



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

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1. David Tobin et al. [State Violence in Xinjiang: A Comprehensive Assessment]

State violence towards Turkic Muslim peoples in Xinjiang is of significant humanitarian, economic, and security interest for policymakers, businesses, and the public across the world. This report shows how China's party-state organises and co-ordinates systematic and interconnected practices of ethnically targeted violence in Xinjiang, which prevent intergenerational transmission of cultural, linguistic, and religious practices, the foundations of the targeted groups.

Key findings:

- State violence towards Xinjiang's peoples has rapidly intensified since 2014.
- The officially stated intent of policy in Xinjiang is to "break their roots".
- Mass detainment, forced labour, child separation, repression of religion and language, and sexual violence and torture are systematic, interconnected practices.
- Widespread and systematic forced labour for ethnic minorities includes coercion, forcible transfers of population, and child-separation (chapter 1).
- Transfers of Uyghur children from their families to state care have grown rapidly since 2017 (chapter 2).
- Coercive "birth control policies" and internment for women with "too many children" has significantly contributed to declining Uyghur birth rates (chapter 2)
- Widespread and systematic practices of rape and sexual violence are routine methods of torture and punishment within the camps (chapter 3).
- Religious practice as a criterion for extra-legal detention is part of broader campaigns to "Sinicise" religion (chapter 4).
- "De-extremification" campaigns include coerced intermarriages, arbitrary detention of cultural figureheads, and forcible mass "re-education" (chapter 5).

1322 **5 June 2021 (00:04:40 – 00:24:19)**

1323 **David Tobin**

1324

1325 DT – So the report we have produced for today is by five UK-based scholars. We've
1326 pooled our resources deliberately because we're very different specialisms. As you were
1327 hearing yesterday, this topic covers many issues. It requires different disciplinary
1328 knowledge – we've pooled those skills. We have significant regional knowledge and
1329 experience in the region. But we focused on providing information and analysis that is
1330 relevant for those who are legally qualified. We are not lawyers, we do not make
1331 pronouncements about international law, but we provided information that we believe
1332 would be relevant for those qualified.

1333 The plain title we have gone with is 'State Violence' rather than 'conceptualising the
1334 violence'... When I interviewed Nyrola Elima, who will be speaking, she told me "while
1335 the world debates a word, we are dying". So, we had decided at this point we are not
1336 going to focus on conceptualizing these actions – we are going to focus on the information
1337 that we think is relevant and people will need to hear. So, the report and research were
1338 structured by focusing on key issues of concern raised...by diaspora interviewees. These

1339 were forced labour, sexual violence in the camp system, child separation and coercive
1340 birth controls, and repression of religious and cultural practices.

1341 We link broad statistical evidence to real life impact. We present a comprehensive
1342 assessment of evidence drawn from official primary sources. These include Chinese
1343 government documents, procurement contracts, statistics, internal statements, and white
1344 papers. And we triangulate that data with interviews with families affected and testimonies
1345 presented by witnesses to the US Congress, international media, and NGOs. The report
1346 shows that the Chinese party-state organizes and coordinates systematic and
1347 interconnected practices of ethnically targeted violence in Xinjiang which prevent
1348 intergenerational transmission of cultural, linguistic, and religious practices, the
1349 foundations of the targeted groups. The official and explicit intent of these practices is to
1350 'break their roots'. The interviews we conducted for the report – we really link policy
1351 analysis to impact on people's lives. I conducted the interviews for the report. I interviewed
1352 12 Uyghur diaspora families who all requested full anonymity, so we have not included
1353 those interviews in great detail. Most of these focused on issues of trauma and the
1354 description of family separation as torture. But these families were too uncomfortable and
1355 frightened of being included, so we focused in the interview section on two high profile
1356 interviewees – Nyrola Elima in Sweden and Jevlan Shirmemet in Turkey...cases that we
1357 could verify.

1358 Those two interviewees – Jewlan Shirmemet and Nyrola Elima – they have publicly
1359 available case details. These are all listed on the Xinjiang Victims Database, they were
1360 already verified. I was able to see the documents that were relevant to Nyrola's cases,
1361 including bank transfers and title deeds for a family home. When doing these interviews,
1362 the methods of the interview – we ask detailed, specific questions focused on these case
1363 details, focused on verifying their interviews that they have already conducted – but I
1364 always combine this with broad open questions: how has your life changed? How has
1365 your family been affected? This a standard practice we use to enable the interviewee to
1366 talk on their own terms and to raise the issues they believe are important to this case. It
1367 also reduces researcher bias, so that I am not deciding the issues that they believe are

1368 most relevant. So, the report shows how state violence targets families, severs contact –
1369 and this prevents intergenerational transmission of cultural and religious practices.

1370 In the introduction, I use my fieldwork in the region from 2007 to 2010 to address the
1371 question – what does counter-terrorism actually mean? The question, as we were
1372 discussing yesterday with Sean Roberts, this is a long-term issue. This is about history –
1373 before 1949, Uyghurs were simply described, generally, as barbarians. Chinese
1374 narratives described *hua* (华) the Chinese civilisation, and the outside world as
1375 barbarians. It was only after 1949, when Mao Zedong comes to power, that Uyghurs are
1376 reframed as internal ethnic minorities '*shaoshu minzu*' (少数民族), and the construction
1377 of the regional autonomy system – if we look at the regional autonomy law – is explicit
1378 that the autonomy system is to hold China together and to modernize Xinjiang. And the
1379 phrase '*minzu wenti*' (民族问题) frames this discussion – 'ethnic problem'. So, Uyghurs
1380 in the region are being described as an ethnic problem since 1949. Fast forward to 2017,
1381 in the spirit of the nineteenth Congress...the term '*shaoshu minzu*' (少数民族)
1382 disappears. It's used twice in Xi Jinping's speech, only to refer to minority cadre
1383 recruitment. And now we have an official policy called 'fusion' – that all former 56 *minzu*
1384 (民族) ethnic groups should be fused into one '*zhonghua minzu*' (中华民族).

1385 So, when I look at this term 'counter-terrorism', I first of all read the official explanations
1386 that are given to the local population – not in English, not to the outside world. I read
1387 universal 'ethnic unity education' textbooks that were used in universities and in work
1388 units. So almost everyone I interviewed when I was in Xinjiang were aware of specific
1389 texts, including '*the 50 Whys*' – this is just an example of one. This text is used in
1390 classrooms and universities. You chant the text, you memorize it, and you answer exam
1391 questions in order to proceed your education. It explains policy in the region and
1392 adherence to the party-state's narrative history as counter-terrorism.

1393 So, the July 2009 violence – violence by Uyghurs – was simply called a 'life or death
1394 struggle' versus terrorists, and people were prosecuted as terrorists under anti-

1395 separatism law. Han violence at the same time in [inaudible] was called an ordinary
1396 criminal incident, and they were punished according to criminal law. In this text, they're
1397 very explicit about identity: "Uyghurs are not an Islamic group. Uyghurs are not a Turkic
1398 group. Only the three evils would say this" – the three evils being separatism, terrorism,
1399 and extremism. Uyghur identity, its roots, are being framed as a form of terrorism. It's not
1400 about organizations – it's about ideas and identities. For example, the term East
1401 Turkestan – 'dongtu' (东突) in Chinese – this phrase is used to mean ETIM East Turkestan
1402 Islamic movement. You cannot say 'dongtu' (东突) without implying terrorism in Chinese.

1403 Similarly, the 1759 arrival of troops by the Manchu – this is called a reincorporation of
1404 Xinjiang into China. Calling it an invasion is an act of terrorism under the three evils. So
1405 what we've seen under Xi Jinping, then, is an intensification of these narratives, and an
1406 intensification of state violence. First of all, he called it the 'great wall of iron'...in
1407 2012...and then in 2014, we have the 'People's War on Terror'. But the logics are
1408 consistent.

1409 We were aware of many of the issues we've been discussing for a long time. Many of my
1410 interviewees in Xinjiang endured issues of forced abortion...particularly one lady who only
1411 had one child but endured a forced abortion, under pressure from her manager, and then
1412 the party-state. She was also sacked from her job because she could not prove that she
1413 was not involved in the violence – she was guilty until proven innocent. You had to get a
1414 piece of paper proving that you were not involved in the violence from your local police
1415 station, but she happened to be in another [inaudible]. And she was sacked.

1416 In 2018, we have [a] XUAR government work report that describes camps and boarding
1417 facilities as "defeating the foundations of separatism forever". And this is the three evils,
1418 but remember – the three evils means Turkic and Islamic identities. So, this regional
1419 government directive, "break their lineage, break their roots, break their connections", has
1420 sparked...family breakups and widespread trauma for those inside and outside the
1421 region. The camp system and related practices target and break up families with "relatives
1422 in detention" – a key indicator determining internment. Families are usually given no

1423 official verdicts unless they pressure authorities – and many do with public campaigns to
1424 give explanations.

1425 The reasons given are [*inaudible*]...religious and cultural practices... of course cadres
1426 work with [quotas?]. And we know from history that any attempt to round up people is not
1427 orderly – it becomes arbitrary. You can't round everyone up at once. So, it's targeting
1428 identities, but the practice has become arbitrary.

1429 The reasons that I draw from Xinjiang Victim Database exemplary entries – so these are
1430 ones that have eye witness testimony, document verification, and interviews – these
1431 include interaction with the outside world: applying for a foreign visa, wanting to travel
1432 abroad, being exposed to foreign thought, staying too long in Kazakhstan, [and] obtaining
1433 second citizenship. Also, banal everyday behaviours: not watching state television, not
1434 greeting officials appropriately, not smoking, being born in the 1980s-1990s, contractual
1435 requirements to maintain employment, and, importantly, disturbing public order by writing
1436 letters to gain information on family whereabouts and health.

1437 Interviewees describe how not knowing their family whereabouts, while knowing anything
1438 could happen, as torture...constant struggle as trauma. Most discussed deteriorating
1439 mental health, anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and recurring nightmares. The
1440 interviewees were keen to say, “this is only one story, we are not suffering as much as
1441 many, many other people”. But this tip of the iceberg, as they also say, provides enough
1442 substantial evidence and testimony to conclude that state violence targets Uyghur and
1443 other indigenous families, preventing transmission of cultural and religious practices.

1444 Nyrola and Jevlan's cases are representative examples of detainment, without
1445 explanation, of highly educated, apolitical, Mandarin-speaking professionals and civil
1446 servants who receive no vocational training, suffer deteriorating ill health, and appear to
1447 be targeted because their family members are abroad. With the time I have left, I will
1448 introduce you to these two interviewees. Nyrola Elima campaigned from Sweden for the
1449 release of her aging aunt, Mahire Yaqup. Mahire worked as a Mandarin language teacher,
1450 civil servant, and insurance sales person...raising children alone. In 2018, Mahire was
1451 detained in a vocational training centre without explanation. But when pressured, officials
1452 referred to her family's 2013 bank transfer to pay for relatives' new home in Australia.

1453 Following her release in December 2018, Mahire spoke with Nyrola before being detained
1454 by Ghulja Public Security Bureau in 2019. She looked extremely pale and weak, having
1455 lost 13kg in weight during detention, suffering liver damage without access to healthcare,
1456 and receiving no vocational training. Nyrola's contact with her retired parents, 62-year-
1457 old mother Gulbekrim Memtimin, and 65-year-old father Qasim Tohti, was severed in
1458 2017, and they're held under arbitrary house arrest. Nyrola explained she wants no
1459 involvement in politics, but must speak for her family.

1460 The targeting and breakup of Jevlan Shirmemet's elderly family members followed similar
1461 patterns. Jevlan's mother, Suriye Tursun, was a party cadre and civil servant on the verge
1462 of retirement. She was sentenced to five years in a camp with no written verdict in 2019.
1463 Jevlan has had no contact since January 2018, at which time she was in poor health.
1464 Jevlan continues to press Chinese embassy and consulate staff in Turkey to be permitted
1465 to speak to his family. The embassy instead asked him to provide information on all his
1466 contacts and activities in Xinjiang and Turkey. Jevlan's family, like Nyrola's, have no prior
1467 criminal records, until moving abroad. Jevlan moved to Turkey to study law, and his
1468 mother visited him for 15 days with an official Chinese tour group in 2013. The only
1469 attempted explanation from embassy staff was "maybe terrorist activities".

1470 Jevlan concludes that his family members are being targeted and their connections
1471 broken because he is a Uyghur who chose to study abroad. "They are trying to break my
1472 family", he said. His aging father, Shirmemet Hudayar, was detained and brother, Irfan
1473 Shirmemet, held under arbitrary house arrest. Both were subsequently sacked from civil
1474 servant positions. No official explanations have been given. Jevlan wants no involvement
1475 in politics, and he says he is targeted because, in the party-state's eyes, as long as you
1476 are Uyghur, you are political. When I ask him what that means – I ask[ed] him the types
1477 of questions that we had to engage with yesterday about intent and reasons – he just
1478 says "I don't know. I just want to speak to my mother".

1479 The treatment of these two families is the tip of the iceberg. Their experiences illustrate
1480 how the party-state's coordinated, systematic practices of ethnically targeted state
1481 violence arbitrarily target and break up Uyghur family units. Family breakups deprive
1482 Uyghur and other indigenous groups of community, and they prevent intergenerational

1483 transmission of cultural, linguistic, and religious practices – the foundation of the targeted
1484 groups.

1485 **5 June 2021 (00:24:25 - 00:50:00)**

1486 **Laura Murphy**

1487

1488 LM – In the spring of 2018, significant evidence began to emerge that the People’s
1489 Republic of China (PRC) government understood its system of detention centres and
1490 internment camps as merely one part of a massive transformation of the Xinjiang Uyghur
1491 Autonomous Region (XUAR or Uyghur Region) into a docile and lucrative economic hub.
1492 While continuing to hold indigenous citizens of the region in internment camps without
1493 trial, regional and local governments shifted their focus to the creation of an enormous
1494 forced labour regime. This system had the explicit goal of employing practically every
1495 adult citizen and was accompanied by the justification that the programme would increase
1496 both the economic productivity and the “stability” of the region.

1497 In that same year, a paper was published by the Nankai University Institute of Wealth and
1498 Economics that explicitly stated the intention of the labor programs was to reduce the
1499 Uyghur population density and to assimilate them into Han society and culture.

1500 We were easily able to identify that these labor programs were discernably not the same
1501 as others across China. US Customs records, for instance, listed companies that were
1502 exporting abroad were located in the same exact address as the Lop County #4
1503 internment camp, which had already become famous because of the photo posted to
1504 Weixin [WeChat] by the Xinjiang Department of Justice. In 2018, many companies were
1505 still listing their official addresses as being in “vocational and educational training centers.”
1506 They have since changed their addresses to indicate that they are inside “industrial
1507 parks.”

1508 We needed to look no further than the PRC’s own media to understand that there was
1509 forced labor happening within the internment camps. Chinese state television celebrated
1510 the fact that people detained in the vocational training centers were being put to work to
1511 contribute to the economy. Some of those media programmes even revealed that the

1512 people were making goods bound for international markets. These camp/factory co-
1513 locations are not unusual. This week alone, I have identified two companies that are
1514 exporting into international markets that are located within the walls of internment camps.
1515 My research regularly identifies these camps/factory co-locations. Satellite imagery
1516 reveals hundreds more. It is clear that if a person is in an internment camp, they have no
1517 alternative but to perform the work that is assigned them. Experts agree that this meets
1518 all international definitions of forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery. But
1519 internment camp forced labour is merely the tip of the iceberg.

1520 There are several other mechanisms by which the Xinjiang regional and local
1521 governments compel minoritized citizens in the Uyghur Region to work. Abduweli Arish
1522 was a computer programmer and GPS specialist before he was sent to camps in 2017.
1523 He was only released under the supervision of his brother who owned a grocery and
1524 promised that he would employ his college educated, highly skilled brother, where he
1525 could be monitored. He was not allowed to return to his chosen profession or choose his
1526 line of work. He was not in need of poverty alleviation, but the government still compelled
1527 him to work and determined where he would have to work.

1528 Even those who have never been in the camps are subject to forced labor transfers. In
1529 many countries in the southern part of the Uyghur Region, government agencies go door
1530 to door to identify people they can send for labor transfers to meet the quotas set out by
1531 county governments. In some places, people are rated on a point system that determines
1532 whether they have to receive additional ideological training to convince them to go out to
1533 work or whether they are safe to go out to work but need to be fairly close ot home or
1534 whether they can be sent to the rest of China to work in factories.

1535 The Emedin family was sent 50 kilometers away from home to work at Hoshine Silicon
1536 company. But only after they were subjected to repeated coercive strategies. They were
1537 told they had to take Chinese language classes to increase their capacity to work in
1538 Chinese factories. They submitted, but they were determined to need more ideological
1539 training. A cadre came to their house regularly to train them to accept poverty alleviation.
1540 They were then sent to do welding training to occupy them in the off season. They were
1541 then told they needed to be transferred for labor. They balked because they had elderly

1542 family members who needed care. The government agency provided medicines for the
1543 grandparents to alleviate their concerns. As Dr. Thum discussed, there is a
1544 disproportionate number of elder care facilities and orphanages being built in the Uyghur
1545 region to “alleviate the concerns” of people being sent away for labor. But the Emedins
1546 also had land to tend... seven acres of grape farms. The government alleviated that
1547 concern by taking it into the care of the state. According to the state media report in which
1548 their story was told, they also had a beautiful home in their village, but the government
1549 put them in a dormitory with other workers. They were transferred to Hoshine to work,
1550 having had all of their home, family, land, and community taken away from them.

