here in a redacted version prepared by UHRP--is a
10 spreadsheet containing 677 rows of detailed information about 311 detainees under
11 the management of Bostan subdistrict in the county seat of Qaraqash county, Hotan
12 prefecture. The purpose of the document, which is titled “Internees related to
13 ‘unreturned’ persons,” appears to have been to track the social relations and “re-
14 education” “progress” of these detainees, and eventually to determine whether they
15 should be released. The detainees share several things: 1) they are all Uyghurs, 2)
16 they are all under the administration of the Bostan subdistrict (even in cases where
17 evidence shows that their home address is outside Bostan, in a different township),
18 and they are all related to “unreturned people,” which denotes other Uyghurs who have
19 gone abroad and not come back to the Uyghur Region. The spreadsheet contains 12
20 columns, which detail various kinds of information about the 311 detainees. Here I
21 have zoomed-in views of those 12 columns, which include information about the
22 following:

23 1. Entry numbers. 1-677

24 2. Facility of detention. Four detention centers and a “healthcare facility.”

- 25 3. Date interned. The entries stretch from April and May 2017 to October 28, 2018.
26 Updates continued to be made through March 2019, however.
- 27 4. Detainee name. This cell lists each detainee's first and last names,
28 transliterated into Chinese characters. The names make it immediately obvious
29 that these individuals are Uyghur.
- 30 5. ID number. This cell lists each internee's 18-digit Chinese national ID number.
31 All IDs show that the individuals were born in Qaraqash county.
- 32 6. Responsible subdistrict office. Administrative unit at the county-town level.
- 33 7. Responsible neighborhood office. This cell notes the neighborhood
34 administrative office responsible for each internee. All eight neighborhoods in
35 Bostan subdistrict are here.
- 36 8. Detainee address. These addresses are likely those noted in each internee's
37 household registration.
- 38 9. Reason(s) for detention.
- 39 10. Management level: "normal" (普), "strict" (严), or "maximum" (强) management.

40 And now, to the bottom image:

- 41 11. "Three circles." This is the most extensive column of the document, recording
42 detailed information about 1) immediate and extended family, 2) friends and
43 neighbors, and 3) religious inheritance/practice.
- 44 12. Evaluation. This column notes whether a particular detainee should remain in
45 internment or be released.

46 In my organization, we conducted a close reading and textual analysis of the
47 document, as well as a translation and a redaction of part of the document, as part of
48 our work to discern what the data could tell us. We were struck by the detail in the 11th

49 column, the “Three Circles”. Entries in this column include detailed information about
50 individuals associated with each of the 311 detainees, including their name, ethnic
51 group, sex, ID number, age, employment place/status, and/or behavior status (e.g.,
52 “good behavior,” “ok behavior,” etc.). Other information included in some but not all
53 entries includes detention status and any relevant prior criminal charges and/or
54 sentence lengths. Many entries make note of the use of what we translated as “three
55 circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), which appears to be
56 a novel method authorities are using to gather and analyze data, as we have not found
57 it in use in other leaked databases.

58 Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted
59 a collision analysis of Tursuntohti XXX's "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was
60 found that before being sent to a re-education center, he occasionally performed
61 Namaz at home. On Fridays, he occasionally visited the mosque to perform Jüme
62 Namaz. After eating, he performed Dua and occasionally celebrated the two holidays.
63 This religious knowledge originated from his grandfather Turdi, deceased 1994.

64 When including all individuals mentioned in the Three Circles cell, the total number of
65 individual Uyghurs mentioned in the document, according to figures calculated by Dr.
66 Adrian Zenz, is 2,802 adults and hundreds of minors, totaling more than 3,000 people.
67 656, or 23.43%, of the 2,802 persons are or were at one point in time interned or
68 imprisoned -- 137 w/ prison sentences (4.9%), 42 in detention centers (1.5%), and 477
69 in re-education (17%). In our original reporting and analysis, one key part of this
70 document’s significance was the way it provided confirmation of other policies and
71 tools in use in the region since 2016/2017.

72 The Qaraqash List mentions the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, a predictive
73 policing app, at numerous points in the “Three Circles” column, emphasizing how
74 surveillance and data-gathering are part of the system of detention. Per our count,
75 there are approximately 106 references to the IJOP in this spreadsheet.

76 Another significant point about the Qaraqash List is that it provides confirmation of the
77 implementation of the XUAR government’s program of intense monitoring inside the
78 home--here I’ve noted it as the “Becoming Family” program, but I also might have titled
79 this slide even more accurately as “work groups in Uyghur homes.” The document
80 contains 3 references to community-level cadres living inside Uyghur homes to
81 monitor what happens inside, and a total of 28 references to community-level cadres
82 more generally. We calculated some limited demographic statistics based on
83 information about the 311 main detainees. In our analysis, 94% of them were men,
84 while 6% were women. This correlates to information we have obtained from
85 testimonies and investigative reporting from 2017 into the present, which have all
86 suggested that men are disproportionately targeted in the various forms of state
87 custody. Of the 311 main detainees, 39% were in center 1, 38% in center 2, 3% in
88 center 3, and 19% in center 4. 1% were in a healthcare facility of some sort.

