On September 11, 2001 the world witnessed America’s worst terrorist attacks, and many years
have passed, while its repercussions are still keenly felt by many around the world. It was also a
turning point that has continued to affect both domestic and international policies across many
regions of the world. The attacks accompanied by subsequent attacks in Europe and Indonesia
motivated by political Islam have contributed to a global consciousness, where Islam was/is still
linked with terrorism and Muslims became a target group particularly subject to negative attitudes
and discrimination.
In the wake of the attacks, the Bush administration declared ‘war on terrorism’. Within three
months after 9/11, China officially issued its own ‘war on terror’ document entitled “Terrorist
Activities Perpetrated by ‘East Turkistan’ Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and
the Taliban”, which claimed that there was an extensive network of Uyghur terrorists posed serious
security threats to China and the world. And on January 21, 2002 China released another
document entitled “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Escape with Impunities”, attributing all
past Uyghur opposition in East Turkistan to terrorists linked with a global network of terrorist
organizations. The last-mentioned document also accused almost all Uyghur human rights and self-
rule groups for being funded directly by Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida (Roberts 2018, 232).
There was a sudden shift in CCP’s official discourse toward Uyghur opposition right after 9/11
attacks, explicitly linking it with terrorism, whereas previously keeping ethnic discontent under
wraps (Becquelin 2004a, 39). The terms ‘East Turkistan’ and ‘terrorism’ were rarely used in earlier
CCP documents (Millward 2007, 339). This shift in official discourse blurred the line between
dissent and Islam. For example, the Baren Uprising in 1990, the 1995 protest in Khotan, and the
Ghulja demonstration in 1997, all of which previously attributed to ‘splittists’, who were then
relabeled as ‘terrorists’ in a 2004 article (Zhu Jun 2004, cited in Bovingdon 2010, 120). However,
there was a lack of evidence for any active Uyghur militant group inside or outside China; besides,
most Uyghur opposition activities in the 1990s, like demonstrations, most started out as peaceful
protests only turned violent after police intervened with suppressive tactics, the nature of which
could hardly be considered as terrorism regardless of how one defines the term (Roberts 2018,
233). In other words, “no viable Uyghur terrorist threat existed inside the country” during the early
2000s (ibid., 240). Moreover, it was a relatively peaceful time in East Turkistan when the Chinese
regime put forth the abovementioned assertions.
The Chinese regime persistently released documents accusing the alleged Uyghur terrorist
network of constituting a security threat to China and the world. In September 2002 both the
United States and the United Nations officially recognized a little-known Uyghur group, the Eastern
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), as a terrorist organization, which later also subjected to
international sanctions. Their official recognition gave China the legitimacy for various upcoming
counter-terrorism measures that would further repress the Uyghur people in East Turkistan. It is
worth to note that there was no reliable source of information about ETIM’s activities after 2001
that could indicate the organization’s capacity and its support base (Roberts 2012, 19). In other
words, ETIM had little capacity to carry out organized terrorist attacks against China in the
post-9/11 context.
It was only in 2006 that some evidence for the existence of ETIM emerged. A new group
consisting of only a handful of Uyghurs formed in 2008 in Waziristan: the Turkistan Islamic Party
(TIP). But after 2013 the group grew bigger in size in Syria, owing to the fact that many Uyghurs
fled repression in East Turkistan, who felt that their Uyghur identity was constantly persecuted by
the Chinese regime, and consequently were a vulnerable militant recruitment target (Roberts 2020;
Roberts 2018, 252). There is no evidence of violent attacks ever carried out by this group in East
Turkistan, or in other parts of China for that matter (Roberts 2020). However, this group has also
made a number of graphic videos, some of which made explicitly to threaten the Beijing 2008
Summer Olympics, constituting a real threat to China at the time, which in turn have justified
China’s continued counterterrorism measures targeting Uyghur dissent (Roberts 2018, 241; Roberts
2020).
In response to the “sudden” alleged Uyghur terrorist threat, the Chinese regime amended its
criminal legal code in December of 2001, adding ‘terrorism crimes’ with harsher punishments to an
existing category ‘Endangering Public Security”; Amnesty International (2002, 4-5) noted that these
newly added crimes were vaguely defined and thereby casting doubts on future fair prosecutions.
Consequently, this amendment just like many other Chinese laws , inherently attempts to be as
ambiguous as possible to effectively function as a catch-all measure, preemptively locking up
people before the occurrence of any crimes. It also paved the way for future “highly subjective and
on-going hunt for terrorists” in East Turkistan (Roberts 2018, 238). The ‘Global War on Terror’
presented a clear dichotomy between global terrorism and Islamic extremism, which propelled and
justified China’s ongoing persecution of Uyghurs, where the regime equates unauthorized religious
activities to ‘extremism’. Beijing has since continued to use this new rhetorical arsenal to persecute
the Uyghurs in East Turkistan.
It is worth mentioning the fact that Islam only constitutes one of several unifying markers for
Uyghur identity, any of which could play a leading role depending on the circumstances Uyghurs
find themselves in. By this line of reasoning, it is to be suggested that an Islamic fundamentalist
group will have only limited support among Uyghurs (Gladney 2004, 109). The most obvious and
powerful unifying marker for Uyghur identity is their common struggle and suffering under the
Chinese rule, who are collectively subjected to the assimilationist and integrationist policies of the
CCP.
On July 16, 2001 amendments were made to the Regulations on the Management of Religious
Affairs, for instance in Article 1 the “protection of normal religious activities” was replaced by
“regulating religious activities according to law” and “guide religion to adapt to a socialist society”.