1551 Others are sent much further from home. Buzaynap was compelled to go to work for
1552 Huafu Textile company over 5000 kilometers away from home. When the labor agency
1553 came to her village, no one volunteered to go. Agents went to her home over and over
1554 again to coerce her family into letting her go. They tried to shame them by saying that
1555 they were holding her back. She herself explicitly said that she did not want to go. And
1556 yet they kept at the family and others join her village until several women relented. The
1557 Nankai report tells us that there are many more people in the Uyghur Region who are
1558 unwilling to engage in these labor transfer programmes.

1559 In addition to a legitimate desire to take care of family, be with one’s children, take care
1560 of and maintain the right to one’s land, the investment in community and one’s own right
1561 to free choice, even there are good reasons not to want to go to the factories. Government
1562 directives tell us that inside the factories, people are controlled through “militarized
1563 management” that typically involves armed guards or special security officers. They are
1564 compelled to have “iron discipline.” All of this is premised on the racist beliefs that Uyghur
1565 and other minoritized citizens of the Uyghur Region are inherently lazy, slow, idle, and
1566 have a dangerous penchant for personal freedoms.

1567 And yet, according to government documents, upwards of two million labour transfers
1568 happen each year. This is because, as government directives explicitly tell us, labor
1569 transfer programs are based in a logic that suggests that people who don’t take steps
1570 recommended by the state are infected by terrorism and separatism. It is clear to
1571 everyone in the region that the punishment for being associated with the “three evils” of

1572 terrorism, separatism, and extremism is being sent for re-education. In addition, a
1573 forthcoming human rights report reveals interviews with both victims of the camps and
1574 security within the camps that indicated that people outside the prisons were coerced into
1575 working in factories through a point system that promised better outcomes for loved ones
1576 in camps if the ostensibly free people accepted labor transfers. As a result, we must
1577 understand all state-sponsored labor programs in the region to be tantamount to forced
1578 labor. While there are certainly people who might choose to work in t factory, what we
1579 know is that people are not allowed to choose not to be transferred to factory labour.

1580 These programs, as they are practiced in the Uyghur Region, are clearly in violation of
1581 the ILO convention on forced labor, which characterizes forced or compulsory labour as...
1582 In my review of state directives, first-person narratives, and interviews with social auditors
1583 who have been on the ground in factories in the last several years, the transfer of Uyghur
1584 labour meets at least ten of the 11 indicators of forced labor as identified by the ILO (and
1585 I am not ruling out the physical or sexual violence piece -- I just haven't seen evidence of
1586 it as yet). Indeed, while I admit to not being a legal scholar, it is my opinion that these
1587 practices meet the threshold for all sociological and legal definitions of modern slavery,
1588 human trafficking, and forced labour that I have studied.

1589 *Counsel – You state that a third of minority population of XUAR may be help in this*
1590 *intertwined system of internment and forced labour. Is there a breakdown of that*
1591 *internment by gender or other protected characteristics?*

1592 LM – Not that I know of.

1593 *Counsel – Is there a statistical breakdown by profession and/or education?*

1594 LM – Not that I know of.

1595 *Counsel – You state on page 145 of your report that “many of the people who work in the*
1596 *camps are trained professionals and business people” – on what basis can that assertion*
1597 *be proved?*

1598 LM – The examples that I use are from reported accounts of family members, taken from
1599 the Xinjiang victims database. Family members have reported their loved ones have been

1600 moved into work. There are also accounts by people who have left the Uyghur region,
1601 e.g. in Kazakstan who were forced into labour. There is not broader statistical analysis
1602 yet as people working in these systems are not those getting out. Since the labour system
1603 began, fewer and fewer people are leaving the region. we do not have a lot of first-person
1604 account so it is a challenge to our research. We have to do it from this distanced
1605 perspective. But we use the government's own state media, company's annual reports to
1606 confirm what they themselves are doing.

1607 *Counsel – You state professionals are used to do menial work?*

1608 LM – Drivers, chefs, artisans, computer programmers, who are highly trained Mandarin
1609 speaking often education in other parts of the country were successful before they were
1610 put in camps or made to do menial tasks like sewing, or agriculture.

1611 *Counsel – Can you explain what the forced labour programme is intended to achieve on*
1612 *the part of the CCP?*

1613 LM – If we look specifically at Chinese state documents, some of what they say are
1614 directives as to how to operate the system – to improve Uyghur discipline, less likely to
1615 make them lazy. Also points to depleting the population, studies saying there should be
1616 more Han people and more dispersed Uyghur people. Moving them around China is one
1617 way of operating this dispersal. It will move the thinking towards more industrialised
1618 thinking 'hanified' way of thinking. All along on side of programs they are building
1619 orphanages and elder care facilities for those left behind and for a Han based education
1620 for the children.

1621 *Panel – What proportion of people are transferred outside of XUAR and why are they*
1622 *transferred?*

1623 LM – 100,000s at least sent away, documents straight from local governments –
1624 sometimes as many of 50,000 sent away. Not all sent far from their mother region, have
1625 seen photos of people put on buses, stories of people sent on trains. Right now, we don't
1626 have kinds of numbers we need to do accurate assessment.

1627 *Counsel – Is there a rational for movement?*

1628 LM – There is in sense of the level of dangerousness or insecurity. Claims people are
 1629 matched with certain skills, and also programs matching cities with specific Uyghur region
 1630 towns e.g., Hotan sent to Dongguan.

1631 *Panel – You’ve stated that children are forcibly transferred – how long are children*
 1632 *separated from their parents from and do they get reunited?*

1633 LM – We have not seen evidence of any systematic child labour yet. One photo captioned
 1634 ‘children working in a factory’. They are away from their parents as long as they are out
 1635 on transfers. The program is fairly new so we do not have statistical sense of how long
 1636 sent out.

1637 *Panel – How long on average do people sent away?*

1638 LM – We do not have many stories, when the Chinese government gives reports, they
 1639 talk about people units and moving back and forth – ostensibly, six month, one year, I
 1640 have seen a three year contract some point. I couldn’t make a generalisation.

1641

1642 **5 June 2021 (00:51:00 – 01:12:00)**

1643 **Rian Thum**

1644

1645 RT – I wanted to give a review of both the phenomenon of the separation of children,
 1646 removal of children to Han dominated state care, and limits on births. Partly as an
 1647 independent review of scholarship and media reports that have already come out, and
 1648 partly as an update as the Chinese government has released quite a few documents and
 1649 statistics on these phenomena. I wanted to tell story from a different angle, based on
 1650 types of sources and where the information comes from. There are three types of sources.

1651 Firstly, reports from the Xinjiang Bureau of Education. In particular a 2018 report on the
 1652 year 2017 first reported by the New York Times. It gives very specific numbers on
 1653 percentage of children placed in residential schools for whole region of Xinjiang (XUAR).
 1654 Can compare report with 2019 report from the same bureau to see change over time. The
 1655 increase in number of students has been reported elsewhere but I will give some context

1656 to it that I don't think is available elsewhere. Remarkable increase – it's almost 400,000
1657 placed in boarding schools within two years of children into schools – compulsory
1658 education. The second reason this 2017 report is interesting – it is very explicit about the
1659 goals of increased in boarding education. Xinjiang has been extraordinary for not having
1660 very many boarding schools which has changed overnight. The report has taken the
1661 boarding schools are the number one planning item for the Xinjiang Bureau of Education
1662 in 2017-18. The main reason is the overall stability of Xinjiang security. It goes on to
1663 explain why a boarding school increases stability – “creates a stable and peaceful
1664 environment for students blocking the influence of the family's religious atmosphere on
1665 the children to the greatest extent and reducing the occurrences of teaching science in
1666 school, listening to the scriptures at home, with thinking and ideas suffering the shocks of
1667 moving back and forth”. Explicit statement that the goal is to interrupt the knowledge and
1668 customs going from the parents to the children.

1669 Interesting about the report is published in a larger report, over 200 pages which includes
1670 report from every level education bureau in China – shows distinctiveness of education
1671 policy in China. There are other boarding schools elsewhere but different reasons which
1672 is extending reach of education. In Xinjiang it is linked to economic purpose. Don't really
1673 focus on boarding all that much for the schools in other regions and there are no stats as
1674 it is not a priority. Focus on this as much of international media discourse on separation
1675 of children from parents has focused on orphanages. But here the boarding schools are
1676 equally or greater mechanism for the separation. I forgot to mention this has resulted for
1677 middle school students in 49.5% by 2019 of students are in boarding schools. 77%
1678 compulsory age students are from minority groups in Xinjiang. I recommend looking at
1679 the full 2017 report, it has a lot of information on intent, such as getting more Han
1680 teachers, teaching Chinese, having it as a language of operation in the school not just
1681 language of education, involving the method of home visits to push these families into
1682 sending their children to these boarding schools.

1683 My report does focus more on intent involving language, home visits as way to push
1684 parents to send children to these schools. Second document I looked at was related to
1685 the orphanages. We do not have the same kind of government stats in Xinjiang - I haven't

1686 located a document which gives raw numbers. What I did was to follow in the footsteps
 1687 of the report by Associated Press which looked through construction tenders and
 1688 government bids to build new orphanages and repeated research that AP did to provide
 1689 the raw docs in the appendix. I located 44 construction calls for orphanages – smaller
 1690 than AP as some have been deleted presumably since then. I also compared this to other
 1691 regions specifically to Gansu which is neighbour province, similar population, similar
 1692 economic profile, only 16% as many calls. Construction boom happening whilst rest of
 1693 China there has been 40% decrease in number of orphans. One main difference is mass
 1694 internment program. Show Chinese state bureaus at local level dealing with children of
 1695 people put in internment camps.

1696 Last kind of document: a local government economic and social development report about
 1697 birth rates and natural increase rates. Very extensive reports by Adrian Zenz which brings
 1698 data to 2018. Documents starting to arise for 2019 so I was able to double check the Zenz
 1699 numbers and extend to the more recent past. This work has been superseded by the
 1700 report by Nathan Ruser and James Leibold. They have done for more units and spent
 1701 more time. So, no need to talk more on that. Look at things from another direction. I had
 1702 a look through the most plausible, or least implausible to the Chinese government
 1703 response to birth rates – study from Urumqi academic who wrote almost journal link article
 1704 to attempting to pick apart the Zenz report - operates by omitting any response to major
 1705 claims, manipulating data, making invalid comparison e.g., Zenz claims that growth rate
 1706 is higher in Xinjiang but there are more Uyghurs in the region.

1707 On their face high boarding rates and birth limits exists in mainland China and Xinjiang –
 1708 but the way they operate and goals are quite different. In Han regions boarding schools
 1709 are not fully compulsive theoretically. In Uyghur they are. More important, for Han
 1710 students these residential schools are teaching with own mother language whereas
 1711 Uyghur is language of dominant group. For compulsory birth limits – telling Han people
 1712 to have more, Uyghur people to have less. Maximum penalty for Han is lack social
 1713 security, for Uyghur is arbitrary internment.

1714 *Counsel – We heard from you how Xinjiang moved from being a region of relatively low*
 1715 *percentage of students in boarding schools, to expansion by end of 2017, also heard*

1716 *government stated reasons to expand boarding school are notable both for divergence*
 1717 *from polices in rest of PRC and for explicit assimilationist intent. Could you say more*
 1718 *about government reasons for expanding residential schools in Xinjiang and the*
 1719 *assimilatory intent and diverge and differ from what they are doing in other parts of China?*

1720 RT – Boarding schools are not expanding as quickly in rest of China. In the documents
 1721 where they talk about them the reasons are to improve quality of education, to improve
 1722 the reach of education compulsory. Accessibility is not mentioned in the report for
 1723 Xinjiang. Quality is mentioned, they do use some of the same language, for example
 1724 poverty alleviation is mentioned (almost in any policy for Xinjiang). Assimilation is the
 1725 primary reason. This fits into larger ideological principles the state has promoted e.g.,
 1726 Official assimilation described as melting pot approach which is a stark divergence to
 1727 ethnicities policies before say 2010 there was careful curation of ethnic difference – there
 1728 has been turn at top level towards assimilation.

1729 *Counsel – Relating to birth rates – trying to understand what is happening in Xinjiang is*
 1730 *different and why to rest of China. Trying to understand how it is different. Report states*
 1731 *draconian Xinjiang polices have no parallel elsewhere in China, why is that so? Why are*
 1732 *birth rates in Xinjiang different and having different polices than rest of PRC?*

1733 RT – Numerous reasons – some cultural, frame have too many children as road to
 1734 extremism and terrorism. Personally, I suspect this is more a concern with population
 1735 managing the ethnic proportions in Xinjiang. Seen from the Nankai report that there is an
 1736 interest in diluting the Uyghur population. Has to be seen alongside program of migration
 1737 by Han people to Xinjiang. Policies such as ‘move to the south’ which is catch all term for
 1738 Uyghur dominated areas of Xinjiang. New interest in moving Han people to the south at
 1739 same time as we see the birth rate change. To put that in historical perspective in 1940s
 1740 less than five percent of Xinjiang were Han, in 1980, 40%, then stops moving here all way
 1741 through 2015-2017 – we don’t know where it is right now. I suspect it is changing. This
 1742 required balancing at that point as Uyghurs were having more children – so how to
 1743 balance that was to encourage migration of Han people to Xinjiang. We are seeing cutting
 1744 of birth rate of Uyghur and increase of Han.

1745 *Counsel – Why is the policy to dilute the Xinjiang population, the Uyghur and indigenous*
 1746 *population? What is the final purpose of diluting it?*

1747 RT – We do have some historical evidence of the central government considering the
 1748 settlement of the region to be crucial to the security of the region e.g., we see echoes of
 1749 that in documents. I would want to reread those before giving firmer answer but I am
 1750 happy to submit to the tribunal later.

1751

1752 **5 June 2021 (1:12:22 – 1:35:00)**

1753 **Rachel Harris**

1754

1755 RH – You read my report which is a survey of available testimonies and you will be
 1756 listening to some more over the next few days so I will limit my remarks to a few reflections
 1757 of the readings of the testimonies. Women have been detained in numbers which are
 1758 certainly in the hundred thousand. The women range from farmers to academics, my own
 1759 colleague and her postgraduate students are amongst those detained. From these large
 1760 number of women detained we have just a handful of testimonies and they come from a
 1761 handful of Kazakh and Uzbek women detainees. Of course, this speaks to the uneven
 1762 possibility of escaping the country. Each of these revelations comes at serious cost and I
 1763 must say that I seriously admit their courage. They have to overcome shame within their
 1764 community, they have been targets for Chinese agents who accused them of lying, of
 1765 corruption or being paid US agents. Male detainees also experience sexual violence in
 1766 the camps, we know this from testimonies and males are detained in larger number than
 1767 women. We focus on women’s experience. There are particular aspects of violence
 1768 against women, gendered violence and what I read is systematic sexual violence against
 1769 women, which are relevant to the discussions that are on-going in this tribunal.

1770 Just a quick word on background, for years academics have been writing on the position
 1771 of minority women generally in China and the practices of objectifications and
 1772 sexualisations against them. ubiquitous images of smiling, always welcoming. Women in
 1773 Xinjiang used in the same way as “window-dressing” for the current Chinese policies in

1774 that region. We can see that from camp inspection visits and of course, very prominently
1775 we see the use of these young women dancers as entertainment for the planned, over
1776 200,000 mainly Chinese tourists who are expected to visit the region in the coming year
1777 under the new tourist drive. Just to state that given the violence these images are highly
1778 problematic. I would like to trace a line then from that to the processes of de-humanisation
1779 in the camps and this is a theme that is shared across the testimonies that we have seen.

1780 Just to mention a few names here, Gulbahar Haitiwaji, now resident in France, spend two
1781 years in a camp near Karamay, describes her experience in terms of de-humanisation,
1782 as brainwashing, having to memorise long tracks of political literature, enforced
1783 sterilisation and public self-criticism. The language of de-humanisation is also used in
1784 interviews given by Gulbahar Jelilova, she talks about experience of crowded cells,
1785 hygiene, constant surveillance and drugs, again using the language of de-humanisation.
1786 Across these reports, there is a high level of consistency, for example in Gulbahar
1787 Jelilova's report paired with testimony given by Mihrigul Tursun; she has spoken
1788 prominently in the US, has detailed her experience of torture and spoken of deaths of
1789 fellow inmates. If we speak specifically about sexual violence, the reports have been slow
1790 to emerge. I think that this is consistent of what we experience with reporting on sexual
1791 violence within a conflict in other contexts around the world. From the Xinjiang context,
1792 we have important testimony from Tursunay Ziyawudun; an ethnic Uyghur, now in the US
1793 and she is recounting her personal experiences of gang rape and sexual torture, including
1794 many disturbing details, like Sayragul [Sawutbay] who we heard from yesterday. She
1795 notes that women were removed regularly from the cells every night and raped. This
1796 testimony is also supported by testimony from Gulzira Aulhan, a Kazakh detainee. She
1797 spoke how she was forced to strip women before being left alone with guards and camp
1798 officials. Her account struck me because it shows how inmates within the camp system
1799 are made complicit with the system. They also share the guilt. Gulzira also details a
1800 financial incentive to the abuse. Something we hear from testimonies is guards or officials
1801 paying or bribing for access. We also heard from Qelbinur Sidik, shocking details – two
1802 aspects, the details on methods of torture all kinds of electric shock. This again echoed
1803 by accounts from Tursunay [Ziyawudun]. I also note Qelbinur's comment on her own
1804 interlocutors who notes that rape has become a culture within the camps.