89 In his own report on the document, Dr. Adrian Zenz calculated a broader range of
90 statistics that accounted for all the adult persons in the document: He found an age
91 distribution of 25 to 49 years as the main age range of interned individuals, that half of
92 people were interned April-June 2017, two-thirds in 2017 and another one-third in
93 2018. Evidence suggesting links to forced labour also appear in the list, though I do
94 not have time to go into them here.

95 I include photos of camps 1 through 4, in screenshots from Google Earth, which we
96 captured in February 2020. I'll flip through these quickly.

97 [*displays four pictures*]

98 We referenced the work of Shawn Zhang to identify the locations and likely locations
99 of these camps. Adrian Zenz provides further confirmation of the camp locations in his
100 own report on the issue. We were also interested in the cell describing reasons for
101 detention. Of the 311 detainees:

- 102 - 115 Family planning violations
- 103 - 91 Unsafe/untrustworthy post 80s, 90s, or 00s person
- 104 - Violations involving religious practice in some way or another
- 105 - Overseas connections
- 106 - Other reasons I can share later if requested

107 Our report from February 2020 includes this detailed table in the Appendix, where we
108 list reasons for detention in greater detail than in the body of the report.

109 Final judgments by officials show that many detainees were remaining in or under
110 some form of close monitoring and control:

- 111 - 98 of the 311 were "released" into community management and control
- 112 - 77 were "finished/safe"
- 113 - 43 were under "continue training, finish after one year"
- 114 - 41 "working at the (industrial) park"
- 115 - 34 continue training
- 116 - And more, including 2 sentenced to prison

117 At the time it was published in the international press, the third high-profile leak of
118 documents relating to the campaign in the Uyghur Region, the Qaraqash List was
119 significant for the way it provided a granular look into the system we had already come
120 to understand so well. The document has several important implications:

- 121 - Evidence for linkages between the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)
122 and the information gathered and stored on individual Uyghurs at the subdistrict
123 and neighbourhood levels of geopolitical administration in the Uyghur Region;
- 124 - Linkages between this information and other government policies and tools,
125 including the Becoming Family program and the program of forced labour;
- 126 - The scope and intent of data-gathering, and the direct relationships between
127 that data and various forms of repression playing out in the Uyghur Region
128 today;
- 129 - The role of guilt-by-association in Chinese Party-state repression of Uyghurs;
130 and
- 131 - Evidence that the Party-state has effectively criminalized everyday life as it
132 restructures Uyghur society from the ground up.

133 *COUNSEL – The presentation focused on the camps; my few questions refer to*
134 *outside of the camps. In your report you describe a system of intense intrusive*
135 *extensive and high-tech surveillance comprised of high-tech systems such as IJOP,*
136 *you refer towards the end to the becoming family program where more than 1 million*
137 *individuals, mainly Han Chinese, are paired off with Uyghurs in order to spy on them*
138 *and report on families. My question relating to this kind of surveillance outside the*
139 *camps, for those Uyghurs who are supposedly free, how closely are they monitored*
140 *by the Chinese authorities, to what extent are those free Uyghurs almost totally*
141 *and continuing surveillance?*

142 EA – Given what we know about the surveillance and monitoring system, even
143 Uyghurs who are free or outside custody are constantly subjected to checkpoints and
144 monitoring in different systems such as plug phones into tools so police can scan,
145 facial recognition systems and body scanners at these checkpoints. In addition, the
146 ‘free’ Uyghurs who are visited by representatives of the state by the Becoming Family
147 program for example. Accounts in the secondary literature that mention the Becoming
148 Family program detail the way Uyghurs do not feel free to speak in the Uyghur
149 language, or cook food they want to cook, or where they cook with the Becoming Family,
150 they cannot ask what kind of meat is in the food as that might be a sign of religious
151 extremism. The Becoming Family members document what happens inside the family
152 home, asking children about daily life. Technological surveillance, checkpoints,
153 scanners and human element where there is more room for error. Those two things
154 combine, in my opinion they are not free even when they are ‘free’.

155 *COUNSEL – To what extent is this intrusive surveillance accorded to Han Chinese?*

156 EA – To best of my knowledge, this kind of surveillance is not used on Han Chinese
157 people in the region. I was last in the region in 2018, I saw at checkpoints, there are
158 separate lines, there were in 2018 that Uyghurs and other non-Han people had to go
159 through. There was different treatment, even though Han Chinese had to go through
160 checkpoints they did not have to go through same lines. In literature, the Becoming
161 Family cadres going into people's home is just for Uyghurs and Kazakhs.

162 *COUNSEL – What activities are criminal on the list? We often hear Chinese authorities*
163 *state individuals in prison are there are engaging in criminal activities. In your report*
164 *you state that activities can be classed as suspicious include things such as practising*
165 *religion, is that correct? Is following Uyghur religions potentially criminal or suspicious?*

166 EA – Yes, given the way I understand the Qaraqash list and broader context,
167 assembled and used effectively many if not all expressions of distant cultural and
168 religious are at least suspicious if not downright criminalised. In the exert I read to you
169 the note that he performed Dua, a kind of prayer after eating, or celebrating ‘two
170 holidays’ those are practises as much cultural as they are religious – the lines between
171 the two are not immediately obvious. Evidence that criminality is all encompassing and
172 broad sweeping comes from second highest reason for detention is unsafe post
173 80s,90s, 20s. The mere fact of when someone was born as suspicious. A memorable
174 example, some people were noted as suspicious and recommended for detention as
175 they had applied for a passport and never gone abroad. Some people apply for
176 passport and that makes them suspicious – wide ranging, and broad sweeping.