What was already an intrusive requirement for the clergy in Article 8 of the 1994 Regulations was
extended to apply to “all citizens who profess a religion”: the loyalty to the state comes first and the
practice of religion is “conditional on support for government and Party leaders” (HRW 2005, 37).
The crackdown on various religious activities intensified since October of 2001, and in the city
of Kashgar it was reported that 13 “illegal” religious centers were shut down and more than 50
worshippers arrested in early November the same year; in addition, there were scores of arrests on
“terrorism” related charges, and many were believed to be sentenced to death (Amnesty
International 2002, 20-27). Furthermore, religious observation and access to unsanctioned
information throughout East Turkistan were also restricted. In this region-wide campaign, around
150 people were arrested in Ürümchi over the course of two months since September of 2001 for
taking part in “illegal” religious activities and “terrorism”; there were also reports of arrests in other
parts of East Turkistan (ibid., 15).
The official restrictions and clampdown on religious rights/activities applied to all of East
Turkistan, penetrating into many aspects of what constitute an ordinary Uyghur life. The regime
dictates the ways in which a religious institution (e.g. a mosque) conducts its matters, e.g.
regarding the cleric selection process, the use of the “correct” version of the Qur’an, the place of
religious gathering, and preaching contents (HRW 2005, 3). Uyghur government officials (i.e.
Communist Party members) and minors (i.e. school children) were banned from observing
Ramadan fast, and the authorities also discouraged other Muslims working in various government
sectors (e.g. schools and hospitals) from observing religious practices during the holy month of
Ramadan (Amnesty International 2002, 23). Moreover, Uyghur clerics (i.e. Imams) were/are still
under constant state surveillance, whose ideological state must be in line with that of the
Communist Party. To ensure this ideological alignment, the regime carries out ‘religious training
campaigns’ and ‘political reeducation campaigns’; “[the] campaigns in 2001 and 2002 systematized
the ideological control imposed on clerics (HRW 2005, 50).
Human Rights Watch (HRW 2005, 69-70) noted that law enforcement security forces regularly
carried out sweeps in neighborhoods and villages, examining individual houses for ID cards and
household residence booklets and interrogating the residents about the whereabouts of the absent
family members. They also searched for “illegal” publications, such as Qur’ans not approved by the
government. Those who were deemed problematic by the security forces were taken to unknown
security facilities for further questioning. These searches were said to be brutal in that family
members or relatives could not find out what happened to their loved ones after being detained.
Some detainees were locked up for long periods of time without any charges, some convicted, some
sent to “reeducation” through labor camps, and others released.
“[I]ndependent religious activity or dissent is at times arbitrarily equated with a breach of state
security, a serious crime in China and one that is frequently prosecuted” (HRW 2005, 3). A
scholarly paper from a compendium issued by China’s Ministry of Justice, procured by Human
Rights Watch (ibid., 72) demonstrates that 9.2% of all convicted Uyghur prisoners in 2001 were
imprisoned for having committed “state security crimes”.
We can draw parallels between the anti-separatist campaigns in the 1990s and the
abovementioned counter-terrorism measures right after 9/11, where the latter had an
internationally recognized focus, namely the ‘terrorism’ element, which in turn contributed to a
more repressive approach toward oppressing the whole Uyghur population; to an outsider a course
of action justified and to the Chinese regime a repressive policy streamlined with the help of the
“Global War on Terror” campaign/narrative. The persecution of Uyghurs would continue with
accrued intensity in the following years.
In January 2002 the Chinese regime’s ideology alignment campaigns extended to apply to
Uyghur cultural sphere, which includes artists, writers, poets, historians, etc., where “all who
openly advocate separatism using the name of art” would be prosecuted, said the region’s chairman
(HRW 2002, 11; Amnesty International 2002, 24-25).
It was reported (RFA 2002) that in June 2002, the Chinese regime executed a large-scale book
burning in Kashgar, where thousands of books were destroyed, including about 128 copies of A
Brief History of the Huns and Ancient Literature and 32320 copies of Ancient Uyghur
Craftsmanshipan. The latter documented, among other things, age-old techniques and methods of carpet-making, silk-weaving, papermaking, and carpentry. This was decidedly an affront to the
Uyghur culture, a part of the state-sponsored Uyghur culture obliteration program. This public book
burning was hardly an isolated incident, there had been many campaigns to “wipe out pornography
and strike at political publications” (扫黄击政 sǎohuáng jīzhèng), including public burning of
“illegal” unsanctioned literary, historical, and religious publications. The authorities can openly
obliterate Uyghur literary and cultural works by simply claiming that they are just enforcing the law
(Becquelin 2004a, 45).
The Chinese regime continued its efforts to garner international approval and support in its
second official December 2003 document entitled “East Turkistan terrorist groups and individuals”,
legitimizing yet again its repressive policies in East Turkistan. The document, essentially a rehash of
the first official document that was released in January 2002, suggests that Uyghur opposition of all
sort is linked to international radical Islamic terrorism.
In 2002 and 2003 the Chinese state intensified its ‘Strike Hard’ campaign with ‘Strike Hard,
High Pressure’ campaign, in an effort to fight against the purported “three forces” — separatism,
terrorism, religious extremism. According to official media accounts in January 2004, many
“terrorists” and “separatists” were arrested in the past 12 months, while revealing no accounts of
any trials. In September 2004 the Communist Party head in East Turkistan Wang Lequan revealed
that in the first eight months of 2004 authorities accused 22 groups and individuals of committing
alleged crimes of “terrorism” and “separatism” (HRW 2005, 69).
Source: “The persecution of Uyghurs in East Turkistan” Authors: Erkin Kâinat; Adrian Zenz; Adiljan Abdurihim
Link: https://www.utjd.org/register/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/the_persecution_of_uyghurs_hard_copy.pdf