1805 There is an interviewee, a young woman called Rukiye, who is based in Germany who
1806 has given a harrowing account of her own experience of rape and torture. She speaks of
1807 being held for long periods of time in an underground room filled almost to the roof with
1808 water. We heard examples of that from Omer Bekali. Again, Rukiye talks of bribery, she
1809 was only released because her family paid a large amount to get her released. And again,
1810 this question of the difficulty of speaking out so Rukiye has claimed that 99% of women
1811 have experiences rape but they wouldn't speak about it because they would feel too
1812 ashamed. These descriptions range from daily life inside the camps, the nature and
1813 method of abuse.

1814 I find them to be broadly consistent across different accounts. These are provided by
1815 women who have spent time in different camps and who were speaking from different
1816 countries. I consider these accounts to be broadly credible and sadly I think that they are
1817 representative of the experiences of large number of women detained in the camps. In
1818 our joint report, we suggested that China organises and coordinates systematic and inter-
1819 connected practices of ethnic targeted violence. I want to make explicit what the direct
1820 links of these various forms of gender-based violence to my colleagues' statements are:
1821 the culture of rape inside the camps, the sterilisation of women inside and outside the
1822 camps, and also, we can make a link with the report on coerced marriage with Han
1823 Chinese man.

1824 I also suggest sexual violence is an integral part of the planned transformation of the
1825 Xinjiang region into a hub of the Belt and Road initiative and part of that drive for
1826 development. I believe that sexual violence plays a major role in the climate of terror and
1827 that underpins the production of a large and passive labour force which is being used to
1828 populate the new factories which have sprung up alongside the camps, filled with so
1829 called graduate of the camps as well as transfers from rural areas. As we have seen in
1830 other contexts that have been designated as genocide sexual violence is an attack
1831 against the individual woman and an attack against the ethnic group. In Yugoslavia and
1832 Rwanda, in the case of the Yazidis and Rohingya, sexual violence against women has
1833 been used to humiliate, subordinate, and emotionally destroy entire communities.

1834 Violations against women and their bodies and reproductive capabilities are dubbed a
 1835 “weapon of war” against that whole ethnic group. I would link that comment to the
 1836 testimony of women who have come out of the Xinjiang camps. They talk about the
 1837 experience suffered by many former inmates and detainees, of extreme trauma after
 1838 release, feeling dead inside, only a shell, insomnia, suicidal thoughts. There are also
 1839 report of those released into the community in Xinjiang turning to alcohol or other forms
 1840 of addiction. To quote Tursunay Ziyawudun “it is designed to destroy everyone's spirit”.
 1841 My final point, we had a few questions about the question of intent on the level of which
 1842 these policies are sanctioned or deliberate. I suggest that this wide spread practice of
 1843 gender-based violence must be at least condoned at very high level.

1844 We know that the use of torture in detention centres right across China is well
 1845 documented. Common methods employed Omer Bekali’s account that you heard and we
 1846 also have reports of rape in detention employed specifically against other groups of
 1847 women, so Tibetan, nuns and Falun Gong followers. In relation to the Xinjiang camps, the
 1848 leaked internal documents shared with the New York Times in 2019, for example, do
 1849 demonstrate the direct leadership of Xi Jinping in the crack-down, that goes back to the
 1850 series of speeches that he made in 2014. This explicit call for a people’s war on terror
 1851 and the specific call for the education remoulding and transformation of criminals. Sean
 1852 Roberts told you about the direct role of Chen Quanguo and how he is the direct architect
 1853 of many aspects of the system in Xinjiang, the great social management system. I will
 1854 leave it there.

1855 *Counsel – In your report, you surveyed a number of secondary reports and testimonies,*
 1856 *mainly from 2017 onwards. You have also conducted field work in the region for 20 years*
 1857 *and you said that, over this period, you witnessed incremental levels of repression of the*
 1858 *indigenous people, can you elaborate on this?*

1859 RH – Already in the 1990’s, I was observing a series of crackdowns against religious
 1860 practice for example, with high levels of censorship. Around the 2000’s things started to
 1861 get more difficult. I think a real turning point in terms of my personal experience of the
 1862 region and the increasing securitisation would be 2009: I was in Urumqi during the 2009
 1863 demonstrations and the subsequent crackdown and inter-ethnic violence that occurred in

1864 the city. I saw high level of securitisation across rural Xinjiang, with mobilisation of local
 1865 police, checkpoints and a lot of arrests. As I began to work with rural women, I conducted
 1866 a lot of interviews with religious practitioners, who already were speaking of being
 1867 arrested for these normal, everyday practices, like teaching children to read Arabic or
 1868 recite the Qur'an, etc. Also, in general, the question of reproductive rights was very
 1869 prominent, so, many of the women would talk about their experience of coerced abortions
 1870 going back to the 1990s.

1871 *Counsel – In your opinion, would the stigma inhibit the re-integration of the victims of*
 1872 *sexual violence into the Uyghur community, and/or would inhibit their desire or ability to*
 1873 *reproduce?*

1874 RH – Undoubtedly there would be difficulties in re-integrating for women who dare to
 1875 speak out about this. The shame is a problem for the family, the wider family. I believe
 1876 that would be a powerful restraint on women's willingness to speak out about these things.

1877 *Counsel – As mentioned, the report is primarily based on secondary reports and*
 1878 *testimonies, and you stated that, based on your experience, these reports are credible,*
 1879 *can you explain?*

1880 RH – We have seen Chinese official sources attempting to discredit these witnesses on
 1881 the basis of the lack of reliability of the women, and I think there is a widespread tendency
 1882 to regard minority, and particularly Muslim women as unreliable, uneducated “baby-
 1883 making” machines, to quote one recent comment from a Chinese official. But I'd like to
 1884 give credit to them as witnesses who have an equal validity to any other person who could
 1885 sit up on a panel like this.

1886

1887 **5 June 2021 (01:36:00 – 02:20:50)**

1888 **Joanne Smith-Finley**

1889

1890 JSF – Thank you for reading my report. I'm going to just summarize, hopefully fairly
 1891 quickly, the main ideas. As you know, the report focuses quite significantly on my own

1892 ethnographic field work, so particularly my two most recent field trips to the Uyghur region
1893 in 2016 and 2018. I'm going to bring some more photographs – I couldn't put all the
1894 photographs in the report, so I'm going to bring some more photographs today to show
1895 you. But the bulk of my evidence from there is from snatched conversations – the only
1896 way to have interviews at that time – photographic evidence, and video evidence. We
1897 don't have time to watch any of the video evidence, but I can provide that at a later date
1898 if necessary.

1899 The most recent intensification of religious repression begins from 2017, seven months
1900 after Chen Quanguo came to power as the regional Party Secretary. So we have the
1901 Regulations on 'de-extremification', which ostensibly aim to halt the penetration of
1902 extremism. So we see things like 'making religion more Chinese', the Sinicization of
1903 religion, establishing 'correct beliefs', 'correctly handling the relationship between law and
1904 religion', and this refers to a longstanding division in China between official and unofficial
1905 religion, legal and illegal religion...

1906 As my colleague Ondřej Klimeš has written in 2018, what the party seems to be doing
1907 here in fact is seeking to "solve the problem of to whom to listen, whom to trust, and whom
1908 to follow". So, here, the party is wanting the Uyghurs not to be following an alternative
1909 authority in the form of Islam, but to be following the CCP and CCP ideology. So, in
1910 practice what's happened is that Islam has been targeted as a virus, as an addiction.
1911 We've had imams referred to as parasites in state discourses, and piety referred to as
1912 parasitic, in the sense that individuals, Uyghur individuals, who are spending time praying
1913 five times a day cannot possibly be useful economic producers for the Chinese nation.

1914 We've seen these medical analogies used – virus, addiction, malignant tumours...poisons
1915 – to justify mass internment using population targets and arrest quotas. And actually, if
1916 you look closely at the regulations themselves, you can see straight away, in Article 5, a
1917 direct reference to an annual target responsibility evaluation system, which refers directly
1918 to the targets and quotas that have been used to intern individuals. And in Article 14, a
1919 direct reference to educational transformation, which is of course a reference to
1920 transformation through education or political re-education, which consists of combining
1921 ideological education, psychological counselling, as a euphemism, and behavioural

1922 'corrections'. You'll notice that the word 'correction' appears a lot in state discourses in
1923 the last few years with regard to the Uyghurs.

1924 So, what the state purports to be as a targeting of extremism is in practice what Darren
1925 Byler has referred to as a 'carpet-bombing' approach – it has been completely arbitrary.
1926 This internment campaign has targeted anyone, really, who displayed a high level of piety
1927 or a high adherence to daily religious practices – everyday ordinary peaceful religious
1928 practices. The state itself has referred to it as an indiscriminate use of 'weed-killer'. So
1929 the state itself uses the term 'weed-killer'. 'You can't just pull out the weed, you have to
1930 spray the entire field' – I think is the rough translation of what the state has said.

1931 During my last trip to Xinjiang, to the Uyghur region, conversations with both Han Chinese
1932 residents and Uyghur residents brought the same notions out. "So these detained
1933 people", said one Han taxi driver, "they're just there to have their thinking changed, and
1934 then they will come out of the camps again". Although everyone I spoke to during that trip
1935 told me that very few people were coming out of the camps. A Uyghur businessman said
1936 to me, "some people were given medicine to change their thinking in the camps, medicine
1937 for their minds, and this made them ill. And when they became ill, only then were they
1938 allowed out". I've seen other reports from human rights defenders, Chinese human rights
1939 defenders, working on the ground in China, that have referred to these people [as having]
1940 been actually transferred to mental health facilities from the internment camps.

1941 What are the eligibility criteria for internment then? Not terrorist acts as you and I know
1942 them, but in fact everyday religious practices. Growing a beard, regular prayer, inviting
1943 too many people to one's wedding, giving your children names of Islamic origin, looking
1944 too religious, reciting an Islamic verse at someone's funeral, washing bodies according
1945 to Islamic custom, holding strong religious views, allowing other people to preach religion,
1946 teaching the Qur'an to your children, asking an imam to name your children, attending
1947 the mosque regularly, studying or teaching 'unauthorized' forms of Islam, praying at a
1948 mosque other than on the traditional prayer day of Friday, attending Friday prayers
1949 outside of your village, making a pilgrimage Mecca, or possessing illegal religious content
1950 on a mobile phone or computer – and this can simply be a woman wearing a niqab or
1951 hijab. So what does this look like? What does this religious repression campaign look like

1952 inside the camps? It has been a campaign of coercive secularization. Internees have
1953 been forced to renounce Islam, to disavow their Islamic beliefs, to make self-criticisms.
1954 The most religious internees, the ones who perhaps were Islamic scholars or much more
1955 pious than others, have been forced, singled out, and forced to eat pork as punishment,
1956 or to drink alcohol. Internees have not been allowed to wash their hands and feet – this
1957 sort of regular washing of hands and feet was...labelled as extreme.

1958 They were lectured about the dangers of Islam, and in some cases they were tortured.
1959 And as reported in the Guardian in 2018, from one camp survivor, “they would say to us:
1960 there is no religion. The government and the Party will take care of you”. The government
1961 and the Party is benefactor, wanting to switch off the internees’ authority from Islam, from
1962 God, to the CCP. So it’s just one slide about my trip in 2016 – there’s a lot more data if
1963 you want to know anything...I can tell you that at a later date. This is just to say that
1964 trouble was already brewing very significantly in 2016. So, just a couple of quick
1965 snapshots there – restaurant staff who had [fled] from Kashgar and Aksu to Urumqi
1966 saying, “we’ve come to Urumqi because there’s no freedom in the south anymore. A man
1967 can’t even grow a short beard or a moustache. Only older men can grow a longer beard.
1968 Women are not allowed anymore to wear the niqab or burka”. And a migrant taxi driver
1969 who had also fled from Hotan to Urumqi, “a lot of people have been put in prison down
1970 south for very, very small things, like wearing a veil or growing a beard”.

1971 So to my 2018 trip, lots of photos from here on in. I did a lot of walking during this trip – I
1972 walked around the city for hours, hours, and hours, and observed everything, and
1973 photographed everything, as well as I could, [and] had a lot of snatched
1974 conversations...around mosques and in different places, and took video footage. All of
1975 the mosques without exception were completely deserted. I never saw anybody go in at
1976 any time of day on any day of the week whilst I was walking around – this was a three
1977 week visit, during which I was mostly unmolested by the state. I have a couple of two
1978 arrests which I could tell you about later if you’re interested – brief arrests, two hour
1979 arrests. We have the PRC flag in four courts of the mosques, barbed wire, razor wire,
1980 coiled all over the perimeter fences, digital running slogans against religious extremism,
1981 and so on. But nobody praying.

1982 So in my conversations, I found that people were saying that only between ten to twenty
1983 elderly men [go] to the mosque at prayer times, although I never saw one single person
1984 go in myself. Most other retired men, they explained, were too afraid to go in because the
1985 state would stop their retirement benefit if they did. People who were still employed in
1986 state work units said they could not go in because if they went in, they would lose their
1987 jobs. If you work for a state enterprise or a state organ, you're not allowed to be religious.
1988 And everyone else, they said, even the independent businessmen who used to go in in
1989 droves prior to 2016, and even still in 2016 actually, are now too scared to go in. No one
1990 is going in. Why? Because of these security checkpoints set up at all the mosque
1991 entrances with iris scanners. People said, "we want to go in the mosques, but if we go in
1992 the mosques they will take us to prison. They look at our identity cards and they will mark
1993 us for internment".

1994 Moving to Kashgar in the south – this is probably the most important mosque, one of the
1995 most important mosques in the Uyghur region. This mosque was turned into a museum
1996 when I visited in 2018. You see a Uyghur ticket seller sitting at the counter there on the
1997 right. Just to her right, there is a riot policeman asleep on the desk with two riot shields in
1998 front of him. And I was allowed to go in as a tourist only. So this is what happened when
1999 I went inside (*refers to quote on slide*) – I'll just let you read this by yourself – gives you a
2000 sense of at the atmosphere. Moving to the Kashgar old town, we have a similar situation.
2001 All of the small neighbourhood mosques are padlocked without exception – razor wire,
2002 barbed wire, framed posters of the 'de-extremification' regulations on the outside walls,
2003 CCTV, and in some cases the mosques have been desecrated, not in this case on the
2004 left there, but in many cases, crescents removed from the domes – a desanctification.

2005 Again, through conversations, I asked people, "where has the crescent gone? Did
2006 someone take it away?" Sometimes people were too scared to say, to speak out loud,
2007 because the CCTV camera was right above their head. They would nod and say "yes,
2008 they took the crescent away", but they would not answer verbally because they were
2009 afraid of being recorded. Others were less fearful and said, "yes, they took it away. They
2010 took the crescent away". What was really noticeable, if you look at that slogan across the
2011 door here – this slogan says: '*Love the Party, Love the Country*'. This has replaced an

2012 earlier slogan that said: *'Love the Country, Love Religion'*. It used to be okay to love
2013 religion as long as you loved the country a little bit more, but now it's no longer okay to
2014 love religion. You can only love the party and love the country. These are the only options.
2015 And some mosques unbelievably – I couldn't quite believe my eyes when I walked into
2016 this place – have been turned into café bars and are now being frequented by Han
2017 Chinese tourists who are drinking beer inside.

2018 So here's another little story, little snapshot – I spoke to a Hui man and his Uyghur wife
2019 who said that the school, the Islamic school on right hand side there, had been closed for
2020 many years already. Closed down lots of years ago, whereas the mosque on the left had
2021 been closed down almost exactly around the time of the publication of the 'de-
2022 extremification' regulations. And they said, "oh, some foreign Muslims came the other day
2023 and they wanted to go in the mosque and we had to redirect them to the Heytgah
2024 mosque". I just looked at them and said, "I'm so sorry, the Heytgah mosque isn't open
2025 either". And I explained what had happened, and they looked absolutely dismayed and
2026 shocked.

2027 His wife asked me, "what do you do?"

2028 I said I am a university teacher.

2029 She looked at me for a moment and said, "so you know then. You know all about it".

2030 I said, "yeah, I do".

2031 And she burst into tears.

2032 She squeezed my hand, I tried to comfort her, and I said, "look, everything changes,
2033 everything changes".

2034 And she says, "when? When will it change? When will it get better?"

2035 That's just one example, but there were lots of examples like that.

2036 And then the defacement and removal of halal signage – this was all over Urumqi – it was
2037 already complete for the Uyghurs by the time I got there in 2018. All of the Uyghur
2038 restaurants already had no halal signage when I got there. But it was still in process for

2039 the Hui. It had spread to the Hui communities and the Hui restaurants as well, and it was
2040 still in process. You can see the mosque, picture of the mosque insignia and the halal
2041 signage has been removed from the top left corner there... I have hundreds of photos like
2042 this showing various stages of defacement.