177 *PANEL – The use of this document, when the document came to your team had it*
178 *already been assessed, or did you approach it with an open mind?*

179 EA – We did approach it with an open mind and attempted as best we could assess
180 whether it could be genuine. We concluded it was genuine in our eyes.

181 *PANEL – As you went through the process, did you at any stage have doubts, or was*
182 *it a question of confirmation of what you expected or hoped was genuine?*

183 EA – For me personally, there were instances where it appeared that some ID
184 numbers were incorrectly recorded, were not the proper length, names recorded
185 inconsistently, some people obviously male were female – these things made me
186 doubt. Ultimately, we came down to think this was the result of human error. There are
187 clear instances of people recording it and writing it down.

188 *PANEL – The copy of the original, is it possible to say how many people contributed*
189 *or would it have been a single scribe?*

190 EA – It is not possible to say how many people contributed to it, my suspicion is it was
191 not one as indicated by the sheer number of entries.

192 *PANEL – Could you briefly summarise the bases on which you concluded it was*
193 *genuine?*

194 EA – We found linguistic clues in the document namely regarding naming conventions
195 particular to the region. We also found that factual information corroborated details
196 such as the IJOP and Becoming Family program as evidence it was likely. It wasn't
197 every single entry that referenced those. There are not as many references as if
198 someone was trying to make it fit a predetermined narrative. Re the Chinese ID
199 numbers, we did not have access to a database of numbers to run an analysis to check
200 if they were accurate. Dr Zenz was able to use documents and databases from his
201 own cache of documents to show many ID numbers were authentic. Additionally in
202 comparison to other documents we have reviewed before we thought it was genuine.
203 In discussion with other experts such as Dr Zenz and others we reached out to – we
204 all determined that it appeared genuine.

205 *PANEL – Was the giveaway by someone from the PRC?*

206 EA – In the days followed publication of our report, media and Dr Zenz, Chinese state
207 media claimed it was inauthentic – China Daily inadvertently confirmed the authenticity
208 of the document in an article referencing a person's name and information from the
209 list. This particular individual's information and name had not been made public as it
210 was redacted in the released document. The Chinese then released a video featuring
211 a woman in 190 of the Qaraqash list in this video she claims she was never interned;
212 she notes her age (which is the same as in the list). The final entry notes it was
213 recommended she could continue her release and detention on account of good

214 behaviour. That would explain why she was able to be in the video perhaps more
215 easily than other people.

216 *PANEL – This video was trying to show the document was false?*

217 EA – Yes, that is what it was attempting to show. She says ‘don't interfere with my
218 good life’. This bears the features of other similar videos. Akin to forced confessions.

219 *Panel - Are there other non-Chinese sources critical to assessment of this document?*

220 EA – I have not seen any other on this particular document.

221 *PANEL – Does your answer suggest there are some academic opinions on another
222 document?*

223 EA - Not in any published source. I have heard some people doing work on primary
224 sources link to Shanghai list – there are some doubts of the authenticity of that list.

225 *PANEL – Has the PRC published criticisms of detail of the list, or simply said it is
226 forged?*

227 EA – They have published in China Daily, China Times, they have brought out people
228 on the list such as video I have described here. China Daily brought out someone
229 mentioned in family circle 346 row of document, saying that this is not true and he
230 doesn't understand why he is in the document. The attempts at refutation have taken
231 this form.

232 *PANEL – Has the refutation always been by the person rather than pointing out
233 inaccuracy of the statistical or other details?*

234 EA – Yes, I am not aware of any publishing of inaccuracy of statistics or other details.

235 *PANEL – People may say things at the behest of the government?*

236 EA – Yes.

237 *Panel - Is anything known about the person who leaked document, is anything known*
238 *about the person or possible category of person?*

239 EA – We do describe in our report the chain how it came to us as several individuals
240 were happy being public. It came to us as several individuals were happy to be public
241 about that, we received it from linguist and activist Abduweli Ayup and he received it
242 from Asiye Abdullahad in the Netherlands. Ms Asiye says she received document from
243 an official in Qaraqash county as part of the same leak from China Cables.

244 *PANEL – China cables, same question, were they subject to non-Chinese criticism,*
245 *academic or otherwise?*

246 EA – Not that I am aware.

247 *PANEL – Is the likely source, an official in office who made document?*

248 EA – Yes.

249 *PANEL – Given your broader experience, is this indicative of at least one person not*
250 *persuaded by the philosophy that lies behind the control of the Uyghurs*

251 EA – Correct, at least one other instance of a relatively high ranking official on a county
252 level disagreeing with the policies and openly doing so.

253 *PANEL – The document itself has extraordinary detail of reasoning behind people*
254 *being detained, does that suggest the presence in the community of unknown spies,*
255 *are spies working without population knowing about it?*

256 EA – It could be, I don't think there is iron clad evidence of it. We do know, and this
257 predates current campaign (2016-17), neighbours have often been recruited to spy on

258 one another, through relatively formalised everyday social organisation such as the
259 10-household system where people have to be on the lookout for one another. Dr
260 Byler has written based on evidence he gathered, that the authorities have offered
261 rewards for spying and informing on one another.