2043 And onto other reports – these are not my reports – these are reports from other scholars,
2044 from my colleagues Dr. Harris, Dr. Thum, and also from the ASPI.

2045 And so we began to hear then, in around the time [of] April 2019, of the systematic
2046 destruction of religious built heritage. This included mosques and shrines. So first of all,
2047 we heard from Shawn Zhang, who is a Chinese PhD student at UBC, about the north
2048 gatehouse of the Keriye mosque in Hotan having been demolished. And the satellite
2049 imagery came out to show how this had still been visible in November 2017 on satellite,
2050 but by April 2018 it had vanished. This gatehouse had vanished.

2051 And this is an example, as Dr. Harris has written, of what UNESCO calls “strategic cultural
2052 cleansing: the deliberate targeting of individuals and groups on the basis of their cultural,
2053 ethnic, or religious affiliation, combined with intentional and systematic destruction of
2054 cultural heritage”.

2055 Also, while I was in Kashgar, I visited the Buwi Maryam Khenim Mazari, Bashkirem, on
2056 the instruction of Dr. Thum, who said that I must go and see what was the current situation
2057 with this shrine. When I got there, it was still intact, but it was deserted. It was padlocked
2058 – all of the...offerings had been removed from the garden. And there was a massive
2059 convenience police station built right next door to it. Huge police station, about probably
2060 ten times the size of the shrine. I couldn't photograph that, I hope for obvious reasons. I
2061 still got arrested. This was a two hour arrest with three levels of interrogation from three
2062 levels of police in three different languages. So I won't go into the details, but I can tell
2063 you about it later if you are interested to hear more.

2064 The Guardian [and] Bellingcat also came out with a satellite-based survey, satellite
2065 imagery analysis, which documented in May 2019 more than two dozen Islamic religious
2066 sites partly or completely demolished. One of them was the Imam Asim shrine, which
2067 showed that the shrine was empty, the mosque and the khaniqah and other buildings had

2068 been torn down, and only the tomb remained. As with the shrine I visited myself, pilgrims'
2069 offerings, flags...had all disappeared.

2070 And this is what the shrine would have, should have, looked like at a pilgrimage, on a
2071 pilgrimage day.

2072 So just to sum up on the shrines again, I quote my colleague Dr. Thum: "Nothing could
2073 say more clearly to the Uyghurs that the Chinese state wants to uproot their culture and
2074 break their connection to the land than the desecration of their ancestors graves, the
2075 sacred shrines that are the landmarks of Uyghur history".

2076 And to quote our colleague, and especially Dr. Harris' close colleague, Rahile Dawut, who
2077 was disappeared in 2017: "If one were to remove these shrines, the Uyghur people would
2078 lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual
2079 history. After a few years, we would have no memory of why we live here or where we
2080 belong".

2081 Moving on to culture... of course culture and Islam are entwined in the Uyghur society to
2082 a large degree. But when I was walking around in Kashgar old town, there were a lot of
2083 padlocked homes.

2084 The parent generation was conspicuous in its absence. There were a lot of children
2085 around, there were a lot of grandparents around, very few people in between – which
2086 suggested immediately to me that those parents had been interned. And what we saw
2087 were signs that these families had desperately tried to prove allegiance to the state. They
2088 had desperately tried to prove a patriotic allegiance to the Party before being taken away,
2089 in the form of New Year couplets pasted on either side of their door, Chinese New Year
2090 lanterns hanging on either side of their doors.

2091 And the propaganda tells the same story too. The posters all over Urumqi in 2018, like
2092 this one, it says – [*speaks in Chinese*] – 'respect traditional Han festivals, hand down
2093 beautiful Chinese virtues'. Where we talk about Chinese virtues and traditional festivals
2094 here, we are talking very much about Han traditional festivals and Han traditional virtues.
2095 And we can see this in the picture, which shows very clearly Han traditional architecture
2096 and traditional living setup.

2097 A Uyghur female bookseller in Xinhua bookstore at this time said to me, “we don’t have
2098 any festivals now, we Uyghurs. No one dares even to say *assalam alaikum* – peace be
2099 with you – anymore either. It’s just too religious”.

2100 So onto language – very quickly – coercive Chinese-medium education is happening
2101 inside the camps and outside the camps.

2102 Outside the camps – as my PhD student is documenting now meticulously – we are
2103 seeing a “slow linguicide”, which has been taking place since 2002. In 2018, this was
2104 becoming very, very clear. You could see it everywhere, most particularly in this picture I
2105 took of a poster outside the number one Urumqi primary school in which – this is a textile
2106 poster – you can see it hanging down the wall there – and the Arabic script has been
2107 literally cut out and then blacked over in that rectangle you see there. This should have
2108 been the Arabic script for [...], the greeting ‘hello’. Almost like a cancer being cut out, I
2109 would suggest.

2110 And then children of ‘doubly-detained’ parents have been placed in securitized national
2111 education boarding schools, as we’ve heard from my colleague Dr. Thum, and, we hear,
2112 psychologically tortured. So in one report from ethnic Han Chinese human rights
2113 defenders working undercover – these are religious Christian human rights defenders
2114 who are working undercover for *Bitter Winter* magazine in China – they wrote about how
2115 children in classrooms were showing extreme caution when trying to speak and write in
2116 Chinese, almost “as if they were skating on very thin ice”. In my most recent research
2117 together with Dilmurat Mahmut at McGill University in Canada – who is a Uyghur scholar,
2118 Uyghur folklorist – we have been analysing closely, very closely analysing, a set of
2119 textbooks that were revised and re-published in 2018. And in these textbooks, all Uyghur
2120 cultural and social characteristics have been erased, completely erased.

2121 The word ‘Islam’ does not appear once in 6 books. The ethnonym ‘Uyghur’ only appears
2122 once or twice, and then only as a part of the name of the region – XUAR. All of the pictures
2123 of human characters are showing Han facial features, not Uyghur. All the names are
2124 typical Chinese names, no Uyghur personal names.

2125 Han Chinese and western literatures are highlighted, but no Islamic literature, no Turkish
2126 or Middle Eastern literatures, and definitely no Uyghur literatures. The same is true for
2127 poetry.

2128 Mahmut and I argued that this is a deliberate intention to ‘invisiblize’ and eventually to
2129 eradicate the Uyghur people as a separate ethnic group or nation.

2130 I’ve put these two pictures up here because this was a quite stunning thing we discovered,
2131 which didn’t fit the pattern I’ve just described. We found one picture – just one picture, the
2132 lower picture – which clearly shows Uyghur children. We think this was left in the set of
2133 textbooks by mistake. If you look at the top picture – this is the same picture doctored to
2134 make the children look Han, ethnically Han, in appearance. So in the bottom picture, we
2135 have shadowed eye sockets to show the deep-set eyes. We have Uyghur braids on the
2136 girl in the pink dress. In the top one, all of the children have magically become Chinese –
2137 Han Chinese. And we have regular pigtails instead of the Uyghur braids.

2138 So these changes are causing significant mental harm, I would argue. The controls on
2139 religious dress and facial hair...a colleague of mine was in Ghulja, in the northern oasis
2140 of Ghulja, in 2018, and interviewed a Uyghur taxi driver. He got out a picture of him[self]
2141 when he used to have a moustache and began to cry, and said to her, “today, it’s not
2142 possible to grow a moustache. It’s not officially forbidden, but everybody knows the
2143 consequences of doing so”.

2144 I spent two hours talking to this young man in Kashgar. He sang the national Chinese
2145 anthem to me in perfect Chinese. He also sang me a song in perfect Chinese that helped
2146 him to learn the Chinese tones, the four tones, the pitch in Chinese – in mandarin
2147 Chinese. And then, all of a sudden, he got some white sticky labels and began to recreate
2148 a beard on his face. He’s not aware of what’s happening to him yet at age 6. There is a
2149 significant psychological trauma, I think, in this community resulting from these
2150 restrictions.

2151 There was also the campaign to cut women’s tunics and dresses, which was going on
2152 when I was in the Uyghur region in 2018. I didn’t see any of it personally, but it was being
2153 reported at the time by Radio Free Asia and some Taiwanese news outlets, where women

2154 were having their long tunics and skirts cut in the street – cut short in the street – because
2155 wearing a long tunic and hiding your behind was supposedly a sign of religious extremism.
2156 And of course, this has been described as an attack on Uyghur women’s dignity.

2157 Also, Dr. Harris made reference to coerced intermarriages. The PRC has been
2158 aggressively incentivizing intermarriage since 2014, by offering couples money and
2159 material goods to encourage them and persuade Uyghur women to marry Han Chinese
2160 men. And, indeed, we’ve had a recent report last year, June 2020, from the Associated
2161 Press, where a mixed couple report receiving such incentivized goods. However, our
2162 colleague Darren Byler has published analysis of PRC state narratives which suggest
2163 significant level of coercion. So we have Han male migrants and security workers
2164 choosing a Uyghur woman in the region and then working with various arms of the local
2165 authorities to convince the families to agree. And when this is happening in a context
2166 where refusal will be labelled as extremism and will result in you or your parents being
2167 interned in a camp, it is very difficult to refuse such an intermarriage.

2168 We’ve also seen the detention, the targeting of famous cultural figures – or ‘killing the
2169 chicken to show the monkey’ – to use a Chinese phrase. So this is the deliberate targeting
2170 of celebrity and cultural figureheads. Again, it’s a way of inducing terror in the community,
2171 inducing fear. It promotes the state project to eradicate local languages and cultures, but
2172 it also warns everyone – all of the broader masses – that nobody is safe, not even the
2173 Uyghur elites. This practice has reached beyond the realm of high culture – for example,
2174 we see a celebrity footballer interned, we see a philanthropist businessman sentenced to
2175 life imprisonment, and so on.

2176 The pictures you see here are of very highly respected musician – Abdurehim Heyit – a
2177 long-term friend of mine and Dr. Harris’. And these are pictures of him before and after
2178 detention. He is now out of the internment camp but, we believe, under house arrest in
2179 Urumqi.

2180 Just very quickly, just to say that, everything I was describing from what I saw with my
2181 own eyes in 2018 is still happening now. We know this from a recent Reuters report,
2182 among others, in which Reuters investigative reporters visited around 24 mosques across

2183 seven counties during Ramadan and found that most of them were either partially or
2184 completely demolished.

2185 You see a picture here of part of a minaret broken off from the Xinqu mosque in Changji,
2186 and you see here the same mosque with the minarets removed.

2187 In this picture, you see a mosque that has apparently been destroyed altogether and
2188 reporters were prevented from entering the site. And a Han Chinese resident told
2189 reporters, “there are no Muslims like that here anymore”, meaning there are no Muslims
2190 who pray publicly in a public place in a public mosque here anymore.

2191 I’ll stop there.

2192 *Counsel – You mentioned that the Chinese Communist Party sees Uyghur Islam as a*
2193 *virus and you also referred to the party using this medical analogy to describe with*
2194 *reference to cleansing treatment and so forth. Is this a reference to cleansing the people*
2195 *of their religion or is it something more than that?*

2196 JSM – I think it is something more. I think it is a hollowing out of their entire identity and
2197 religion is targeted amongst other things because it is the central component of their
2198 identity but it is not the only component of their identity. I think it is a hollowing out; an
2199 emptying of the Uyghur identity so that in the end the Uyghur group as we know it will not
2200 exist anymore. In the same way that the Manchu group have already inter-married to such
2201 a level and being sinicised to such a level that really the Manchu group doesn’t really exist
2202 anymore in China and Uyghurs often refer to the Manchu group when they are voicing
2203 their fears about eradication and disappearance.

2204 *Counsel – You stated that in fractions in the community leads to detention and you*
2205 *discussed in your report that within the detention facilities there is forced secularisation*
2206 *and de-extremification. What are the consequences for those who refuse secularisation*
2207 *in the camps?*

2208 JSM – We don’t have much information about this. There is a report called “From camps
2209 to prisons” by Gene Bunin, an independent researcher. He is also the curator of the
2210 Xinjiang Victims Database In which he has described how the most unreformable in

2211 Chinese official's eyes internees have been transferred from internment camps into
2212 formal prison situations and in these situations there have sometimes been kangaroo
2213 court held within the internment camps and those internees that were sort of perceived to
2214 be unreformable or unrepentant have been handed a very arbitrary summary, a sentence
2215 of ten, 15 or 20 years and there are some statistics in that report that show the kind of
2216 proportions and backgrounds but it is usually young men, young very pious men who
2217 refuse to renounce Islam in the camps who end up being treated in that way. Apart from
2218 that report I am not aware of other information.

2219 *Counsel – You stated that when severe restrictions on religious practice were put in place*
2220 *in South Xinjiang, that people where then going from the South to the North. Can you tell*
2221 *us how common that was, and whether that could be construed as a forced displacement*
2222 *or not?*

2223 JSM – To a certain degree, it was a forced displacement because there people were
2224 migrating to Urumqi in the North because they were no longer able to practice their
2225 religious beliefs and were molested in the South and if they continued practicing everyday
2226 religious activities in the South, they risked being interned and imprisoned. Those people
2227 were moving to Urumqi because there were much greater freedoms there. This has been
2228 happening for quite some time already. I have been going to the region over a period of
2229 thirty years. If I think back of the first time, I was there in 1995/96, at that time all the
2230 people would be going into a mosque on a Friday in Urumqi where elderly man; local
2231 Urumqi residents and very few of them actually. Not very many. A handful of elderly man
2232 going into the mosque around Friday lunchtime. By 2002-2004, as the local Islamic revival
2233 was picking up in pace, it was very different. In Urumqi, the mosques had been rebuilt.
2234 They were four/five times the size, two or three story, huge forecourts, and thousands of
2235 men of all ages going in and out. A lot of those people at that time had already started
2236 coming up from the South, I think. This intensified very much after 2009, after the
2237 demonstrations in Urumqi. By 2016, when I was there, we were already seeing
2238 restrictions in Urumqi whereby the women wearing niqab and hijab and so on. In 2004 or
2239 in the 2000s when I was there were no longer wearing those. They were replaced by a
2240 halfway hijab, like a permissible hijab that the authorities would allow and we also turban,

2241 saw these fashionable turbans, especially the young women, which seemed to be allowed
2242 by that time. But by 2018 all of that had completely vanished. In Kashgar in 2018, I saw
2243 one lady with a very regular sort of chiffon lightweight headscarf during the whole time
2244 that I was there and even she was asked to take that off as she passed through a security
2245 checkpoint and no other woman was wearing any other head covering at all.

2246 *Counsel – the severe restrictions you refer to have extended as you stated in your report*
2247 *to Urumqi and the rest of Xinjiang. Has that led to a consequent pattern of displacement*
2248 *of movement of people in Xinjiang to elsewhere or within Xinjiang?*

2249 JSM – I interviewed some Uyghurs who had to move to Inner China from the Uyghur
2250 region ironically because it was easier to practice in Inner China than it was in the Uyghur
2251 region. However, by 2019 even the migrants in Inner China had come under significant
2252 scrutiny. So, for example, in Shanghai when I was interviewing Uyghurs in restaurants in
2253 2019, they had removed all of the Arabic calligraphy and all the sort of Islamic pictures
2254 from the walls inside the restaurant. They explained how they were no longer able to go
2255 into the mosque. The mosque was just across the street and the Hui Muslims were happily
2256 going in and out of the mosque without any problem at all but the Uyghurs said “we cannot
2257 go in the mosque, as soon as we go in the mosque, we will be rounded up and send back
2258 to Xinjiang to be locked up”. And they said they had Han Chinese political cadres coming
2259 into the restaurant and checking up on them, coming to eat in the restaurant but clearly
2260 coming for surveillance purposes.

2261 *Counsel – you stated in the report that Uyghur cultural leaders have been detained and*
2262 *at page 189 of your report you refer to artists, writers, poets, academics, singers and*
2263 *athletes. It might be that there aren't any details about this but how widespread is the*
2264 *detention of Uyghur cultural leaders?*

2265 JSM – It is hard to gage that as with everything, we know about what we know. Often it
2266 may just be the tip of the iceberg. In the case of celebrity figures, the most recent report I
2267 have seen numbers about 435 known celebrity figures to have been disappeared,
2268 imprisoned or detained. But how representative that is across the whole it is hard to say.

2269 *Counsel – Does the detention of these figures; is it accompanied by publicity in state*
 2270 *media about the fact that they have been detained or not?*

2271 JSM – No. Everybody knows the person has disappeared. Everyone in the community
 2272 knows so the fear is instilled but it is not loaded publicly in the press. Not that I have seen.

2273 *Counsel – My final question which in one form or another has been asked of your*
 2274 *colleagues. What would you say is the logical conclusion, if any, that could be reached in*
 2275 *respect of the policies you have mentioned relating to cultural destruction?*

2276 JSM – What we are seeing is an identity castration. That is a term I used recently and
 2277 that I think that really resonates. It is like an identity castration or it is like an absolute
 2278 emptying of the Uyghur religious, linguistic and cultural identity. It is leaving the physical
 2279 shell. Yes, we are not seeing mass killings. No, but we are seeing the mass killing in the
 2280 sense that we are seeing the mass killing of an identity and we are seeing a physical shell
 2281 of people left without the cultural substance left anymore, in any recognisable form and
 2282 we are seeing that people are being deprived of the ability to transmit that life force that
 2283 cultural life force from one generation to the next. Deliberately, intentionally deprived of
 2284 the opportunity to do that by the state.