262 *PANEL – The Becoming Family program, you refer to that, can you explain what that*
263 *is?*

264 EA – The Becoming Family program grew out of established program in 2016 and it
265 grew from 2014 program that was instituted across Uyghur autonomous region
266 dispatched cadres to work alongside and to monitor daily lives of individuals who were
267 living there. That was 2014, and in 2016 after Chen Quanguo assumed control – they
268 revived this into Becoming Family – where Han cadres, government representatives
269 are dispatched to be family members to Uyghurs and Kazakhs, they can pop in
270 unannounced, live amongst the family, be part of cooking and stay the night. As
271 scholars such as Darren Byler have written about extensively, the real intent of the
272 program is monitoring, surveillance and thus ultimately a form of control.

273 *PANEL – We will hear more about this and how bad behaviour is frequently reported,*
274 *in general it is another way of providing information to justify detention?*

275 EA – Yes.

276 *PANEL – Turning to the significance of the document, the column allows for possibility*
277 *of release or further detention, does that necessarily imply that there is detailed*
278 *monitoring in detention?*

279 EA – The column itself does not.

280 *PANEL – How could a decision be made that someone’s behaviour has improved in*
281 *detention be made without monitoring?*

282 EA – Correct – details how they were being monitored are not here.

283 *PANEL – Moving away from the document, when people are in detention, when they*
284 *are in the tiger chair, sometimes in the tiger chair and left for a week, there may be or*
285 *must be records available to the PRC in order for the information to be recorded?*

286 EA – I can imagine so though I have not seen such records. We know from first hand
287 testimony the centres are fitted with cameras and screens. This is one way of
288 generating data and records.

289 *PANEL – Accounts of torture, is it likely that there must be records planning the*
290 *program for particular detainees and monitoring the progress in order that this*
291 *document be prepared?*

292 EA – It is likely there are but have seen no such things.

293 *PANEL – You're entitled to answer with whatever level of confidence as you wish,*
294 *what is the purpose behind this?*

295 EA – This is a bit interpretive; I see the relationship between the party states, CCP
296 and state of PRC and Uyghur region as a colonial relationship. I believe that the
297 leadership and entire governing structure are deeply anxious about its rule in this
298 region particularly as Uyghurs and Kazakhs have resisted assimilation for many
299 decades. The region sits atop vast natural resources, and part of belt and road initiative
300 – there are major economic reasons. It is a place where the party state wants to exploit
301 economically and integrate fully into the PRC and eliminate other sources of loyalty

302 peoples like Uyghurs express. Religion is another form of loyalty; these things are
303 terrifying to the party state.

304 *PANEL – My last question is general, it is said that there is an effort to eliminate Uyghur*
305 *culture, language, identity and ultimately to merge nations and ethnicities. First, has*
306 *the PRC ever acknowledged that is true, second, has the PRC ever said anything that*
307 *it wants to maintain the Uyghur identity, religion?*

308 EA – The PRC has never come out and said in those words ‘we intend to eliminate
309 Uyghur culture, religion, identity, language...’. When faced with evidence, if we just
310 look at what is happening with the language in schooling, all it takes to eliminate it is
311 to cut off education in that language which is what we see happening.

312 *PANEL – Whether it might have done if it had genuine intentions to maintain the*
313 *identity, in our country would be uncomfortable for politician to say they want Scottish*
314 *identity to be maintained, does the PRC say it wants to maintain Uyghur identity?*

315 EA – The PRC will pay lip service to Uyghur culture by saying look we love this music,
316 we love this dance. Officials have tweeted about this. They do not say we want to
317 maintain this.

318 *PANEL – Why are they worried about people letting people go abroad when they are*
319 *encouraging other Chinese to go abroad to go and get knowledge or whatever they*
320 *want?*

321 EA – The way I understand the evidence for everything happening the authorities are
322 worried about people going abroad as they are less monitorable and controllable in
323 that way. A number of policies of the past decade, including people's convenience
324 card policy, are about bringing people back to places they came from so they can be

325 more easily monitored, surveyed and controlled. That motivation is outward and
326 upward – a desire to control.

327 *PANEL – It might be because they want to bring back western ideas of liberation and*
328 *freedom and that might unsettle their program?*

329 EA – That is potentially another element. In the period when I lived there, many
330 Uyghurs would say I want to go abroad but struggled to get passports. They said they
331 wanted to go abroad to broaden their minds, but authorities here do not want our minds
332 open.

333 *PANEL – What was the reaction of the Uyghur population, was the data a surprise to*
334 *them?*

335 EA – In one sense it was confirmation for Uyghurs outside the PRC who felt like they
336 were screaming, and no one was listening – it was confirmation of what people were
337 saying – it was shocking to see details again with composite details of individuals on
338 local level. CNN found the sister of one of the detainees who was living in Turkey and
339 she broke down crying in the interview, and said she never imagined her sister would
340 be taken away and had no contact. Receiving confirmation, even if it was something
341 she already knew, was still shocking and traumatising.

342 *PANEL – May I ask you to return to the notion of those detained and those free, and*
343 *reflect for us briefly on notions of trust. What does the existence of this leave for wider*
344 *society, what has happened to social solidarity amongst Uyghurs as a result of the*
345 *existence of these sorts of spreadsheets?*

346 EA – From the literature reporting on this region and this crisis there is evidence the
347 policies and practices has eroded trust between Uyghurs sometimes on family level

348 and also on level of friends – might consult Dr. Joanne Smith Finley ‘*Now we don’t talk*
349 *anymore*’ which details such erosion of bonds which Uyghurs.

350 *PANEL – You referred a number of times to Dr Zenz’s work on the Qaraqash list, what*
351 *does your organisation do to satisfy itself about his methodology?*

352 EA – Part of it is reviewing his work and assessing and following the paper trail to the
353 documents that he examines; it is a fact that so much of his research is based on the
354 government documents itself. This makes us satisfied that his data and methodology
355 are sound.

356 *PANEL – Can you conclude anything from Qaraqash list or wider work that officials*
357 *need to fulfil quotas?*

358 EA – The Qaraqash list itself contains no evidence itself that officials are trying to meet
359 quotas. However, there are details in the China cables as well as in the Urumqi police
360 files published in the Intercept in 2021 that officials have been trying to fulfil quotas.

361 *PANEL – The common conception of prison is four walls but with surveillance*
362 *equipment Xinjiang has been described as an open-air prison, do you recognise that?*
363 *If that is the case what is the purpose from your view of the detention and re-education*
364 *and other penal establishments?*

365 EA – First, yes, I do recognise it as an open-air prison. The process of that began
366 before 2016, it was well underway already. To the second part of the question, the
367 point is power and intimidation. To send a message that if you do not behave you can
368 be here as well. That is about a display of power.

369 *PANEL – In your experience and knowledge, is it possible for these profound*
370 *strategies by PRC to be done without the direction of the central authorities?*

371 EA – In my opinion no, it would be impossible for these policies to be enacted without
372 the control of central authorities.

373 *PANEL – The last column in list is decision making, do we know from list who is making*
374 *these decisions. All they say is approved. Second thing, the category of people 80s,*
375 *90s, 2000s – why is that? Because they grew up in a more liberal time?*

376 EA – Language throughout the document says things such as ‘community level
377 opinion’ this is referred to community neighbourhood officers. Some language refers
378 to opinions of subdistrict level. Second question – people born in 80s, 90s, 2000s grew
379 up in a different era of China becoming more open, might have received more outside
380 influence which increases the chance of openness. There are so many ways for
381 Uyghurs to be suspicious I wonder if authorities are just looking for labels to come up
382 with. I can only speculate as to this. It seems likely.

The Qaraqash List

Leaked Records of Mass Detention

Dr. Elise Anderson
Senior Program Officer, Uyghur Human Rights Project
Presented before the Uyghur Tribunal
London, England, UK
10 September 2021



UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
ئۇيغۇر كىشىلىك ھوقۇق قۇرۇلۇشى