2285

2286 **5 June 2021 (02:45:40 – 04:09:20)**

2287

2288 **Questions to the Expert Panel**

2289

2290 *Panel – in your statement you start by saying voluntary, what do you think the Chinese*
 2291 *use of the word “voluntary”. What do you the authorities mean by that?*

2292 LM – In many documents I have seen in the last year the Chinese government /local
 2293 authorities use it in a defensive posture against claims against forced labour and that they
 2294 are using forced labour in these programmes. When we see publicity about the labour
 2295 transfer programs the celebration is the ideological readjustments of those subject to
 2296 these labour force programs. Though the stories are about those explicitly unwillingly –

2297 the success story is via consorted efforts of cadres and agencies and private labour
2298 agencies as well, which are subsidised by the government, that people who were
2299 previously unwillingly to go to work/accept government's "largess" that they have been
2300 transformed and now voluntary join work. These efforts are clearly coercive and
2301 consistently and going back to people's houses and telling them that they need to be re-
2302 educated if they don't go. The threat to resist the programmes are tantamount to being
2303 affiliated terrorist mean what the Chinese government calling voluntary and celebrating
2304 voluntariness is in fact a systematic program of coercion.

2305 *Panel – The words “work enforcement” and “enslavement” – what are the pointers to*
2306 *slavery?*

2307 LM – When we talk about slavery as sociological or legal – sociological definition e.g.,
2308 Kevin Bales at Nottingham who has defined it as person experience being compelled to
2309 work against their will under threat of violence without ability to walk away. All these
2310 factors are there in this case – that the people who are being subjected to these
2311 programmes are going unwillingly, they are being subjected to forced work and under
2312 threat of violence (camps) and unable to walk away – some are literally behind fences
2313 and walls. Others are extraordinarily isolated, that there would be no way to get out of it
2314 unless someone where to transport you. These programmes meet the sociological
2315 definition that is about the experience of the enslaved person. At the same time, we have
2316 definitions in UK modern slavery law, or the Palermo Protocol on trafficking or the ILO
2317 Convention on forced labour. Some of those focus on, not the ILO Convention, but the
2318 others focus on the criminal act, the programme the state or the person who enacts inflicts
2319 slavery on someone. Typically, these definitions hang on three categories or three
2320 characteristics of slavery: forced, fraud or coercion. In the UK it is often called deception
2321 instead of fraud. But in this case all three of these characteristics are met – there are
2322 many cases in which people are being forced by being held within the fences of the
2323 internment camps, or within the fences of the factory, fraud they are being promised of
2324 paid or promised that they can go back. In some cases, people are being paid but in other
2325 cases people are not. And then coercion, being coerced through this system of agencies

2326 that go out and after them, time and time again. All of these possible definitions of
2327 trafficking and slavery and forced labour seem to be met in my opinion.

2328 *Panel – In terms of that internment site and the Palermo Protocol – how do they explain*
2329 *what they are doing?*

2330 LM – I can't possibly tell how they would do that.

2331 *Panel – When you talk about forced labour do you mean slave labour as well as low-paid*
2332 *labour?*

2333 LM – Yes, most definitions of slavery... there is a lot of debate about what constitutes
2334 slavery. Some people would suggest that the definition of slavery hangs on whether or
2335 not a person is paid. There are testimonies to the effect that there are people who are in
2336 the system of labour transfer that are in fact not paid or paid little. Some testimonies show
2337 debt bondage, that is that they are being told that they own money for transportation, for
2338 housing at the place of work and therefore never make the money promised. Most
2339 definitions of slavery do not hang on this question of payment, but hang on the question
2340 of voluntariness of labour and the ILO definition of forced labour is like this; that is an
2341 unwilling coercion to work and so compulsion/compulsory work. Question of pay is not as
2342 relevant, even if person is paid, they don't have right to spend as they like, they don't
2343 have the right to come and go as they please, they don't have the right to choose their
2344 work which is a right given to humans by UDHR.

2345 *Panel – Does money ever reach their families, who presumably wouldn't have any money*
2346 *to survive on, if they were detained?*

2347 LM – Chinese government reports people do send money back home and that is a method
2348 of poverty alleviation. We don't have any first-person testimonies suggesting this
2349 happens. We have very little ability to know anything about what is happening to workers
2350 there because no auditors or researchers or journalist can go to factories allowed to get
2351 close. We cannot independently verify if people are being paid or sending money back
2352 home to their families. We can't know.

2353 *Panel – Going back you just said that you can't go back in. How do you corroborate the*
2354 *evidence you have given us? A lot is secondary, from articles, how do we know this is*
2355 *true?*

2356 LM – A lot of what I use to describe the systematic nature of the programs is drawn directly
2357 from government directives and documents – typically local level documents instructing
2358 labour agencies on how to operate labour transfers and that instruct them to
2359 systematically employ everyone who can be employed. I work with a team of incredible
2360 researchers from the region who do not currently live there who speak Uyghur and
2361 Chinese and Kazakh. I also work with a supply chain analyst – we are a team. We do a
2362 lot of work to verify this. When we locate a media article about these directives, those
2363 directives are typically celebrated or promoted through many different media sources, and
2364 we track down the original government directive that comes from the regional
2365 government. This is the public regional directive, there might be other ones that we don't
2366 know about. These are the claims they want the public to know, the operational systems
2367 that they expect people to understand and implement on the ground, and ostensibly they
2368 have no concerns about hiding because they are open sourced online. The main contours
2369 of this system is drawn directly from government evidence.

2370 *Panel – Have any of you actually been to a camp? Seen what goes on within the camp?*

2371 LM – No.

2372 *Panel – Nobody within the team has been there. This is all secondary. Let's talk about*
2373 *having being arrested, is there a problem about seeing anything, presumably this is 2018?*
2374 *Has anyone been allowed and look?*

2375 LM – I know of a financial auditor before 2016 or 2017. She says before the wall came
2376 down, was allowed to inspect a factory in Xinjiang, since then they had no access to that
2377 region.

2378 *Panel – You mentioned quantitative point system, could you explain this to us?*

2379 LM – Over course of last four years I have seen number of different quantitative point
2380 systems, early on there was a form found online showed different practices that would

2381 determine the status or outcomes for people who were of ethnic minorities in that region.
 2382 I specifically talk of one assigning people to different forms of labour transfers or education
 2383 if they deemed dangerous. There are a number of different ways those points are masked
 2384 and working in labour transfer is a way to gain points, which is a form of coercion (losing
 2385 could mean detention or worse treatment for your family members). Those points are
 2386 accrued or lost through these incredibly invasive visits of Han people which are often
 2387 implemented by companies themselves. We have investigated several companies that
 2388 have programmes in their companies where they move Han workers out to Xinjiang
 2389 region to do more technical parts of the jobs, the educations they have and then those
 2390 people are required to go into Uyghur people's homes to educate them on Chinese
 2391 thinking and ideology and gear them up towards working in factories and to monitor them
 2392 and to assign these points.

2393 *Panel – The Xinjiang Construction Corps operation, is that a government or a commercial*
 2394 *organisation?*

2395 LM – It is a paramilitary corporate organisation which owns cities, 14 publicly held
 2396 cooperations and has 4,400 entities under its investment portfolio – it is, what you may
 2397 call an “archipelago government” – runs satellite cities across the vast region of Xinjiang
 2398 but it's also the local government in those places while making tons of money from labour
 2399 transfers and the people they govern.

2400 *Panel – Can you explain difference between orphanages and boarding schools, in*
 2401 *policy documents and in practice?*

2402 RT – That's a difficult question. Orphanages for those who cannot return home. We do
 2403 not have lots of information about how boarding schools are operating over the last two
 2404 or three or four years. In previous situations and in other parts of China, some boarding
 2405 schools would allow children to return home at weekends, others will allow them to return
 2406 home only during holidays. Whereas orphanages is conceptualised as something being
 2407 permanently raised there. The orphanages are also considered as being a part of social
 2408 services, so they are often paired with elder care institutions and in a large number of the
 2409 construction bid documents that I submitted they are soliciting bids simultaneous
 2410 construction of an orphanage and an elderly care facility which hints at the possibility that

2411 the internments and the forced labour; the forcible transfer of the labour programme are
2412 not just leaving children without family support but the elderly without family support and
2413 these are seen as linked issues by the state.

2414 *Panel – Is there a link to the 2017 policy document from the Xinjiang Education*
2415 *Department, the one that set out to isolate children from their families and any*
2416 *documents you are aware of from the Ministry of Education in Beijing?*

2417 RT – Yes, that report is actually published by the elementary level education division of
2418 the Education Bureau in Beijing. It is a collection of reports from the provincial level
2419 education bureaus published by the Beijing Department of Education.

2420 *Panel – Do you know the extent of children’s placement in residential care when only one*
2421 *parent is interned?*

2422 RT – That is a difficult question to answer as we don’t have systematic data for and will
2423 probably best be asked to Dr Zenz. He has done quiet extensive research on the question.

2424 *Panel – Language of correction of the derogatory relating to infection, is that found in*
2425 *policy document relating to children?*

2426 RT – I have not seen that language in those documents.

2427 *Panel – What is the nature of parental consent? What does your data suggest that the*
2428 *transfer of children is taking place without parental consent or indeed children’s own*
2429 *consent?*

2430 RT – First of all, this is compulsory education, when the state changes what type of school
2431 you are compelled to go to. Of course, compulsory education is common around the
2432 world. Families are compelled to send their children to school. What we are seeing here
2433 is that the nature of the schools is being changed. Once the schooling is changed to
2434 boarding, the families are still compelled to send children there. We have a handful of
2435 first-person testimonies, actually they are family testimonies from people who have
2436 escaped the region. Those are found in the Xinjiang Victim Database but not particularly
2437 numerous. Here we face the usual barrier of access to data.

2438 *Panel – Given that Chinese is not just media but also communication, any evidence from*
 2439 *parents or children of communication between the generations?*

2440 RT – Yes, absolutely. Last time I was in the region was December 2017, the goal of
 2441 changing the medium of education and administration in schools to Chinese was 100%
 2442 has been around for quite a long time before 2008 and was slowly moving at first. You
 2443 can already see the effects. When I was there doing field work, people would complain
 2444 having trouble talking to their children as they didn't know their mother language well and
 2445 I believe you can find some quotes on media reports on people talking about this as well.

2446 *Panel – Given children are separated from their parents, that they are using a different*
 2447 *language of communication to one they are familiar with and experiencing the curriculum*
 2448 *as your colleagues have explained that is not reflecting their own culture and experience,*
 2449 *do you know of any evidence on children's mental health or psychological wellbeing?*

2450 RT – Talk of concern about mental wellbeing of children in state documents, particularly
 2451 when they talk about the so called “hardship students”. Can refer to a range of hardships,
 2452 often specified as a product when parents are in indoctrination camps. Mental health is a
 2453 focus of some state documents for such “hardship” students. But this is a very recent
 2454 policy and we do not have access to information about what has happened to children in
 2455 the last two years who have been raised and educated in these schools.

2456 *Panel – If you had to respond to the argument that the increase in boarding provision,*
 2457 *let's leave aside orphanages in the region, constitutes a kind of levelling up of provision*
 2458 *in line with other areas of China?*

2459 RT – I would argue that there was no need for boarding up to give educational access. In
 2460 Xinjiang and especially in the South where the Uyghurs are in majority has not seen
 2461 proletarianization that the rest of China has seen with the concurring hollowing-out of rural
 2462 areas. The population until then, it is hard to tell what is happening the last two/three
 2463 years but until then the overwhelming majority of Uyghurs were small independent farm
 2464 operators so there was no problem that needed to move or concentrate educational
 2465 resources in light of closing schools in the countryside into the towns. There is no
 2466 evidence of any need, in fact it is counterintuitive and a major expensive, unnecessary

2467 use of resources. It doesn't fit the needs of resource provision that are talked about for
2468 the interior of China.

2469 *Panel – Turning to coercive birth control, you referred Uyghur women allowed fewer*
2470 *children than the official entitlement, we heard that from witnesses. Are there any*
2471 *statistics on this phenomenon?*

2472 RT – No comprehensive statistics, not something the government would measure, we are
2473 reliant on government statistic for these comprehensive numerical measures. It is
2474 something that happens in drive to meet quotas rather than a drive to meet regulations.
2475 There are parent quotas for birth rates in various local regions and those put pressure on
2476 people on the ground to sort of bend the rules against national policy. Those quotas seem
2477 to emanate from either the region or Beijing. This means they are not keeping track of
2478 things that go against official policy.

2479 *Panel – Was there a 2020 census?*

2480 RT – There was a 2020 census. Data is not out yet. There might be a preview.

2481 *Panel – Was a Uyghur category in that?*

2482 RT – I do not know, more relevant would be the 2020 Xinjiang statistical yearbook which
2483 provides more fine-grained data for Xinjiang and in that they have eliminated ethnic
2484 categories in much of the data. When we used to get very clearly, for example birth-rates
2485 and natural increase rates at the county level. They have eliminated the birth rates on the
2486 country level and they have also eliminated ethnic categorisation on some of the data
2487 sets.

2488 *(3:12:35) Panel – How many female camps do you think there are in Xinjiang?*

2489 RH – I do not have those kinds of statistics available right now.

2490 *(3:14:20) Panel – How many camps do we have reports of torture rooms being present*
2491 *within them?*

2492 RH – We have a quite limited number of accounts altogether, which is due to the extreme
2493 level of secrecy.

2494 *Panel – This is just to determine if this is a general thing, which would mean it is a central*
2495 *directive. Do you think it is reasonable to generalise from a very small number of cases?*

2496 RH – That kind of evidence is very hard to determine, Adrian Zenz would probably be
2497 more able to answer that.

2498 *Panel – With regards to the rape culture you referred to within the female camps, do we*
2499 *know whether a similar rape culture exists in the prison services in Mainland China?*

2500 RH – I have only come across suggestions of systematic rape of female detainees on
2501 Tibetan nuns and Falun Gong practitioners, and these are special groups, so I would not
2502 say a widespread practice across the mainstream population, no.

2503 *Panel – Do we have any idea what the drugs forcibly given to detainees are?*

2504 RH – We believe they are designed to halt menstruations.

2505 *Panel – Why do you believe that?*

2506 RH – This is what has come from testimonies. Women coming out of camps have on
2507 several occasions independently stated that they believed these drugs were given in
2508 order to stop their ability to have children, to sterilise them.

2509 *Panel – I don't doubt that that's what they believe. Stress and weight loss are two major*
2510 *causes of cessation of menstruation. I wonder how you get beyond that. Is there any*
2511 *procurement data because these are massive amounts of these drugs that are being*
2512 *administered? Is there any procurement data on drugs from pharmaceutical companies*
2513 *within China?*

2514 RT – I haven't seen any data like this and I know that there is a lot of interest in it and
2515 there have been efforts to find it. To date we don't have any knowledge on precisely
2516 what these medicines are. We rely entirely on the testimony of survivors for any picture
2517 of what is happening.

2518 *Panel – We also heard that drugs have been forcibly administered to men in the camps.*
2519 *Do we know if they are the same of different drugs?*

2520 JSF– We don't know exactly which drug it is. We have some reports from doctors from
2521 the Xinjiang Victims Database where former internees had medical checks after coming
2522 out of the camps and have been found to be sterile. There are a limited number of such
2523 reports. After medical examination in Kazakhstan.

2524 *Panel – I am not sure what medical checks would tell you that someone was sterile*
2525 *beyond the fact that they weren't menstruating but we will leave it there.*

2526 RH – This was regarding man was it not?

2527 DT– Uyghur men were interviewed claiming to be impotent after taking medicine but
2528 there is no medical examination.

2529 *Panel – With that rape culture in place, one could anticipate an increase in the*
2530 *transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, have we observed any evidence of a rise*
2531 *in sexually transmitted diseases?*

2532 RH – No, that is not information that I have.

2533 LM – We might also expect there to be massive outbreaks of pregnancies and we do not
2534 see that either.

2535 *Panel – Do you think the placement of Han relatives in Uyghur home are the main source*
2536 *of sexual harassment?*

2537 RH – Yes, I think there are a lot of accounts now, it seems intuitive for me that it is going
2538 to be a very problematic practice. We heard one from Qalbinur [Sidik].

2539 *Panel – Is there any evidence of religion, given that it can't be practiced openly, has*
2540 *been driven underground?*

2541 JSF – Originally yes as it became harder to practice in public spaces for pious Uyghurs.
2542 It retreated into the family space. For example, in the 2000s, I was interviewing a lot of
2543 Uyghurs that had taken up Islam in a very pious way for the first time, teaching themselves
2544 how to pray at home, using pamphlets at home they had bought at the market. Uyghurs
2545 who were very pious practising religion praying 5x day at home even though they were
2546 state employees and not allowed to do so. So that was happening in the 2000s. Since

2547 becoming family campaign and cadres visiting and then home-staying, it has become
2548 almost impossible. The cadres are sent into the homes with the manual, an instruction
2549 manual on which Darren Byler has written extensively about and they are told to look out
2550 for Qu'rans to Arabic calligraphy on the walls, any indication the household is following
2551 religion in a pious way. Going into the house with pork dumplings and if refusing pork
2552 dumplings interpreting that as a sign of religious extremism. In that context it has become
2553 very hard to practice religion in the domestic space compared to before.