The Qaraqash List

出境未归人员亲属送培学员

序号	教育点	入教时间	姓名	身份证号	乡镇(街道)	村(社区)	组别	标准管理分类	三属情况	乡镇研判意见
1	第一培训中心	2017-5-23	图尔荪托合提	6532221970606602	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	1.老婆面, 2.超生4孩;	1.老婆面, 2.超生4孩;	<p>亲属圈共8人, 其中1人收押。 妻子: 萨伊普加玛丽, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222197906, 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在喀什监狱(判刑6年)。 长子: 阿不都, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322219980, 陕西打工, 现实表现好。 次子: 阿不都, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322219950, 幼儿园老师, 现实表现好。 三子: 阿不都, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220020, 重玉县三中就读, 现实表现好。 四子: 阿不都, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220130, 幼儿园学生, 现实表现好。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经社区寺管会干部对图尔荪托合提的三属、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 偶尔在家做乃玛孜, 星期五偶尔去清真寺参加居麦乃玛孜, 饭后做杜瓦, 偶尔参加两节会礼, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其父亲图尔荪托合提, 于1990年去世。</p>	<p>研判结果: 图尔荪托合提除妻子蒙面、超生四胎之外, 未发现其他问题, 且目前该人思想转变大, 能够认识错误, 悔过态度认真, 没有现实危害, 同意退培后回乡管控。</p>
2	第一培训中心	2017年10月11日	阿卜杜拉克	653222197046704	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	1、出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回送培; 2、超生1孩	1、出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回送培; 2、超生1孩	<p>亲属圈中有8人, 培训2人。 妻子: 阿米乃, 65322219700, 家庭住址: 新疆墨玉县博斯坦街道明珠社区和谐巷, 墨玉县爱心医院护士, 2017年10月17日因出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回送培。 弟弟: 阿卜杜塔迪尔, 65322219710, 居住地址: 吐外特乡艾日克村, 2017年11月因一体化推送、超生二胎送培。 长子: 阿布都外力, 65322219900, 爱心医院的医生, 表现一般。 儿媳: 布海里木, 65322219880, 墨玉县迎宾社区干部, 表现良好; 孙女: 苏麦亚, 65322220110, 幼儿园就读(学龄前儿童), 表现良好; 次子: 阿不都, 65322219931, 实习生(在新疆二医院实习), 表现一般; 长女: 阿依, 65322219941, 墨玉县爱心医院的医生, 表现一般; 次女: 阿依, 65322219971, 墨玉县爱心医院医生, 表现良好; 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈里未发现其他严打收押送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经社区寺管会干部对阿卜杜拉克的三属、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现, 此人每次饭后都会做祷告, 每天早晨在家做一次礼拜, 每周五去一次清真寺做居麦乃玛孜, 每年两节会礼都去清真寺做礼拜, 参加朋友和亲属的四项活动, 该宗教知识来源于该人奶奶: 萨伊普汗(1990年去世)。</p>	<p>研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判后认为, 阿卜杜拉克送培原因是出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回形迹可疑人员; 此人于2015年3月将户口从墨玉县迁至库尔勒, 2016年2月在库尔勒办理护照, 护照证件号码: E610, 于2016年5月10日至9月16日出境至沙特阿拉伯长达128天, 出境返回后长期在墨玉县居住, 有现实危害, 建议继续培训。</p>
3	第一培训中心	2018-3-11	吾阿力妮萨	653222197517501	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	超生二胎	超生二胎	<p>亲属圈共6人, 其中收押1人, 培训1人。 爸爸: 麦麦提, 2017年3月30日因恐恐爆被判有期徒刑7年, 目前在乌鲁木齐第四监狱服刑。 老公: 艾合麦提托合提, 65322219750, 因超生二胎, 办理护照未出境被乌鲁木齐送教培训, 目前已转回墨玉县第三培训中心参加培训。 长女: 苏比伊, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220010, 北京中学高中一年级学生。 二女: 赛比, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220040, 墨玉县第二中学初一学生。 三女: 娜迪, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220120, 墨玉县玛热帕提幼儿园中二班学生。 四女: 娜扎, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 65322220150, 学龄前儿童。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈里未发现其他严打收押送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经社区寺管会干部对吾阿力妮萨的三属、六图碰撞分析及外围摸排发现, 此人送培以前每次吃过饭后会做祷告, 每天早晨在家做一次乃玛孜, 参加亲属和朋友的婚礼, 起名, 割礼(该知识来源于其母亲古丽妮娅孜)。 </p>	<p>研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判分析一致认为, 其亲属在我辖区期间现实表现良好, 积极配合社区工作, 本人超生二胎, 目前参加教育培训未满一年, 建议继续培训, 提升国语水平。</p>
4	第一培训中心	2018-3-11	柔则艾力	653222197518304	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	80后不放心人员	80后不放心人员	<p>亲属圈共13人, 收押1人, 送培2人 公公: 麦麦提, 身份证号码: 65322219540, 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在监狱(判刑6年)。 丈夫: 麦麦提, 身份证号码: 65322219860, 因办理护照于2017年5月21日被普恰克其乡送培; 二弟: 阿卜杜吉力力, 身份证号码: 65322219920, 2017年5月4日因一体化推送人员(9.13段通联)送培。 爸爸: 艾力, 身份证号码: 65322195708, 水利局退休干部目前表现良好; 母亲: 多玛加吉, 身份证号码: 653222195908, 扎瓦镇合尼村农民, 目前表现良好; 大姐: 塔塔姑丽, 身份证号码: 65322219751, 斯依社区物业公司职工目前表现良好; 二姐: 努热曼, 身份证号码: 65322219780, 县医院急诊科护士, 目前表现良好; 三姐: 吾依尔, 身份证号码: 65322219830, 扎瓦镇合尼村, 裁缝, 目前表现良好; 一弟: 阿卜杜克热木, 身份证号码: 653222198905, 扎瓦镇合尼村, 开出租车, 目前表现良好; 婆婆: 凯麦尔罕, 身份证号码: 65322219600, 在家农民, 目前表现良好。 社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈中未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经社区寺管会干部对柔则艾力的三属、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 2014年每天做一次乃玛孜, 吃过饭后做祷告, 每年两节会礼去亲属墓地做祷告, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其奶奶麦热木汗(2000年去世)。</p>	<p>研判结果: 经街道社区综合研判分析一致认为其亲属在我辖区期间现实表现良好, 积极配合社区工作, 本人系80后不放心人员, 思想较为活跃, 目前参加教育培训未满一年, 建议继续培训, 提升国语水平。</p>

序号	教育点	入教时间	姓名	身份证号	乡镇(街道)	村(社区)	组号	精准参训原因	管理分类
1	第一培训中心	2017-5-23	图尔荪托合提	653222199209 2219 6602	博斯坦街办	玉华社区	波斯坦街道玉华社区玉华小区	1.老婆曾蒙面, 2.超生4孩;	亲妻监长长次次三四社宗星

三圈情况	乡镇研判意见
<p>亲属圈共8人, 其中1人收押, 妻子: 萨伊普加玛丽, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222197906, 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在喀什监狱(判刑6年)。 长女: 阿尔祖提, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199209, 英也尔乡阿克吾斯堂幼儿园合同工, 现实表现好。 长子: 阿不, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199801, 陕西打工, 现实表现好。 次女: 帕提, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199505, 幼儿园老师, 现实表现好。 次子: 阿不力, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222200204, 墨玉县三中就读, 现实表现好。 三子: 阿卜杜瓦, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306, 幼儿园学生, 现实表现好。 四子: 阿卜杜萨, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306, 幼儿园学生, 。</p> <p>社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈中未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。 宗教传承圈情况: 经驻社区寺管会干部对图尔荪托合提的三圈、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 偶尔在家做乃玛孜, 星期五偶尔去清真寺参加居麦乃玛孜, 饭后做杜瓦, 偶尔参加两节会礼, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其父亲图尔, 于199年去世。</p>	<p>研判结果: 图尔荪托合提除妻子蒙面、超生四胎之外, 未发现其他问题, 且目前该人思想转变大, 能够认识错误, 悔过态度认真, 没有现实危害, 同意退培训后回乡管控。</p>

“Three Circles” status (Entry no. 1)

三圈情况
<p>亲属圈共8人, 其中1人收押。 妻子: 萨伊普加玛丽 [REDACTED], 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222197906 [REDACTED], 2017年6月因参加非法台比力克严打收押在喀什监狱(判刑6年)。 长女: 阿尔祖 [REDACTED] 提, 女, 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199209 [REDACTED], 英也尔乡阿克吾斯堂幼儿园合同工, 现实表现好。 长子: 阿不 [REDACTED], 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199801 [REDACTED], 陕西打工, 现实表现好。 次女: 帕提 [REDACTED], 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222199505 [REDACTED], 幼儿园老师, 现实表现好。 次子: 阿不力 [REDACTED], 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222200204 [REDACTED], 墨玉县三中就读, 现实表现好。 三子: 阿卜杜瓦 [REDACTED], 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306 [REDACTED], 幼儿园学生, 现实表现好。 四子: 阿卜杜萨 [REDACTED], 维吾尔族, 身份证号码: 653222201306 [REDACTED], 幼儿园学生, 。</p> <p>社交圈情况: 经核查该人朋友圈和邻居圈中未发现其他严打收押、送培人员。</p> <p>宗教传承圈情况: 经驻社区寺管会干部对图尔荪托合提 [REDACTED] 的三圈、六图碰撞分析及摸排核查中发现, 此人送培以前, 偶尔在家做乃玛孜, 星期五偶尔去清真寺参加居麦乃玛孜, 饭后做杜瓦, 偶尔参加两节会礼, 该宗教礼仪常识来源于其父亲图尔 [REDACTED], 于199 [REDACTED] 年去世。</p>

“Three Circles” status (Entry no. 1)

"Three Circles" Status
<p>Family circle includes 8 people with 1 in detention.</p> <p>Wife: Sahipjamal [REDACTED] female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222197906 [REDACTED]. In June of 2017, she was detained in a prison in Kashgar (sentenced to six years) under the "Strike Hard" campaign for participation in an illegal Tablig activity.</p> <p>Eldest daughter: Arzigül [REDACTED], female, Uyghur ethnicity, ID Number: 653222199209 [REDACTED], contract worker at Yéngiyer Town Akewu Sitang Kindergarten, good behavior.</p> <p>Eldest son: Abliz [REDACTED], Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 65322219980 [REDACTED], working in Shaanxi province, good behavior.</p> <p>Second daughter: Pat [REDACTED], Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222199505 [REDACTED], kindergarten teacher, good behavior.</p> <p>Second son: [REDACTED] itip [REDACTED], Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222200204 [REDACTED], studying at Qaraqash County No. 3 Middle School, good behavior.</p> <p>Third son: [REDACTED] waris [REDACTED], Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222201306 [REDACTED], kindergarten student, good behavior.</p> <p>Fourth son: Abdu [REDACTED] [REDACTED], Uyghur ethnicity, ID number: 653222201306 [REDACTED], kindergarten student.</p> <p>Social circle: An investigation of this individual's circle of friends and neighbors revealed no one else detained or sent for re-education under the "Strike Hard" campaign.</p> <p>Religious circle: Community officials of the Management Committee for Places of Worship conducted a collision analysis of Tursuntohti [REDACTED]'s "Three Circles and Six Diagrams." It was found that before being sent to a re-education center, he occasionally performed Namaz at home. On Fridays, he occasionally visited the mosque to perform Jūme Namaz. After eating, he performed Dua and occasionally celebrated the two holidays. This religious knowledge originated from his grandfather Turdi [REDACTED], deceased 1994.</p>

Integrated Joint Operations Platform (Entry no. 267)

7年送培(原因推送一体化人员), 2018年9月4日返回(因病返回);
芒来乡送培至墨玉县第一培训中心(原因 推送一体化人员) 2019年1月19月结业返回。;
芒来乡送培(原因推送一体化人员) 目前在墨玉县第一培训中心培训。。

见良好;


墨玉县一中教师, 现实表现良好, 朋友: 阿不来提· [REDACTED] 6532221988030 [REDACTED] 普恰克其中

见, 此人参加培训以前每次吃过饭都做祷告, 发现该人在家早晨做一次乃玛孜, 周五偶尔去清真寺(其宗教常识和行为来源于该人的爷爷)。


“Becoming Family” program (Entry no. 231)

因80后不放心人员,于2017/10/3送培至第一培训中心(博斯坦库勒)。该人亲属圈内二舅因村霸,被判刑10年,现乌鲁木齐市监狱。本人5个兄弟中2人送培,1人列管,因该人舅舅被送培,所以女儿:凯利比努尔·[REDACTED] (21岁)在阿布拉江[REDACTED]亲家中居住,已一年之久,社区干部在住户时,发现凯利比努尔·[REDACTED]带头巾睡觉,其家庭宗教氛围浓厚,亲属不配合社区工作,表现一般,本人有现实危害,建议继续培训。

Qaraqash List detainees by sex



Qaraqash List detainees by facility



Facilities in Qaraqash List

Center no. 1 (Bostan)



Qaraqash county train station, suspected location of Center no. 2



Facilities in Qaraqash List, cont.