2554 *Panel – Not expecting to give an empirical response, is your sense of the repression of*
2555 *the religious activity is more aggressive than towards other groups, for example House*
2556 *Christians?*

2557 JSF – We have to recognise that the CCP has a problem with religion in general. This
2558 has been on-going for decades. It sees religion and God as a rival authority, and has
2559 done so for years. We are seeing Christians and Falun Gong persecuted as well as
2560 Buddhists to a greater degree in the last few years, but nothing on scale of what done to
2561 Uyghur Muslims. The Hui, yes, we are beginning to see effects on the Hui - I have
2562 anonymous Han contact in Wuhan who is sending me picture. The same on halal signage
2563 defacement happening in Wuhan on Hui Muslim, the islamophobia is spreading across
2564 the country. Not seeing Hui interned in re-education camps on a massive scale as
2565 Uyghurs. Not in comparison with numbers of Uyghurs. It's much bigger with the Uyghurs
2566 that just religion, it is about their whole identity. The difference between the Uyghur and
2567 the Hui is that Uyghurs always concentrated in the northwest border region and had
2568 history of recent independent republics in the 1930s and 1940s. The state is trying to
2569 dilute the population density by transfer of Han in and Uyghur out into forced labour
2570 situations elsewhere. This is a concerted effort to try and reorganise the population
2571 composition in that region. Don't see that with Hui as they have always been widely
2572 distributed around China. They have had a different population distribution and the Hui
2573 are much less suspected than the Uyghurs because they have intermarried extensively
2574 over the centuries and adopted the Chinese language. They are sinicised in a way the
2575 Uyghurs have not been until forced.

2576 *Panel – Shed light on the number of ways there are to destroy a society by internal*
 2577 *fragmentation by creating fear and division, children reporting on their parents and so*
 2578 *on... any evidence on that?*

2579 JSF – We have reports from AP investigative journalists about how children in boarding
 2580 schools and schools have been asked about parents' religious practices. Han Chinese
 2581 teachers in those schools asking if parents been on pilgrimage, or relatives, if parents
 2582 praying at home. It is another way to observe religious activities at home. In one case
 2583 reported by AP, an innocent child informed on uncle had mentioned had been on
 2584 pilgrimage unofficially who was then arrested and taken away to an internment camp.
 2585 This is just one example.

2586 *Panel – Do you think the characterisation of recalcitrant people, as the state sees it, in*
 2587 *this group as viruses, illnesses and so forth... Is that commensurate descriptions used of*
 2588 *other cases such as Rwanda e.g., cockroaches, rats and so on.*

2589 JSF – Since the answer to the 'people's war on terror' in 2014, we have seen 'extremists'
 2590 but extremists here just means pious Uyghurs describes as rats since 2014. We have
 2591 seen a progressing dehumanisation of the Uyghur group whereby they are now being
 2592 described as ideological illness, mental illnesses, and people who have viruses in official
 2593 state media, a long piece that I analysed for an essay I wrote a couple of years ago. We
 2594 see a horrific discourse describing imams, so called 'wild imams' (not trained by state)
 2595 referred to as parasites. We see pious Uyghurs referred to as parasitic as they are not
 2596 active economically productive citizens as they cannot be as they spend too much time
 2597 praying. We see discourses on the infiltration of Islam and contagion of Islam. It is all in
 2598 this discourse of 'halalification' so within the de-extremification, we see a lot of talk about
 2599 'halalifications' - the state seems to be very concerned about 'halalification', beyond
 2600 simply abstention from pork and then infecting the rest of society. I think this
 2601 dehumanisation has been discussed in detail by Dr Roberts.

2602 *Panel – If you destroy the religion, language and cultural base as a group such as this,*
 2603 *identity castration, can that group survive as a recognisable group?*

2604 JSF – It is very difficult to eliminate a group permanently and for good. As we have seen
 2605 groups can recover e.g., certain native American groups, First Nation groups in Canada.
 2606 New policies allowing the indigenisation of education in universities in Canada. We see
 2607 groups in Australia regaining new rights to a certain degree. Not to a great degree.
 2608 Chinese state appears to be going about that goal in an orchestrated, systematic and
 2609 concerted manner.

2610 *Panel – Dr Tobin thank you for a presentation, remarkable in clarity and power to*
 2611 *illuminate. Is there anything you would like to add, correct, interpret, particularly on*
 2612 *matters of intent?*

2613 DT – When I engage with that in my work, I do not when I discuss intent, I discuss,
 2614 continuity of intent. That is not to say that policies have not changed. They have changed
 2615 frequently throughout Chinese history. What I try to do is show the underlying narratives
 2616 of dehumanisation that are present in each era. We see in 1949, the establishment of the
 2617 regional autonomous system, that is framed as holding China together and modernising
 2618 the region. Of course, this is after promises of independence. Mao Zedong and most
 2619 Chinese academic work during that period call it historical materialist in the sense that
 2620 drawing, the idea that cultures and identities are strictly related to economic development.
 2621 The idea was that modernisation means those cultures disappear naturally. In practice
 2622 that is not a natural process but the narrative was that disappearance was natural. In
 2623 2012, for the first time, there was a formal debate about ethnic policy, it was called the
 2624 ‘intergenerational debate’ where the historical materialist saying we need to preserve the
 2625 regional autonomy system to hold China together and that people will naturally assimilate.
 2626 But then you had the second generation consisting of people like Ma Rong (马戎) ,
 2627 historian and anthropologist, Zhu Weiqun (朱维群) who worked for the united front work
 2628 department and Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), a political economist. They drove what they called
 2629 second generation of ethnic policies, essentially responding to 2009 violence saying
 2630 these policies do not work. China’s great revival as they call it meant securing the region.
 2631 Securing the region meant shifting policies we are discussing today. This was taken up
 2632 in formal policy, diffusion policy, where, when I started working on this, every document

2633 was structured around the notion of 56 *minzu* (民族) . You have the Han and you have
 2634 the non-Han, the civilisation and barbarian binary call it that. Now this is formal policy to
 2635 shift towards one *minzu* (民族) , *zhonghua minzu* (中华民族) - the Chinese nation. Ma
 2636 Rong who was a historian and anthropologist now writes articles celebrating this policy.
 2637 This is a very different tone, this is more classics looking to the leader, thanking him for
 2638 his contributions and thanking him for revolutionising this policy. When we read regional
 2639 government documents, their tone speak to the party; the party state. Most regional
 2640 governments just run through these policies and explain how they have achieved them.
 2641 The regional government documents celebrate Xi Jinping as resolving tensions between
 2642 how to include Uyghurs. Inclusion was always violence as leads to ethnic disappearance,
 2643 we now see much more physical violence that is there to police Uyghur identities. When
 2644 you look at any situation which is comparison there is decision-makers that matter, that
 2645 we can talk about. A long-term political process and a multi layered social process which
 2646 involves society and the state.

2647 *Panel – Anything you would like to put right or correct on what has been said?*

2648 DT – If I may add something on the camps question and the structure of the camp,
 2649 numbers of camps, types of camps. Darren Byler’s work, the three layers of camps that
 2650 are often within one facility – the most dangerous areas e.g., black rooms where
 2651 intellectuals and public figures disappear that we have no contact with. Most of the
 2652 testimonies that we have don’t come from those layers but come from the safer layers of
 2653 the camps. That is my point to the description on regional government about the three
 2654 types of people, would all be called terrorists that those three layers are there.

2655 *Panel – I would like to examine the president’s declaration of people’s war on terror, which*
 2656 *Professor Harris raised and its link to state social management and policies, that were*
 2657 *mobilised to go with that. Would I be correct in assuming in the Mandarin, ‘people’s war’*
 2658 *could be interpreted as state violence?*

2659 RH – Revolution is not a tea party. There is a long history of an embrace of “necessary
 2660 violence” in the social change necessary to bring about socialism, this is the socialist
 2661 tradition of propaganda. It is an interesting question: it raises the question of the

2662 relationship between the people of the state. The party assumes leadership over the
2663 people. So yes, I think you could very easily make that link.

2664 *Panel – You have an organigram in front of you now, with the state, the government, and*
2665 *the party. Can we say that this tri-partite area is the state in terms of People’s war?*

2666 RH – I am not an expert on the structures of Chinese governance. I would refer you to a
2667 colleague such as David Tobin.

2668 DT – When we use the phrase “party state” - we use it because there isn’t much
2669 separation between party and state. We study these types of diagrams when we do level
2670 one Chinese politics and when we show how the party state presents itself. It is actually
2671 important. In my teaching I take diagrams from Xinhua news, the ones are used in China
2672 and we discuss these institutional frameworks and usually I would involve Chinese
2673 students in conversations to ask them what do you think? Does it work like this? The
2674 answer is no, of course not. The answer is *guanxi* (关系) relationships, this is just formal
2675 and you use your *guanxi* (关系) to work through the system, people would say there is
2676 not really a distinction between the party and the state like I said the regional government,
2677 the autonomous regional government responds directly to the state counsel. It does not
2678 have as much autonomy as the provinces. The provinces have some economic autonomy
2679 but the autonomous regional governments do not. When we go back to Hu Jintao (胡锦
2680 涛) era which was ten years ago, when we taught these diagrams, usually then you would
2681 talk about formal decision-making power which I think would matter here. You would point
2682 to the Public Bureau Standing Committee and that would be it. Now under Xi not so much,
2683 it is really Xi Jinping who has power to such e great extend and the Public Bureau
2684 Standing Committee is obviously very influential but you centralise power and you
2685 increase this term limits that no longer performs that same function.

2686 *Panel – Dr Smith-Finley – you refer often to normal and every day Islamic practices, I*
2687 *take those to mean practices that would be regarded as normal and every day in all*
2688 *Muslim countries, Muslim majority countries and also Muslim minority countries and also*
2689 *practiced by the Chinese Hui Muslims. Are you aware of anywhere else that would regard*

2690 *them as systematically, those practices, as signs of extremism or radicalisation? Can you*
2691 *also tell us about the tradition of Islam amongst the Uyghurs?*

2692 RT – It is diverse within the Uyghur community. There are a lot of shared elements with
2693 nearby Muslim communities in Central Asia and India. Usually people when I answer this
2694 question will first go to say that it is from the Hanafi legal school of the Sunnis which is
2695 overemphasis on law because there are not really a lot of decision being taken by most
2696 Uyghurs on narrow questions of legalistic Islamic law until this recent turn in after which
2697 there is not much public practice. Islam is seen by a lot of Uyghurs as something
2698 integrated into daily life, not a separate religious vocation, but normal pattern of life and
2699 correct knowledge. It involves for example visiting your parents grave on Thursday,
2700 making proper gestures before you eat, people might say grace in many Western
2701 countries, greetings like people say in English “bless you” after you sneeze. All these
2702 things are part of Uyghur Islams but it is also important to note distinctive elements that
2703 you find amongst Uyghur Muslims. One I have done research on is shrine pilgrimage.
2704 The landscape is dotted with places that are seen as extremely sacred as point as
2705 connection and communication with god or mediation of saints who are buried there and
2706 there are a lot of particular traditions associated with that. Often, they are called Sufi
2707 although they have a local flavour. There are also a lot of Sufi also meditative practice
2708 that until recently was common.

2709 JSF – We see differing degrees of potential criminalisation of Islamic every day practice
2710 elsewhere, but nothing on scale as Xinjiang at the moment. If you speak to British
2711 Muslims, they will make comparison with the prevent programme. On that, I would say
2712 yes, we certainly see under the prevent programme in the UK, we see heightened
2713 surveillance on Muslim communities, which has been very unwelcome for many of those
2714 living in Muslim communities for sure. Key difference between prevent and internment
2715 and re-education that we see in Xinjiang is that with prevent in UK, the UK authorities are
2716 asking communities to flag up those who are potentially being radicalised, then these
2717 people are monitored by social workers and asked to voluntarily submit to deradicalization
2718 programme and they are given the choice, whether they join that programme or not. Major
2719 difference in the two. In the Uyghur region you are not given a choice. If you are identified

2720 by the system as suspicious or problematic in some way, you will be taken into internment
2721 involuntarily. This is one very big difference between the two.

2722 Another example of where we see partially comparable restriction is France – restriction
2723 on religious symbols as part of the secular band of that nation and we have seen
2724 increasing restrictions on different aspects of veiling. I cannot think of any other example
2725 in the world where peaceful religious everyday practices are criminalised in same way as
2726 in Uyghur region right now.

2727 *Panel – did the interrogators at the various arrests at different levels you experienced*
2728 *have a common line in what they said to you? Did what they say to you indicate a common*
2729 *approach to their effective condemnation of you being there?*

2730 JSF – Yes, but very basic. At the *Azkhadem* shrine in Kashgar prefecture – first I was
2731 arrested by a local Uyghur policeman who came out of convenience police station who
2732 came out of the police station located next to the shrine. He asked me who I was, what
2733 my profession was, what country did I come from, was I travelling with anyone. Very basic
2734 questions. What was I doing there. My purpose in being there. Then he held onto me –
2735 he tried to wipe all my photos from phone, put them in recycle bin from where I was later
2736 able to reinstate them. Then he hold on to me and took me to a restaurant invited to have
2737 a cup of tea. This is what normally happens in Han China when you are in trouble with
2738 the authorities. They invite you to have a cup of tea. I was held in a restaurant until a
2739 district Han policeman came and asked same questions in Chinese He was still nervous
2740 about letting me go, he phoned the undercover Uyghur policeman back in Kashgar where
2741 I had come from, ironically. Out into the countryside. He called them out, they drove all
2742 the way out in the car. They were Uyghur, plain clothes, English speaking with American
2743 accents asked same question again, took away passport and took it into the local police
2744 station. Photocopied it, still didn't realise who I was although my profile is all over the
2745 internet. They ought to just do a quick google search but still didn't know who I was and
2746 believed the story I sold them and let me go two hours later.

2747 *Panel – So no policy statement by any of the interrogators?*

2748 JSF – No.

2749 RH – The story is indicative of how power works in that region – the extreme nervousness
 2750 of people at low level to act with any autonomy. This successive, you know, referring the
 2751 problem up. That says a lot.

2752 *Panel – Say more about your understanding of “Uyghur Islams” - Uyghur Islams*
 2753 *jurisprudence – is there a notion of ‘Taqiya’, that is valid to conceal your religious practices*
 2754 *for a time when being persecuted? In the expectation that in some later time, it may re-*
 2755 *emerge? I understand that it is a notion common amongst Shia Muslims. Is there any*
 2756 *such notion that might inform people about how it is acceptable to stand back from your*
 2757 *religious practice for a while until it is appropriate to practice it again because this goes*
 2758 *to the question of whether or not there is a sense amongst people of whether they think*
 2759 *their religion is being destroyed.*

2760 RT – There is not a lot of education in the Islamic legal sciences that has been available
 2761 to the people over the last seventy years. There is not much discussion. Over the last
 2762 twenty years discussion is more accessible to the outside world. One does not encounter
 2763 these types of attempts to make legal decisions based on Hanafi or based on compilations
 2764 of previous decisions by Islamic judges. There is not much in way of informal Islamic
 2765 opinions. This is not really part of the discourse. I have not met many Uyghurs who have
 2766 been concerned by the ‘is it permissible’. I would be surprised with the idea of ‘Taqiya’ - I
 2767 would be surprised to meet someone who would be familiar with that term. You frequently
 2768 encounter people who have own informal understanding and rationalisation - “I will say
 2769 this out loud, but in my head, I will say the opposite” or something like this.

2770 There is a foundational sacred history of the Uyghur Muslim king who was commanded
 2771 by his farther to build a Buddhist temple and then in his head he said silently to himself
 2772 with each brick “I am building a mosque”. There are models for this. That’s a fairly
 2773 widely known story but it is not framed in terms of Islamic law.

2774 *Panel – And it is not within people as an understanding? I understand that the notion of*
 2775 *‘Taqiya’ is not taught to the people because there aren’t schools of jurisprudence. It is*
 2776 *not in any way indigenous to the people’s way of understanding themselves? Not*
 2777 *necessarily through jurisprudence but perhaps through folklore?*

2778 RT – That’s what I meant to get out through the story. Folklore like you may call it.
2779 Histories it is something people could derive that from.

2780 *Panel – I have a question on the census - you say the datasets have eliminated the ethnic*
2781 *categorisation, why is this?*

2782 DT – I link that straight away to diffusion policy. When I first arrived in Urumqi, I was using
2783 these statistical yearbooks. I was shocked that I could essentially walk into the shop that
2784 is for cadres and wonder about and see what cadres were reading. And they told me
2785 you need to read this and so forth which speaks to policies being very ad hoc and have
2786 been centralised recently. At the same time you have diffusion policy where the concept
2787 of ethnic minority is disappearing out of official narratives and official speeches. Then we
2788 have the census data that suddenly changed and this is shocking for someone all their
2789 knowledge was structured around these categories when we studied these subjects
2790 because everything is divided by ethnicity and now it is not. It comes from above in terms
2791 of narrative and just to mention the question on the ‘people’s war on terror’ you know
2792 these are grand narratives, this is what the leader pronounces and that is what is used to
2793 explain these policies.

2794 *Panel – I am trying to square in my mind the fact that the categories have been eliminated*
2795 *and the data collection but on the other hand, we hear the policy in the language. We*
2796 *hear ‘break their lineage’, ‘break their roots’, ‘break their connections’. There is always*
2797 *‘their’ ...*

2798 DT – It is the Uyghur people. When the phrase ‘people’s war on terror’ is used a Uyghur
2799 knows that refers to Islamic and Turkic identities and of course party state leaders must
2800 know this. I know this, why would they not. There has been an ambivalence. One reason
2801 the case confused the world is because of the notion of including minorities and the types
2802 of images we see where people are dressed up in artificial nylon and clothing and so
2803 forth. That exists alongside the violence we are discussing.

2804 *Panel – Reflective of Professor Harris’ commentary – what is the inability of subordinates*
2805 *to make decisions and the fear around that. This is a question to all of you. In your view*
2806 *is it possible for the policy or dehumanisation by destruction of religious base, of language*

2807 *through detention system and torture, and other elements you have talked about in that*
2808 *regard. Could that happen without the implicit consent or direction of the most senior*
2809 *people within both the state and or the party.*

2810 DT – No.

2811 JSF – It would be almost impossible for low level official to operate on that basis without
2812 explicit approval of central authorities. That is how the vertical structures work as seen in
2813 your diagram here. As Professor Harris just highlighted with my story on the arrests. Low
2814 levels officials were terrified in considering what to do with me and how to deal with me
2815 and had to refer it all the way up to the sort of highest level in that part of Xinjiang before
2816 they would even consider letting me go.

2817 Sir Geoffrey, I remember something important in regard to that story. You asked me if
2818 there was anything indicative of policy? Yes, there was actually. The plainclothes
2819 policeman who came from Kashgar city repeatedly said that this area this shrine is not
2820 open for foreign visitation? That is very important. Why? The district policeman said this
2821 as well. Not open to foreign visitation. This phrase has been around for a long time. You
2822 used to have hotels where foreigners could stay and others where you could. Decades
2823 ago, it is the same phrase. It indicated the idea those rural areas and those religious sites
2824 that not been flagged up for touristic visitation purposes were out of bounds for foreign
2825 researchers.

2826 *Panel – You said all detainees had medical checks. Is there any data, documentation of*
2827 *long-term medical problems apart from mental side?*

2828 RH – Not long-term phenomenon yet, the testimonies are from people coming out from
2829 detention from 2015. Questions on medical side are very useful and there is a need for
2830 research to be done.

2831 *Panel – I wish you would do some. We know that men are sterile, are they sterile*
2832 *because they have no spermia or are they impotent because of depression? Clearly*
2833 *depression is going to be one of the major causes of what happens. It has to be.*

2834 RH – Again you have to understand the extreme difficulty of conducting any kind of
2835 research that would have significant validity through your understanding of methodology
2836 because of the problem of access.

2837 *Panel – I am sure but in terms of disabilities, fractures or have they mutilated or*
2838 *amputated...have they done other things?*

2839 RH – We have a limited number of people that we are able to engage with outside of
2840 China and the extreme difficulty of asking those questions through official channels within
2841 China. We can go somewhere perhaps to running a project that looks into procurement
2842 orders. That very careful combing of government data that is freely available on the web.

2843 *Panel – Do we know what is the reaction worldwide in the Islamic community?*

2844 RH – It is a frequent question. I am not sure about the idea of “the worldwide Islamic
2845 community.” We should distinguish Muslim-majority countries and their governments, and
2846 then communities, groups, and people. Obviously, there is a problem with the response
2847 of governments of Muslim-majority countries, many are themselves abusive regimes with
2848 their own kind of human rights issues to mask. And many of them have had direct
2849 relationships with China, in particular since the Belt and Road initiative. In terms of
2850 communities, well just speaking of the Muslim communities here in this country, they have
2851 shown fantastic support.

2852 *Panel – The Muslims in Xinjiang, are they Sunni?*

2853 RH – Sunni, yes.

2854 *Panel – Thinking about the personal testimonies we heard yesterday or ones we will hear,*
2855 *ones that come to mind which talk about the forced labour aspect, have any of you come*
2856 *across personal testimony about the forced regimes?*

2857 DT – One reason we do not have so many, is that forced labour section are those are in
2858 the safest category, they have not escaped. Usually, the accounts I have on forced labour
2859 are from people discussing their family members.

2860 LM – There are several, maybe ten or 12 that have been collected across various different
2861 journalists and databases of direct first-person testimony of people working in factories

2862 trough these forced labour programmes, but not enough for us to make broad
2863 generalisations. We should be very aware of in process of asking questions about first
2864 person testimony and its availability, we have to interrogate the question of why we don't
2865 have access to more people, why we don't have access to data, why we do not know the
2866 medical outcomes of people who are there. Why is the Uyghur ethnicity being erased?
2867 The more important question is why can't anyone see what is happening there. We have
2868 seen a number of people who have been extraordinarily brave and shared their
2869 experiences knowing that they are being erased by the minute. What we can do is rely
2870 on these as best as we can and to understand what is happening. These few people who
2871 have spoken about their experiences on work suggest that they were unpaid, unwilling
2872 and that they were only able to leave because of some special dispensation and that
2873 people remained in those factories. We need to take the first-hand testimony very
2874 seriously.



State Violence in Xinjiang: A Comprehensive Assessment

Dr David Tobin

Hallsworth Research Fellow in the Political
Economy of China

MANCHESTER
1824

The University of Manchester

State Violence in Xinjiang: A Comprehensive Assessment

Chapter 1. **Forced Labour** (*Laura T. Murphy*)

Chapter 2. **Child Separation and Coercive Birth Controls** (*Rian Thum*)

Chapter 3. **Torture and Sexual Violence in the Camps** (*Rachel Harris*)

Chapter 4. **Destruction of Religious Practice and Heritage** (*Jo Smith Finley*)

Chapter 5. **Cultural Destruction** (*Jo Smith Finley*)

Nyrola Elima

“While the world debates a word, we are dying”



Jewlan Shirmemet

“I want to speak to my mother”



The background of the slide is a grid of 40 small aerial photographs showing various detention camps in the Uyghur region. The camps are characterized by their uniform, rectangular structures and organized layouts, often with blue roofs. The text is overlaid on this grid.

FORCED LABOUR IN THE UYGHUR REGION

Laura T. Murphy
Professor of Human Rights and Contemporary Slavery

**Sheffield
Hallam
University**

Helena Kennedy
Centre for
International Justice

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

In 2018, the Xinjiang government began rolling out a program of mass employment:

- Spring 2018: Regional governments directives layout “surplus labour” strategies to ensure that “all those who should be employed are employed.”
- April 2018: Kashgar government declares they will place 100,000 people from “vocational training” in jobs.
- June 2018: XUAR government releases plan for “poverty alleviation” training that includes 100,000 job placements and intent to place at least one person from every household into a job.
- October 2018: Chairman of XUAR announces that “trainees” from the VTICs would find a “seamless link from learning in school to employment in society.”

“Labour transfer not only reduces Uyghur population density in Xinjiang, but it is also an important method to influence, meld, and assimilate Uyghur minorities.”



132	L-GLUTAMINE	GLANBIA NUTRITIONALS (NA), INC.	XINJIANG FUFENG BIOTECHNOLOGIES LLC	07/01/2019	1153	524 NO 188, FANGZHENG EAST STREET, GANQUANPU ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT ZONE, WUSU CITY, TACHENG AREA, XINJIANG CN
133	HAIR GOODS	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES CO.,	06/29/2019	22143	10065 NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU XINJIANG CN
134	HAIR GOODS	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES CO.,	06/29/2019	20607	9367 NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU XINJIANG CN
135	HAIR GOODS	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES CO.,	06/29/2019	21087	9585 NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU XINJIANG CN
136	HAIR GOODS	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES CO.,	06/28/2019	22253	10115 LTD.NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU COUNTY,HETIAN
137	WOMEN'S 100% CASHMERE KNITWEAR	CASHMERE HOUSE INC	XINJIANG TIANSHAN TEXTILE CLOTHING	06/27/2019	2873	1306 IND CO LTD B8 LIYUSHAN RD XINJIANG CN
138	DODECANEDIOIC ACID DODECANEDIOL	CIBT AMERICA INC.	CATHAY (WUSU) BIOTECHNOLOGY CO.,	06/25/2019	220000	100000 LTD. MAGIC ZONE, CHEMICAL INDUSTRY PARK, WUSU CITY, TACHENG AREA, XINJIANG CN
139	PAPRIKA OLEORESIN 80,000CU	SYNTHITE USA INC.	SYNTHITE (XINJIANG) BIOTECH CO LTD	06/22/2019	19888	9040 218 NATIONAL HIGHWAY WEST SIDE BA RUN HA ER MO DUN TOWN HEJING COUNTY, XINJIANG CN
140	WELDING ELECTRODE	GE GRID LLC. USC CBR	SUZHOU WUZHONG DISTRICT XINXIN SWIT	06/21/2019	1247	567 DUQIAO VILLAGE, DONGSHAN TOWN WUZHONG DISTRICT SUZHOU JANGSU, XINJIANG CN
141	PAPRIKA OLEORESIN 80000CU	SYNTHITE INDUSTRIES (P) LTD	SYNTHITE (XINJIANG) BIOTECH CO., LT	06/20/2019	12300	5591 218 NATIONAL HIGHWAY WEST SIDE 830000 XINJIANG CN
142	SYNTHETIC HAIR GOODS(WIGS)	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES	06/19/2019	23177	10535 CO.,LTD. NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU COUNTY,HETIAN
143	SYNTHETIC HAIR GOODS(WIGS)	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES	06/19/2019	22103	10047 CO.,LTD.NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU COUNTY,HETIAN
144	SYNTHETIC HAIR GOODS(WIGS)	I&I HAIR CORPORATION	HETIAN HAOLIN HAIR ACCESSORIES	06/19/2019	21274	9670 CO.,LTD.NO.4,YULONG BAY ROAD,BEIJING INDUSTRIAL PARK,LOPU COUNTY,HETIAN
145	WOMEN'S 100% CASHMERE KNITWEAR	CASHMERE HOUSE INC.	XINJIANG TIANSHAN TEXTILE CLOTHING	06/19/2019	9013	4097 ZHENG YANG ROAD NO 167,HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIAL XINJIANG.,CN
146	DODECANEDIOIC ACID DODECANEDIOL	EMS-CHEMIE(NORTH AMERICA) INC	CATHAY (WUSU) BIOTECHNOLOGY CO	06/16/2019	44000	20000 LTD MAGIC ZONE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY PARK WUSU CITY TACHENG AREA XINJIANG CN



source: CCTV,
"Xinjiang Counter-Terrorism &
Eliminating Extremism Struggle"

和田市泰达服装公司杂宗村卫星工厂





Khorgas Re-education Camp

Yili Zhuolian Garment Company

Image © 2021 CNES / Airbus

Google Earth

Imagery Date: 3/5/2020 44°03'25.26" N 80°51'17.49" E elev 0 ft eye alt



ROUTES TO FORCED LABOUR

Labour is made compulsory through several mechanisms:

- as a requirement of internment
- as a condition of “release” or “graduation”
- in a state-subsidized “satellite factories” that are “on your doorstep”
- through a state-sponsored “transfer” to a factory or farm within the Uyghur Region
- through a state-sponsored “transfer” to a factory outside the Uyghur Region



Abduweli Tohti Arish

阿布都外力·托合提阿日西

653125198902060014

**Locality
(hukou)**

No. 5 Bridge Neighborhood, South Xinhua Road Subdistrict, Tianshan District, Urumqi
(乌鲁木齐市天山区新华南路街道五桥社区)

Age 31 **Gender** M **Ethnicity** Uyghur **Profession** engineer

Likely place of origin Yarkand **Likely current location** Urumqi

Status forced job placement **When problems started** Oct. 2017 - Dec. 2017

Detention reason (suspected I official)
--- | ---

Lists **C_L** **In₋**

Health status

2020-12-10

About doing a good job in serving the urban and rural surplus labor force in Qapqal County

Transfer employment work implementation plan

“All surplus labor force in the jurisdiction shall be managed by points and quantification, so as to ensure that all the surplus labors in the jurisdiction shall be trained and employed. . . . if there are people who have the qualifications to participate in the training but are unwilling to participate in the training, who can go out for employment but are not actively employed, but have outdated concepts or stubborn thinking, the corresponding points will be deducted.”

Points determine placement in three categories:

- **Management & Control**: sent to training
- **General**: assigned nearest local transfer
- **Secure**: issued “Urban and Rural Surplus Labor Transfer Employment Personnel Certificate” and transferred to the interior



Buzaynap

I'm not going.

新疆和田

安徽援疆干部



“fettered by traditional concepts, there are still some labourers who are unwilling to move far away from home and have serious homesickness,” despite “the government’s serious guiding efforts over the past several years.”

source: China Institute of Wealth and Economics, “新疆和田地区维族劳动力转移就业扶贫工作报告”[Report on poverty alleviation work for Xinjiang Hotan Region Uyghur labour force transfer and employment], Nankai University, December 23, 2019

干得好的要表扬、奖励，干得不好的要批评教育甚至处分。

Labour agencies must “have organizational discipline in place and implement **militarized management** to allow people with employment difficulties **to get rid of selfishness** and distractions, **change their long-cultivated lazy, idle, slow, and inconstant behaviours of personal freedom**, to abide by corporate rules and regulations and **work discipline**, and to devote themselves to daily production. In daily life; they should **have iron discipline...**”

“Good work should be praised and rewarded, and bad work should be criticized and educated or even punished.”



Employ one person, Alleviate poverty for a household;
Labour is great; Getting rich is glorious;
Let's unite as one and run toward a well-off life together.


Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang

The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China

September 2020

“**terrorists, separatists and religious extremists** have long preached that ‘the afterlife is fated’ and that ‘religious teachings are superior to state laws,’ inciting the public to resist learning the standard spoken and written Chinese language, reject modern science, and **refuse to improve their vocational skills, economic conditions,** and the ability to better their own lives. As a result, some local people have **outdated ideas; suffer from poor education and employability, low employment rates and incomes, they and have fallen into long-term poverty.**”

“I learned that if one family [member] was in a camp you have to work so father or husband can get out quickly.”



Labour transfers operate within an environment of unprecedented coercion, undergirded by the constant threat of internment.



According to the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930, **forced or compulsory labour** is: "all work or service which is exacted from any person **under the threat of a penalty** and for which **the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.**"

Indicators include:

- **abuse of vulnerability**
- **deception**
- **restriction of movement**
- **isolation**
- physical or sexual violence
- **retention of ID**
- **withholding of wages**
- **debt bondage**
- **abusive working conditions**
- **excessive overtime**

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS



Credit: CCTV, October 2018

- Denial of free choice of employment
- Forcible transfer of people
- Forcible separation of families
- Denial of land rights
- Denial of religious rights
- Denial of cultural rights

The background of the slide is a grid of 40 small aerial photographs showing various urban and industrial sites in the Uyghur region. The images are arranged in a 5x8 grid. Many of the buildings have blue roofs, and some areas appear to be densely packed with structures. The overall tone is somewhat desaturated, with a lot of grey and brown in the buildings and surrounding areas.


FORCED LABOUR IN THE UYGHUR REGION

Laura T. Murphy
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**Sheffield
Hallam
University**

Helena Kennedy
Centre for
International Justice

Students in boarding schools, grades 1-9, 2017 to 2019



“1: Based on the overall stability of Xinjiang, manage boarding schools well.”

“to create a stable and peaceful learning environment for students, blocking the influence of the family’s religious atmosphere on the children to the greatest extent and reducing the occurrence of ‘teaching science in school, listening to the scriptures at home, with thinking and ideas suffering the shocks of moving back and forth”

– Elementary Education Department, “Exchange materials for the reform and development on-site meeting to promote the national overall planning of the integration of urban and rural compulsory education,” Qingdao, December 2017.


“Thanks to preferential measures such as ... relocation expenses, rushing to the rest of the country to recruit talent ... the number of teachers recruited, especially the number and proportion of ethnic Han teachers, is unprecedented.”

“[in recruitment] regard political quality and the ability to teach in the national common language as the primary criteria, in accordance with the principle of ‘tilting toward southern Xinjiang, focusing on rural areas, giving priority to early grades and key subjects’”

“Give full play to the role of the Autonomous Region’s “Home visitation [访惠聚]" work teams in the villages to implement door-to-door visits and urge guardians to send school-age children and adolescents to school and complete compulsory education”

- Elementary Education Department, “Exchange materials for the reform and development on-site meeting to promote the national overall planning of the integration of urban and rural compulsory education at the county level,” Qingdao, December 2017.

Natural population increase rates in minority areas, per mille



Compulsory education boarding schools

	Han	Uyghur
Level of compulsion	Theoretical private option	Compulsory, no private option
Language	Mother language	Dominant group language
Teaching staff ethnicity	Same ethnicity	Majority same, substantial & growing proportion from dominant group
Primary stated purposes	Access/quality, poverty alleviation	Security, “blocking influence of family...”, Mandarin


Compulsory birth limits

	Han	Uyghur
State messaging	Have more children	Have fewer children
Maximum Penalty	Fines, lack of social services	Internment camp
Deviation in practice	Allowing more than regulations	Allowing fewer than regulations





Zhang Heqing @zhang_... · 19h ...
Off your hijab, let me see your eyes.
#Xinjiang dance.
掀起你的盖头来，让我看看你的眼.....