Center no. 3
(Old vocational high school)



Center no. 4
(No. 2 Intermediate School)



Reasons for detention

Reason	No. of Individuals
Birth policy violations	115
“Unsafe” post-80s, 90s, or 00s person	91
Ex-convict or other past law violation	40
Wore veil/wife wore veil/had beard	33
Applied for passport (and didn’t leave the country)	25
Reason related to religious practice	23
International travel	20
Religious extremist thought infection	19
Related to prisoner	12
Movements within China	8
Possessed or watched illegal media	5
Two-faced official	5
Related to someone outside of the country	4
Fraudulent marriage certificate	3
Overseas communication	2

Type of Reason	Reason	Original Chinese	Number
Birth policy violations	Gave birth to X number of extra children/ person who violated birth policies, X number of extra births	超生X孩/ 违反计划生育法超生X胎人员	113
	Did not implement 3-year birth spacing policy	未落实计划生育三年间隔生育政策	1
	Provided fake abortion certificate	提供虚假流产证明	1
Unsafe post 80s, 90s, or 00s person	Unsafe post 80s, 90s, or 00s person	80/90/00后不放心人员	91
Ex-convict or other past law violation	Normal/dangerous type ex-convict	一般/危安类刑满释放人员	29
	Law and order type ex-convict	治安类刑满释放人员	1
	Person diverted from detention center	看守所分流人员	1
	Committed minor offense, not prosecuted	构成轻微犯罪, 未追究法律责任的人员	1
	Person who took drugs	吸毒人员	3
	Person under special management	列管特殊群体人员	1
	Domestic violence	构成家暴行为/ 家庭暴力人员	2
	Witness in a fraud case	行骗案件受害者证人	1
Wore veil/wife wore veil/had beard	Wore a veil/ wore veil before strike hard	蒙面/ 严打前蒙面	6
	Wore a veil and "jilbab"/burqa	蒙面, 穿“吉里巴甫”服人员/ 穿罩袍人员	3
	Wife wore a veil	妻子蒙面	11
	Had a beard/ had a beard before strike hard	以前留胡子/严打前留胡子	12
Applied for passport	Had a beard, wore short trousers, Wahabi thinking	留胡子, 穿短裤, 有瓦哈比思想	1
	Applied for passport (and didn't leave the country)	办理护照人员(未出境人员)	24
	A household where many people applied for passports	一户多人办理护照人员	1

International travel	A returned person/ suspicious returned person	防回流人员/形迹可疑回流人员	16	
	Went to one of the 26 sensitive countries, suspicious return person	出境至26重点敏感国家逾期返回形迹可疑人员	2	
	Illegal exit or attempt to return	非法出境人员或非法出境未遂被遣返人员	1	
	Sent by the Public Security Bureau, went to sensitive countries 5 times	公安审查转培训人员, 5次往返重点国家	1	
Related to prisoner	Related to a prisoner	收押人员亲属	2	
	Related to a "strike hard" prisoner	严打收押人员亲属	10	
Movements within China	Abnormal movements, thinking difficult to grasp, complex communications	行动轨迹异常, 思想难掌握, 人际交往复杂	1	
	Person who moved household registration to inland and lived in Qaraqash for a long time	户籍迁入内地, 人在墨玉长期生活人员	1	
	This person engaged in business and labor activities outside since 2004, during their time outside their communication and movements were relatively complex, they did not ask permission to leave, and their whereabouts could not be grasped, was labeled an unsafe post-80s person by the shequ	该人从2004年起一直在外从事经商和务工等活动, 外出期间人际交往和活动轨迹比较复杂, 也不落实请销假措施, 行踪不宜掌握, 被社区列为80后不放心人员	1	
	7.5 diverted person	7.5分流人员	3	
	Left without permission, went to Urumchi without authorization	未向原户籍地请假, 擅自到乌市	1	
	A person with two households	双户人员	1	
	Two-faced official	Two-faced official	两面性干部	3
		Official who did namaz (prayer) at home	国家干部在家做乃玛孜	1
Official who attended illegal preaching		国家干部参加非法台比力克	1	
Did not obey community (shequ) personnel	Did not obey shequ personnel	不服从社区管理人员	4	

Judgment of subdistrict/community officials

Judgment	No. of Individuals
Community management and control	98
Finished/safe	77
Continue training, finish after one year	43
Working at the park	41
Continue training	34
Returned for work	11
Official returned to post, under continued management	2
At Hotan Vocational School	2
Sentenced to prison (strike hard)	2
Can return home and visit family normally	1

Implications