4244. GOSPAR SPARIC
1995.07.11
SREBRENICA
IBRAHIM DUBIC
SADIK DUBIC
IBRO NUHANOVIC
NASIHA NUHANOVIC
NUHANOVIC

NUHANOVIC
NASIHA
IBRO
IBRAHIM
DUBIC
DUBIC
SREBRENICA - JULI 11 1995
SADIK
DUBIC

Destruction of Religious / Cultural Practice and Heritage

Joanne Smith Finley, Reader in Chinese Studies, Newcastle University

Council Member, China and Inner Asia Council, Association for Asian Studies (CIAC-AAS)

j.smithfinley@ncl.ac.uk

CCP Regional Party Secretary Chen Quanguo: XUAR Regulations on De-Extremification (2017)

Expressed state goal of halting the ‘penetration’ of extremism:

- ‘Making religion more Chinese’ (Article 4)
- Prohibiting ‘the rejection or refusal of public goods’
 - e.g. alcohol, cigarettes (Article 9)
- Prohibiting ‘generalization of the concept of halal into areas beyond halal foods’ (Article 9)
- Leading believers to ‘establish correct beliefs’ (Article 13); and
- Guiding believers to ‘correctly handle the relationship between law and religion’ whilst confirming ‘correct faith’ (Article 35)
- The Party sought to ‘solve the problem of to whom to listen, whom to trust, and whom to follow’ via an education in ideas and beliefs. Uyghurs were to be trained to follow not God but the CCP (O Klimeš, 2018)



Islam as virus / addiction

- Official CCP audio recording, transmitted in 2017 via WeChat (Radio Free Asia):

Members of the public who have been chosen for re-education have been *infected by an ideological illness*. They have been infected with religious extremism and violent terrorist ideology, and therefore they *must seek treatment* from a hospital as an inpatient. ... *The religious extremist ideology is a type of poisonous medicine, which confuses the mind of the people*. ... If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will grow and spread all over like *an incurable malignant tumor*.
- Medical analogies used to justify internment using population targets and arrest quotas (T Grose, 2019)
- XUAR Regulations on De-Extremification (2017)

Article 5: ‘De-extremification efforts are to employ [...] an **annual target responsibility evaluation system**’

Article 14: De-extremification shall complete work on **educational transformation** [...] **combining ideological education, psychological counseling, behavioral corrections**



The 'People's War on Terror'

- A carpet-bombing approach (D Byler, 2017)
- Described by the state in terms of an indiscriminate use of 'weed-killer' (M Clarke, 2018)
- Han taxi driver (Ürümchi, 2018): '[The detained] are just there to have their thinking changed; then they will come out again'
- Uyghur businessman (Ürümchi, 2018): 'Some people were given medicine to change their thinking, medicine for their minds, and this made them ill. Only then were they released'

Eligibility criteria for extra-legal internment

“Extremist religious practices” figure large:

- growing a beard (especially a long one);
- praying regularly;
- inviting too many people to one’s wedding;
- giving children names of Islamic origin;
- appearing too religious (e.g., wearing veils, headscarves, or long clothes in Muslim style);
- reciting an Islamic verse at a funeral;
- washing bodies according to Islamic custom;
- holding strong religious views;
- allowing others to preach religion;

Eligibility criteria for extra-legal internment

- teaching the Qur'an to one's children;
- asking an imam to name one's children;
- attending the mosque regularly;
- studying or teaching "unauthorised" forms of Islam;
- praying at a mosque other than on a Friday (the traditional day of prayer in the Central Asia region);
- attending Friday prayers outside of one's own village;
- making the pilgrimage to Mecca;
- possessing illegal religious content on a mobile phone or computer (including text messages containing religious language, Qur'anic verses or graphics, simple explanations of the Qur'an, or pictures of women wearing the niqab).

Inside the internment camps, coercive secularisation


Internees are :

- Forced to renounce Islam, disavow Islamic beliefs;
- Make self-criticisms of their religious history;
- Forced to eat pork as punishment; drink alcohol
- Rarely allowed to wash hands and feet (equated with Islamic ablutions);
- Lectured about dangers of Islam / drilled with quizzes;
- Instructed that fundamentalist Islam is repressive while the CCP is progressive;
- Tortured (S Denyer, *Washington Post*, 2018)
- “They would say, there is no religion. The government and the party will take care of you” (L Kuo, *Guardian*, 2018)

Restrictions on religious practice– outside the internment camps

- Tighter religious restrictions forcefully imposed on Uyghur society for 4-5 years prior to onset of mass internment in 2017, worsened thereafter
- Initially imposed most heavily in south Xinjiang - the Uyghurs' religious heartland
- 18 September 2016 (Restaurant staff, who had moved up north from Kashgar and Aqsu):
 - “It’s better to be in Ürümchi now, as there’s no freedom in the south. There, young men can’t even grow a short beard or moustache – all facial hair is forbidden now. Only older men are allowed to grow a longer beard. Women are forbidden to wear the niqab or burqa.”
- 21 September 2016 (Migrant taxi driver, who had come to Ürümchi from Khotän):
 - “A lot of people have been put in prison down south for very small things, like wearing veils and growing beards.”

Securitized mosque spaces



The deserted Yan'an Road mosque, with PRC flag, razor wire, and running digital slogans.
Photos: J Smith Finley, Ürümchi, 29 June 2018

Securitised mosque spaces

Conversations outside Ürümchi mosques

- Only 10 - 20 elderly (retired) men entered at prayer times
- Most other retired men feared having their retirement benefits stopped if they entered
- People working in state work units could not enter, because they would lose their jobs
- Everyone else, even the independent businessmen, too scared to go in:

“We want to go in the mosque... but if we do, they will take us to prison ... they check our identity cards.”



Security checkpoint with iris-scanner, entrance to the Aq Mosque, Ürümchi.

Photo: J Smith Finley, 29 June 2018

Touristification / museumification of mosque spaces



Heytgah Mosque, Kashgar. Photo: J Smith Finley, 9 July 2018



“Love the Party, Love the Country” banner, ticket seller, policeman and riot shields. Photo: J Smith Finley, Kashgar, 9 July 2018¹⁰⁶

Touristification / museumification of mosque spaces

A ticket seller (45 yuan entry) and two riot police with riot shields sit inside the entrance. I express surprise that tourists are allowed in and ask when the people are allowed in to pray? The police immediately become threatening, demanding to know my business. Inside is a ghostly museum, a historical site. There is no one praying. Across the front wall of the far prayer hall are banners reading: '**Ethnic unity is happiness (fu 福); Splittism and riot are calamity (祸).**' Young Uyghur men in traditional embroidered shirts (but no hats - uncovered heads in the mosque) usher Han and foreign tourists into the rear prayer hall at the back. I ask one what he thinks of tourists entering the prayer hall? He briefly shakes his head, and says '**This is just my job (mening khizmitim)... I wouldn't know about that (Uy. män ukhmidum)**'. As I walk away, he gets out his phone, and I suspect informs the police on the door of what I said. When I approach an older guy watering plants, he moves away metre by metre, then shakes his head when I say hello. Seconds later, a police officer appears at about 8 metres and hangs around until I move away.'

(Field notes: Heytgah mosque, Kashgar, 2018)

Padlocked neighbourhood mosques





Padlocked neighbourhood mosques, with PRC flag and “De-extremification” regulations. Photos: J Smith Finley, Kashgar Old Town, 10 July 2018

Padlocked neighbourhood mosques


- Neighbourhood mosques padlocked, razor-wired, some crescents removed
- Outside walls adorned with propaganda: 'de-extremification', 'ethnic unity work', 'illegal religious activities',
- 'Love the Party, Love the Country' 爱党爱国 banners had replaced earlier 'Love the Country, Love Religion' 爱国爱教 ones
- 'Where has the crescent gone, was it taken away?' - Male resident nods, does not voice answer – mindful of audio surveillance; then denies he used to go in to pray
- Female resident: 'They took it away!' (Uy: Äkätti!)

Mosques converted to café-bars

'The Dream of Kashgar,'
Photos: J Smith Finley,
Kashgar Old Town, 10 July 2018



Closed mosques and local trauma



- An older [Hui] man in a white skull cap and his Uyghur wife say the mosque was closed for some time, and the religious school for much longer. They are clearly upset. He says the other day some foreign Muslims wanted to go in the mosque to pray. 'We had to tell them to go to the Heytgah mosque, didn't we?' I say the Heytgah mosque isn't open for prayer either, and they look dismayed, glancing at one other in shock. His wife asks what I do, and I say I'm a university teacher. Then it dawns on her and she says, 'You know about the situation then?' And promptly bursts into quiet tears. I try to comfort her, squeezing her arm, and saying everything changes, things will get better. She asks me then, 'When will they get better?'

(J Smith Finley, field notes, 2018)

Photos: J Smith Finley,
Kashgar Old Town, 10 July 2018

Defacement and removal of halal signage from Muslim eateries

- Uyghur self-censorship:

'We did not put it [halal signage] in the plan but everyone knows the restaurant is a *milliy* (ethnic) restaurant' [and therefore halal]



Self-censored Uyghur restaurants
(no halal signage).

Photo: J Smith Finley, Ürümchi, 4 July 2018

Defacement and removal of halal signage from Muslim eateries

Hui female restaurateur:

'Our halal sign will not be replaced when the shop gets its new façade; but even if it doesn't appear up there, I will still have it in my heart'



Hui restaurant with Qingzhen (halal) characters and mosque insignia removed (top left). Photo: J Smith Finley, Ürümchi, 5 July 2018.

Systematic destruction of religious built heritage

- North Gatehouse of Keriya Etika Mosque in Khotän demolished (April 2019, satellite image evidence, Shawn Zhang, Chinese PhD student at UBC)
- Towering architectural monument dated to 1237, extensively renovated in 1980s and 1990s
- Photographed on Islamic festival day, 2016 with thousands of worshippers spilling out
- 14 November 2017: still visible on satellite images; 11 April 2018: a smooth patch of earth

Example of what UNESCO calls **'strategic cultural cleansing: the deliberate targeting of individuals and groups on the basis of their cultural, ethnic, or religious affiliation, combined with the intentional and systematic destruction of cultural heritage'** (R Harris, 2020: 'Uyghur Heritage and the Charge of Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang')





Deserted, padlocked Büwi Märyäm Khenim Mazari, Bäshkirem

Photo: J Smith Finley, Kashgar, 13 July 2018



Systematic destruction of religious built heritage

- Guardian / Bellingcat analysis, May 2019: Documented more than two dozen Islamic religious sites partly or completely demolished since 2016
- 2019: Imam Asim shrine empty; mosque, *khaniqah* (place for Sufi rituals) and other buildings torn down, leaving only the tomb; pilgrims' offerings, flags and pilgrims disappeared

R Harris, 2019: 'Bulldozing mosques: the latest tactic in China's war against Uighur culture';

ASPI report, Ruser, Leibold, Munro and Hoja, 2020: 'Cultural Erasure: Tracing the Destruction of Uyghur and Islamic Spaces in Xinjiang':

R Thum, 2020: 'The Spatial Cleansing of Xinjiang: Mazar Desecration in Context'



Jafari Sadiq shrine

'Nothing could say more clearly to the Uyghurs that the Chinese state wants to uproot their culture and break their connection to the land than the desecration of their ancestors' graves, the sacred shrines that are the landmarks of Uyghur history' – R Thum

'If one were to remove these ... shrines, the Uyghur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history. After a few years we would not have a memory of why we live here or where we belong' – Rahile Dawut, prominent Uyghur folklorist, speaking in 2012; disappeared in 2017)

'Revealed: new evidence of China's mission to raze the mosques of Xinjiang' - (L Kuo, 2019)



Dec 2013

April 2019

Islamic traditions supplanted by Han traditions



Deserted home with Chinese lanterns and new year couplets
Photos: J Smith Finley, Kashgar Old Town, 2018

Islamic culture supplanted by Han tradition



'We don't have any festivals now... no one dares to say 'Ässalam Älläykum' (Peace be with you) any more either! It's too religious' - Uyghur female bookseller, Xinhua bookstore

'Respect traditional [Han] festivals; hand down beautiful Chinese virtues',
Photo: J Smith Finley, Ürümqi 2018

Coercive Chinese-medium education




Ürümchi No.1 primary school
Photo: J Smith Finley, Ürümchi, 2018

- Inside ‘re-education’ camps, Uyghurs undergo coercive Sinicization of language, religion, culture and regional history
- Outside the camps: ‘**Slow linguicide**’ taking place since 2002 (H Burdorf 2021)
- Uyghur modified Arabic script *cut out* from this textile poster (like a cancer)
- Children of ‘doubly-detained’ parents placed in securitised “national education” boarding schools, psychologically “tortured”
- Show extreme caution when trying to speak and write in Chinese ‘**as if they were skating on thin ice**’ (Bitter Winter magazine, 2019)

Uyghur Islam and culture ‘invisibilised’ in school textbooks

- Han Chinese cultural and social life (Confucian, secular) highlighted; Uyghur cultural and social life (Turkic, Islamic) almost absent (‘Islam’ does not appear, the ethnonym ‘Uyghur’ only once or twice)
- Pictures of human characters show only Han facial features and cultural dress; Uyghur features and cultural dress are absent
- Human characters are Han Chinese, with typical Chinese personal names; Uyghur personal names are largely absent





Uyghur Islam and culture 'invisibilised' in school textbooks

- Han Chinese and Western literatures are highlighted (but not Turkish or Middle Eastern – i.e., Islamic – literatures), while Uyghur literature and folklore are largely absent;
- Folk stories are mostly selected from Han Chinese sources; Uyghur folk stories are absent; poems are by Han Chinese authors; works by Uyghur poets missing
- A deliberate intention to 'invisibilise' – and eventually eradicate – the Uyghur people as a separate ethnic group or nation (D Mahmut and J Smith Finley, 2022)

Religious/cultural destruction and mental harm



- Controls on religious dress and facial hair
- Psychological impact on cultural and gender identity (masculinity)
- Ghulja 2018, Uyghur taxi driver started to cry:

'Today it is not possible to grow [a moustache]; it is not officially forbidden, but everyone knows the consequences of doing so'

- Kashgar 2018: After singing China's national anthem in perfect Chinese, a Uyghur boy, age 6, recreated on his face a vanished Uyghur cultural norm—the beard—using white sticky labels

Photo: J Smith Finley, Kashgar Old Town, 11 July 2018

Religious/cultural destruction and mental harm

- Campaign to cut women's tunics / dresses
- 'This campaign has nothing to do with religious extremism [...] This is an attack on Uyghur women, Uyghur people's dignity and way of life [...]'"

Dilxat Raxit, World Uyghur Congress

'Uyghurs Deplore China's Unkind Cuts to Local Women's Skirts' (Radio Free Asia, July 2018)



Coerced, state-sponsored intermarriage as means of Sinicisation



- PRC state aggressively incentivised and promoted Han-Uyghur intermarriage since 2014, accelerating the campaign since 2017
- One mixed couple reported how they were given money for housing, washing machine, refrigerator, and TV (Associated Press, June 2020)
- Analysis of PRC state narratives suggests coercion, with Han male migrants or security workers choosing a Uyghur woman, then working with local authorities to convince the families to agree (D Byler 2019)
- Forced marriages occurring in a climate of terror - a person's refusal could lead to detention in a camp
- “If Uyghur women refuse an offer of marriage, what is to stop officials from branding these women, or their families, as ‘suspicious,’ to be taken away without charge or trial, never to be seen again? Under these circumstances, how could a woman dare to refuse an unwanted marriage?” – Z Shamseden, 2019

Image reproduced at:

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3442256>

Detention of Famous Cultural Figures ('Killing the Chicken to Show the Monkey')

- Xinjiang authorities targeted celebrity and cultural figureheads - a deliberate policy of inducing fear
- Artists, writers, poets, academics, publishers, singers, comedians and athletes
- Promotes state project to 'eradicate local languages and cultures'
- And warns broader masses that no-one is safe – not even elites
- Reaches beyond the realm of high culture, e.g. Erfan Hezim, the footballer; philanthropist businessman Nurtay Hajim,



Pictures of Abdurehim Heyit before/after detention. Source: Xinjiang Victims Database

Reuters on-the-ground investigation, 2021

- Reuters visited ~24 mosques across 7 counties during Ramadan. Most partially or completely demolished
- Part of a minaret broken off from former Xīnqū Mosque, Changji, outside Ürümchi

‘Mosques disappear as China strives to “build a beautiful Xinjiang”’ – C Cadell, 14 May 2021

Picture taken May 6, 2021. REUTERS/Thomas Peter





Reuters on-the-ground investigation, 2021

- The former Xinqu Mosque with its minarets removed, in Changji outside Ürümchi



Pictures taken May 6, 2021. REUTERS/Thomas Peter

Reuters on-the-ground investigation, 2021

- ‘There's no mosque here ... there has never been a mosque at this site’
- Han woman who moved to Khotän six years ago from central China: "There are no Muslims like that here anymore" [ones who pray at the mosque]



Jiamao Mosque in Qira county, Khotän. Picture taken April 28, 2021. REUTERS/Thomas Peter